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This is the second revision of the original Search and Seizure
Survey by Justice Robert F. Utter, Washington State Supreme Court
(retired), published in the University of Puget Sound Law Review,
volume 9, number 1 (Fall 1985). That work was the culmination of
Justice Utter's efforts, as well as the efforts of his successive law clerks,
legal externs, and the members of the University of Puget Sound Law
Review. The original Survey was intended to serve as a source to
which the Washington lawyer, judge, or law enforcement officer could
turn to as an authoritative common starting point for researching the
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Washington law of search and seizure. Three years after the original
publication, this Survey was updated in the University of Puget Sound
Law Review, volume 11, number 3 (Spring 1988).
Continual revision of the law and new cases interpreting the
Washington State Constitution and the United States Constitution
have made an update imperative once again. The Seattle University
Law Review is pleased to have Justice Charles W. Johnson continue
these efforts in this 1998 edition. Justice Johnson and the Seattle
University Law Review have endeavored to update the case comments
and statutory references, which are current through July 1998. In
addition, all references to WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987) have been
updated to the third edition, published in 1996.
Many of these changes involve the Washington State Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Washington Constitution. Also, as the
United States Supreme Court has continued to examine Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, its decisions and their
reflection on Washington law are also discussed.
Article I, section 7 is the state constitutional search and seizure
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that "no
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law." The Washington State Supreme Court has
continued to apply the analytical framework adopted in State v.
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986) in its
case-by-case determination of the scope of protection afforded under
article I, section 7 and in which situations greater protection exists
under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.
Gunwall adopted six neutral criteria: (1) the textual language of
the state constitution; (2) the significant differences in the texts of
parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) the state
constitutional and common law history; (4) the preexisting state law;
(5) the differences in structure between the federal and state constitu-
tions; and (6) the matters of particular state interest or local concern.
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 811. Two years after
Gunwall, the Washington State Supreme Court made the Gunwall
analysis mandatory in cases arguing that the state constitution provides
greater protection than the federal constitution. State v. Wethered, 110
Wash. 2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797, 800-01 (1988) (holding that a
party's failure to address the Gunwall criteria would result in the
court's refusal to consider the matter on the ground that it was
insufficiently argued).
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The analytical framework developed in Gunwall provides the
structure from which the Washington State Supreme Court will
continue to define the scope of article I, section 7. The court has
recognized that article I, section 7 can provide greater protection of
individual rights than those established under the Fourth Amendment.
This Survey, as did the previous Surveys, summarizes the
predominant treatment of search and seizure issues under the Fourth
Amendment and under article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution to the extent that this state's provision is interpreted
differently from the federal provision. The Survey focuses primarily
on substantive search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits
discussion of many procedural issues.
CHAPTER 1: TRIGGERING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7: DEFINING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) "What is a search?";
(2) "What is a seizure of the person?"; and (3) "What is a seizure of
property?"
These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or
seizure problem. Unless a true search or seizure has occurred within
the meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional
protections are not triggered. This chapter will first discuss when a
search has occurred, be it in the form of entry into a home or the
taking of a blood sample. The chapter will then discuss when a seizure
of the person has occurred, be it an arrest or investigatory stop. The
chapter will conclude with a discussion of when, for constitutional
purposes, personal property has been seized.
1.0 Defining "Search" pre-Katz: "Constitutionally
Protected Areas"
Prior to 1967, the United States Supreme Court defined the
applicability of Fourth Amendment protections in terms of "constitu-
tionally protected areas." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-59, 87
S. Ct. 1873, 1882-83, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 1051-52 (1967); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 1388, 10 L. Ed.
2d 462, 470 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12,
81 S. Ct. 679, 682-83, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 738-39 (1961). The Fourth
Amendment guarantees apply only to those searches that intrude into
one of the "protected areas" enumerated within the Fourth Amend-
ment: "persons" (including the bodies and clothing of individuals);
"houses" (including apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices,
stores, and warehouses); "papers" (such as letters); and "effects" (such
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as automobiles). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(a), at
375-81 (3d ed. 1996); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct.
507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
In Katz, the United States Supreme Court rejected the rigid
"constitutionally protected area" test:
The correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally
protected area." ... [T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.. . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-52, 88 S. Ct. at 510-11, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82.
Katz thus defined the scope of search protections as the individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy." The nature of this new test and
the degree of continued vitality of the old "constitutionally protected
area" test will be examined in the following sections. See 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1, at 375-94.
1.1 Defining "Search" post-Katz: The "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy"
In a concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to be
accepted as the Katz test, Justice Harlan explained that the Katz
holding extends search and seizure protections to all situations in which
a defendant has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 587
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1
(3d ed. 1996). A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a
"twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz, 389
U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S.
Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 36 (1988); State v. Young, 123
Wash. 2d 173, 189, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (1994); State v. Boot, 81 Wash.
App. 546, 550, 915 P.2d 592, 594 (1996).
Although "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, . . . objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention
to keep them to himself has been exhibited." State v. Drumhiller, 36
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Wash. App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631, 633 (1984) (legitimate expectation
of privacy means more than subjective expectation of not being
discovered; defendants' claimed privacy expectation in home was not
reasonable when defendants positioned themselves in front of a picture
window with the lights on and drapes open). See also State v. Rose,
128 Wash. 2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (where the "open
view" doctrine is satisfied, the object under observation is not subject
to any reasonable expectation of privacy; no violation was found where
the officer looked through an unobstructed window of the defendant's
mobile home with the aid of a flashlight). See infra section 5.6 for a
discussion of the plain view doctrine.
The expectation of privacy must also be one "which the law
recognizes as 'legitimate."' Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44
n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401-02 n.12
(1978).
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season
may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy,
but it is not one which the law recognizes as "legitimate." ...
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts
of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.
Id. See also State v. Clark, 129 Wash. 2d 211, 221, 916 P.2d 384, 390
(1996) (no expectation of privacy that a buyer would not record the
conversation of drug transaction; "one who unwittingly speaks to an
undercover agent necessarily risks the listener's trustworthiness"). See
generally United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751, 91 S. Ct. 1122,
1126, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453, 458 (1971); State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d
229, 232, 830 P.2d 658, 660 (1992) (no expectation of privacy where
illegal business is openly conducted).
Consequently, when a police investigative device is capable of
detecting only the presence of unlawful articles, the use of the device
does not constitute a search. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707,
103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121 (1983) (a canine sniff
of luggage is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment because it reveals only whether or not contraband is present).
Washington has not adopted the federal Supreme Court's blanket
holding that dog sniffs are not searches; however, Washington law does
require an examination of the circumstances of the sniff. State v.
Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 727, 723 P.2d 28, 30 (1986) (dog sniff of
safety deposit box at a bank is not a search); see also State v. Young,
123 Wash. 2d 173, 188, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (1994); State v. Stanphill,
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53 Wash. App. 623, 631, 769 P.2d 861, 865 (1989) (dog sniff of
package at post office is not a search); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash.
App. 813, 818, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979) (dog sniff of parcel in bus
terminal is not a search). Nevertheless, the court envisions few
situations where a canine sniff of an object would constitute a search.
Boyce, 44 Wash. App. at 730, 723 P.2d at 31. "As long as the canine
sniffs the object from an area where the defendant does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and the canine sniff itself is
minimally intrusive, then no search has occurred." Id.
Similarly, unlawful activity in a public toilet stall carries no
legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583,
590, 740 P.2d 863, 868 (1987) (a police officer's glance over the
defendant's shoulder while standing over an open toilet in a public
restroom was not a violation of the defendant's privacy rights).
In addition, there is no right of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 7 of the state constitution where one
party consents to recording a conversation. United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 744, 99 S. Ct. 1465, 1467, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 738 (1979);
State v. Clark, 129 Wash. 2d 211, 221, 916 P.2d 384, 390 (1996);
State v. Pulido, 68 Wash. App. 59, 63, 841 P.2d 1251, 1253 (1992)
(quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 829 P.2d 1068
(1992)). A defendant who utilized a telephone answering service
whereby both he and the caller were aware that a third party was
taking messages had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
message records and, thus, no search occurred when the records were
subpoenaed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577,
2580, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226 (1979).
1.2 Defining "Search" post-Katz: Continuing Vitality of
"Constitutionally Protected Areas"
Although the concept of "constitutionally protected areas" does
not "serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment
problem," the concept retains considerable authority. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 n.9, 19 L. Ed. 2d
576, 582 n.9 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has referred
to "constitutionally protected areas" since Katz and has given special
deference to the areas specifically enumerated within the Fourth
Amendment. For example, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home, absent exigent circumstances, to effect a routine felony arrest.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1375, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 639, 644 (1980).
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The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a
variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their...
houses . . . shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. That
language unequivocally establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very
core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable Government
intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct.
679, 683, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 739 (1961). In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Id. See also State
v. White, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 111, 915 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1996) (the
sanctity of the home does not extend to a public toilet stall); State v.
Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 184, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (1994) (the use of
an infrared thermal detection device to perform warrantless, infrared
surveillance violated the state constitution's protection of one's
"home"); State v. Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460, 466
(1993) (the state constitution prohibits police officers from arresting a
suspect without a warrant while the suspect is standing within the
doorway of a residence); State v. Weller, 76 Wash. App. 165, 167, 884
P.2d 610, 612 (1994) (the defendant's porch was not a constitutionally
protected area). Houses, then, are "constitutionally protected areas"
because, as under the pre-Katz analysis, "houses" are specifically
enumerated within the Fourth Amendment. "While the Fourth
Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's
home," this prohibition does not apply where the police obtain
voluntary consent, either from the individual whose property is
searched, or from a third person who possesses common authority over
the premises. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793,
2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 156 (1990). Under the Fourth Amendment,
the police may reasonably rely on the apparent authority of the person
consenting to the entry. Id. But see State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d
735, 738, 782 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1989) (establishing that implied
consent by a third party is ineffective where a suspect is present and
objecting to the search).
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1.3 Specific Applications of post-Katz Analysis
1.3(a) Residential Premises
As described above, an individual has a privacy interest in the
interior of his or her home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 652-53 (1980);
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.3(b), at 474 (3d ed. 1996). A search of a
home can occur even when government officers do not themselves
enter the home. If the officers are able to monitor persons, objects, or
activities within the home that would not be observable under ordinary
circumstances, a search has occurred. See United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302-03, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 541
(1984) (a search occurs, triggering the Fourth Amendment, when the
government monitors an electronic device to determine whether a
particular article or person is in an individual's home at a particular
time); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158, 84 S. Ct. 1186, 1186, 12
L. Ed. 2d 213, 213 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Fourth
Amendment is implicated when a microphone used by police officers
"penetrate[s]" the petitioner's premises in a manner sufficient to
constitute trespass); State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d
593, 599 (1994) (infrared surveillance of home was a search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but
extends to other types of residences. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861 (1964) (hotel
rooms); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1308
(1974) (apartments); State v. Davis, 86 Wash. App. 414, 937 P.2d
1110 (1997), review denied, 133 Wash. 2d 1028 (1997) (motel rooms).
There is a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles that are
readily mobile but can also be used for sleeping. California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412
(1985) (mobile motor home). See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d
239, 427 P.2d 705 (1967). In addition, there is a reduced privacy
interest when several persons or families occupy premises in common
rather than individually, e.g., tenants sharing common living quarters
but separate bedrooms. State v. Alexander, 41 Wash. App. 152, 155-
56, 704 P.2d 618, 620 (1985) (community living rule). Note that the
expectation of privacy in residential premises may persist even when
a home is fire-damaged and arson is suspected. Michigan v. Clifford,
464 U.S. 287, 292, 104 S. Ct. 641, 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483 (1984).
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
A person may relinquish the privacy interest in an activity or
object in the home by making the activity or object observable to
persons outside. State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592, 595, 675
P.2d 631, 632 (1984) (defendants had no reasonable privacy interest in
activity in their home when they positioned themselves in front of
picture window with lights on and drapes open). However, a person
does not relinquish his or her privacy interest in the home by opening
the door in response to a police officer's knock. State v. Holeman, 103
Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985). See also State v. Ferrier,
136 Wash. 2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). Furthermore, persons may
waive their right to privacy by willingly admitting a visitor, e.g., an
undercover police officer, into the premises to conduct an illegal
transaction. State v. Carter, 127 Wash. 2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d 290,
296 (1995) (defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly
admitting a stranger into motel room to conduct a drug transaction);
State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. App. 279, 284-85, 716 P.2d 940, 944 (1986)
(student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an illegal
drug transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive since police
were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken
by a willing purchaser).
A person using his home telephone has no Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the phone numbers dialed, Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745-46, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230 (1979),
nor is there a privacy interest in the contents of a phone call when a
recording machine's speaker makes incoming calls audible to anyone
present in the room. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011
(9th Cir. 1983).
The Washington Constitution, however, provides broader
protection to a telephone user's privacy interests. State v. Gunwall,
106 Wash. 2d 54, 69, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (1986) (specifically overruling
Bixler v. Hille, 80 Wash. 2d 668, 497 P.2d 594 (1972) and declining
to follow Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed.
2d 220 (1979)). The Gunwall court found that a home telephone
customer's privacy rights under article I, section 7 were violated when
the police, without valid legal process, obtained by means of pen
register or other device, a record of the local and long distance
telephone numbers dialed on the customer's telephone. Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d at 68-69, 720 P.2d at 816. A pen register is a device that
records or decodes electronic or other impulses that identify the
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which
such device is attached, except for devices used by a provider or
customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, etc.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (1998). The court also considered whether the
police may obtain telephone toll records. The court held that toll
records could only be secured under "authority of law," which includes
legal process such as a search warrant or subpoena. Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d at 69, 720 P.2d at 816.
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not
protected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248 (3d
Cir. 1992); 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b), at 488-89.
When the building is secure and not accessible to the public, the
courts are split. Compare People v. Beachman, 296 N.W.2d 305, 308
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (Fourth Amendment protections extend to the
lobby of a locked residential hotel) with United States v. Nohara, 3
F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (apartment dweller of "high security"
apartment building has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
common areas of the building; search is valid even though officer
trespassed). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b).
Finally, the privacy interest in one's home extends to situations in
which the occupant is not a criminal suspect. The Fourth Amendment
is triggered when an officer enters a person's home to search for
someone who does not live there. See Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 213-14, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 46 (1981).
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment is triggered when a housing
inspector enters to conduct an administrative search. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730-31, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 930, 935 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready, 131 Wash. 2d
266, 270, 931 P.2d 156, 158 (1997).
1.3(b) Related Structures: The Curtilage
The "curtilage" of residential premises consists of "all buildings
in close proximity to a dwelling which are continually used for carrying
on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient
to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes." United
States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). Prior to Katz, the
curtilage served as the controlling standard of an individual's privacy
interest: structures within the curtilage were protected and structures
outside the curtilage were not. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 2.3(d), at 493-94. In the aftermath of Katz, the curtilage has been
considered "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80
L. Ed. 2d 214, 225 (1984).
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The Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be
reviewed in determining the extent of a residence's curtilage:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139, 94
L. Ed. 2d 326, 334-35 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to
adopt a "bright-line" rule that the curtilage extend no further than the
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house. Rather, a court is to use the
factors identified above as a tool in determining whether the area in
question is so intimately tied to the home as to fall within "the home's
'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct.
at 1140, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335.
There is no greater expectation of privacy in structures located
and viewed from outside the curtilage, however, than those viewed
from a public place. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304, 107 S. Ct. at 1141, 94 L.
Ed. 2d at 337. In Dunn, the Court held that police officers standing
in an open field could look into the defendant's barn, even if the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. See also
1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(d), at 496.
Washington courts have not recognized a privacy interest in those
areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to the public. See State
v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (officer
entitled to walk up a porch which was the usual access route to the
house); see also State v. Chaussee, 72 Wash. App. 704, 709-10, 866
P.2d 643, 647 (1994) (no expectation of privacy in common access road
leading to defendant's residence). The court will, however, consider
a combination of factors when analyzing the admissibility of evidence,
including whether police officers have done the following: (1) spied
into the residence; (2) acted secretly; (3) acted after dark; (4) used the
most direct access route; (5) tried to contact the resident; (6) created an
artificial vantage point; or (7) made the discovery accidentally. State
v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 403, 909 P.2d 280, 288 (1996); State v.
Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 905, 632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981). See also State
v. Niedergang, 43 Wash. App. 656, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked
in cul-de-sac not within curtilage).
1.3(c) Adjoining Lands and "Open Fields"
Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling fall within the privacy
protection surrounding the residence. "The protection afforded by the
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
Fourth Amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has never been
restricted to the interior of the house, but has been extended to open
areas immediately adjacent thereto." Wattenburg v. United States, 388
F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of privacy
extends to backyard of lodge). See also Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224 (1984)
(individual may have legitimate expectation of privacy in "area
immediately surrounding the home"). The applicability of federal
search and seizure protections to areas immediately surrounding the
home is determined by the Katz test of reasonable expectation of
privacy. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(f), at 504-05.
Adjoining lands that are used as normal access routes by the
general public are only "semi-private" and therefore do not always
enjoy Fourth Amendment protections. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16, 40
L. Ed. 2d 607, 611 (1974); United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169,
1171 (9th Cir. 1975). Thus, Fourth Amendment protections will not
apply to a police investigation that is restricted to places where visitors
could be expected to go. State v. Gave, 77 Wash. App. 333, 337, 890
P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995) (driveway, walkway, or access routes leading
to residence or to porch of residence are all areas of "curtilage"
impliedly open to the public). See also State v. Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d
688, 698-99, 861 P.2d 460, 465 (1993) (unenclosed front porch held to
be a public place, not a constitutionally protected area); State v.
Graffius, 74 Wash. App. 23, 24, 871 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1994) (driveway
commonly used for guests and members of the public); State v.
Coburne, 10 Wash. App. 298, 314, 518 P.2d 747, 757 (1973) (apart-
ment building common parking lot).
On the other hand, when the police enter onto adjoining lands
that are not used as an access area by the general public, the Fourth
Amendment guarantees do apply. See, e.g., State v. Mierz, 72 Wash.
App. 783, 791, 866 P.2d 65, 70-71 (1994), aff'd, 127 Wash. 2d 460,
901 P.2d 286 (1995) (warrantless intrusion into a backyard which was
enclosed by a six-foot fence and gate secured by padlock violated
Fourth Amendment); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (Sth Cir.
1974) (backyard behind a four-unit apartment building, which is not
used as a common passageway by tenants, is protected); Norman v.
State, 216 S.E.2d 644, 645 (Ga. App. 1975) (truck located under trees
in a small meadow behind a house that was not on a farm access route
was considered within curtilage). But see State v. Niedergang, 43
Wash. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576, 579 (1986) (car parked in
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common area near suspect's dwelling was not considered within
curtilage).
Under the old "constitutionally protected areas" analysis, the
privacy protections did not apply to "open fields." Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S. Ct. 445, 446, 68 L. Ed. 898, 900 (1924).
Consequently, a defendant could not invoke constitutional privacy
protections with respect to police intrusions onto open fields, wooded
areas, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs, or open
waters. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a), at 522-23.
The "open fields" doctrine has been reaffirmed under the Katz
analysis on the grounds that an expectation of privacy in open fields is
unreasonable. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed.
2d at 224 ("[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance."). Moreover, a person in possession of
land falling within the purview of the open fields doctrine cannot create
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area by taking steps to
conceal activities such as posting "no trespassing" signs or erecting
fences around the secluded areas. Id. at 182, 104 S. Ct. at 1743, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 227 (issue is whether "government's intrusion infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment");
State v. Hornback, 73 Wash. App. 738, 744, 871 P.2d 1075, 1078
(1994) ("no trespassing" sign is not dispositive of homeowner's
reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of Fourth Amendment).
Even land within the curtilage may only be protected from certain
types of surveillance. Thus, aerial surveillance is not precluded merely
because precautions have been taken against ground surveillance.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 210, 217 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a
fenced backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment; officer's
observations were merely from a public vantage point). See also
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 102 L. Ed.
2d 835, 842 (1989) (surveillance of a residential backyard by a
helicopter is not a "search" requiring warrant under Fourth Amend-
ment). If highly sophisticated equipment is used in conducting the
aerial surveillance, however, the Fourth Amendment may be implicat-
ed. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. Ct.
1819, 1826, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 238 (1986).
In addition, the fact that police commit a common law trespass
while observing an object or activity in open fields does not render the
intrusion a search under the federal Constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at
183, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 224-25. Thus, an intrusion
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may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance and still not
be considered a search. Id. at 177, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d
at 224-25.
Under the Washington Constitution, aerial surveillance at certain
altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does not constitute a
search. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81, 87 (1985)
(aerial surveillance of defendant's property at an altitude of 3400 feet
without the aid of visual enhancement devices does not constitute a
search, even though surveillance was conducted with the aim of
discovering marijuana plants); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 514,
688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984) (observation of defendant's marijuana plants
at an altitude of 1500 feet with the unaided eye was not a search).
The relevant inquiry under article I, section 7, however, is not
whether the observed object was in a "protected place" or whether the
defendant had a legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the
observed location; rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether "the State
unreasonably intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs."' Myrick,
102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 1205. See also State v. Cockerell,
102 Wash. 2d 561, 566, 689 P.2d 32, 36-37 (1984) (holding that while
an aerial surveillance at the altitude of 800 feet was acceptable, a
second plane which flew within 200 feet altitude was an "unreasonable
intrusive overflight"). The nature of the property may also be a factor
in determining what constitutes "private affairs," but the fact that the
location of the search is an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102
Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has suggested that
even when an individual has no subjective expectation of privacy, an
intrusion may nevertheless constitute a search. "[M]erely because it is
generally known that the technology exists to enable police to view
private activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point, it does
not follow that these activities are without protection." Id. The focus
is on "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a
warrant." Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. See State v. Cord, 103 Wash.
2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81, 84 (1985); State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d
898, 903, 632 P.2d 44, 47 (1981). Note that in both Cord and Myrick
the police used no visual enhancement devices; in addition, their
vantage points for observing the contraband were lawful. Cord, 103
Wash. 2d at 365, 693 P.2d at 84; Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 514, 688
P.2d at 155. Cf. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 227 (police committed common law trespass to view
defendant's property). For a general discussion of aerial surveillance,
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see Bradley W. Foster, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Right
to Privacy: The Flight of the Fourth Amendment, 56 J. AIR LAW &
COM. 719 (1991); 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7 at 617.
Although article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution
generally provides greater protection against governmental intrusion
than the Fourth Amendment, it will not protect against a lawful
intrusion into an open field that was not posted by the owners. State
v. Hanson, 42 Wash. App. 755, 762, 714 P.2d 309, 314, aff'd, 107
Wash. 2d 331, 728 P.2d 593 (1986) (search warrant for marijuana
fields obtained by use of photos and testimony of officer taken from a
"plain view" vantage point was sufficient). Similarly, "storage areas"
that are visible to the naked eye will not be protected by either state or
federal provisions against search and seizure. State v. Jeffries, 105
Wash. 2d 398, 413-14, 717 P.2d 722, 731 (1986); United States v.
Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1972) (police search of boxes
hidden in trees covered with underbrush; defendant could not
reasonably expect to keep anybody who discovered boxes from looking
in them).
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most
business and commercial premises. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 235
(1986); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816,
1819, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 310 (1978) (OSHA inspector's entry into the
nonpublic working areas of electrical and plumbing business constitut-
ed a search); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S. Ct. 2120,
2124, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154, 1159 (1968) (union official has reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her office, even when it is shared with
other union officials). See also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46, 87
S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 947-48 (1967) (absent consent
or emergency, administrative inspectors ordinarily must obtain special
administrative warrants in order to conduct routine inspections of
commercial buildings for possible health and safety violations). Unlike
private homes, however, the legislature may authorize warrantless
administrative searches of commercial property without violating the
Fourth Amendment. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702, 107 S.
Ct. 2636, 2644, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 614 (1987). If the legislative
authorization does not contain rules governing the procedure the
inspectors must follow, however, then general Fourth Amendment
restrictions will apply. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599, 101 S.
Ct. 2534, 2538, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 269 (1981). One of the factors
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considered in determining whether warrantless administrative inspec-
tions are allowed is whether a business has been historically extensively
regulated (such as businesses dealing with liquor and firearms).
Burger, 482 U.S. at 707, 107 S. Ct. at 2646, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 617
(automobile junkyards have historically been regulated); Barlow's, 436
U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 1821, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 312.
The nature of the place as either a personal residence or business
may also affect the determination of whether an area is curtilage or an
open field. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229, 106 S. Ct. at 1827, 90
L. Ed. 2d at 238. If portions of business and commercial premises are
open to the public for inspection of wares, they are not considered
private. "[A]s an ordinary matter law enforcement officials may accept
a general public invitation to enter commercial premises for purposes
not related to the trade conducted thereupon . . . ." United States v.
Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975). Thus, the warrantless entry
into the public lobby of a motel or restaurant for the purpose of
serving an administrative subpoena is permitted although the "adminis-
trative subpoena itself [does] not authorize either entry or inspection
of [the] premises . . . ." Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408,
413, 104 S. Ct. 769, 772-73, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567, 572 (1984) (an
employer may not insist on a judicial warrant as a condition precedent
to a valid administrative subpoena unless government inspectors seek
nonconsensual entry into an "area not open to the public").
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as
furniture stores and variety stores. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 2.4(b), at 531-32. But "[t]he 'implied invitation for customers to
come in' . extends only to those times when the premises are in fact
'open to the public'; the mere fact that certain premises are open to the
public at certain times does not justify entry by the police on other
occasions." Id.
Although a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in commercial
premises, the warrant requirements for administrative searches of
commercial premises may differ from those for searches in general. See
infra § 6.4(b); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(b), at
531.
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply to
automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412 (1985).
"[A]utombiles are 'effects' under the Fourth Amendment, and searches
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and seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to the constitutional
standard of reasonableness." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 548 (1977).
At the same time, the pervasive regulation of automobiles may
dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to
other property. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 386, 105 S. Ct. at 2069, 85 L.
Ed. 2d at 414. Thus, a person does not have as great an expectation
of privacy in a vehicle as in a home. Id. Even so, "[a] citizen does not
surrender all of the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering
an automobile." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S. Ct.
960, 965, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81, 89 (1986). Note, however, that when a
vehicle is used as a home, its owner has a lesser expectation of privacy
if the vehicle is readily mobile and licensed to operate on public streets.
Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S. Ct. at 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 414
(mobile home in public lot was treated as a vehicle). Cf. State v.
Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293, 303 (1996) (lessened
privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig).
The lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not automati-
cally extend to closed containers within the vehicle. Chadwick, 433
U.S. at 13, 97 S. Ct. at 2484, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549. On the other hand,
when an electronic beeper is placed within a container and officers use
a radio transmitter to monitor the container's movement, no reasonable
expectation of privacy is invaded to the extent that the container is
transported in a vehicle on public roads. United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 62 (1983). Cf.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L.
Ed. 2d. 530, 543 (1984) (monitoring electronic beeper while object
containing beeper is inside a home violates privacy interest in the
home). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.5(a)-(d),
at 549-67. For a detailed discussion of the search of closed containers
found in automobiles, see infra § 5.22.
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.
This section examines the question of how that right protects the
search or seizure of personal characteristics, such as fingerprints and
blood samples.
Personal characteristics such as facial features and voice tone,
which are continually exposed to the public, generally are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment because an individual has no reasonable
expectation that these characteristics will remain private.
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In Katz v. United States, ". . . [the court] said that the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection for what 'a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office ... ' The
physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly
exposed to the public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or
handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No
person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know
the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably expect that
his face will be a mystery to the world."
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 771, 35 L. Ed.
2d 67, 79 (1973) (subpoena of voice exemplars does not infringe on
protected Fourth Amendment interests). The Court reached the same
result in United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 776,
35 L. Ed. 2d 99, 103 (1973), where the witness was required to furnish
handwriting exemplars. Likening a person's voice to a person's facial
characteristics, the Court held "[h]andwriting, like speech, is repeatedly
shown to the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the tone of
his voice." Id. See also Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wash. 2d 500, 512,
772 P.2d 486, 492 (1989) (shelter program which required indigent
alcoholics and drug addicts to move into designated shelters in order
to receive benefits did not violate the right to privacy); State v.
Selvidge, 30 Wash. App. 406, 411, 635 P.2d 736, 740 (1981) (defen-
dants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the soles of their
shoes, thus police officer's observation of the soles of the defendant's
shoes was not a search under the Fourth Amendment).
In contrast to the seizure of voice exemplars and facial characteris-
tics, the taking of a blood sample is considered a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 918 (1966). The
police have probable cause to believe that a person's blood sample will
provide evidence of criminal activity justifying the seizure if the facts
and circumstances known to the officers justify their belief that the
person is intoxicated and has committed a crime of which intoxication
is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 184, 804 P.2d 558,
564 (1991), abrogated by State v. Berlin, 133 Wash. 2d 541, 947 P.2d
700 (1997); State v. Schulze, 116 Wash. 2d 154, 161, 804 P.2d 566,
570 (1991) (no right to counsel prior to undergoing a mandatory blood
draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025, 1031
(1985).
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Washington has also upheld mandatory blood tests of putative
fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795,
798 (1980), and mandatory HIV and DNA tests of convicted sexual
offenders, see State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525, 548, 852 P.2d
1064, 1076 (1993) (mandatory HIV testing of sexual offenders presents
minimal Fourth Amendment intrusion for which the State's reasons are
compelling); State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 92, 856 P.2d 1076,
1086 (1993) (statute requiring mandatory DNA tests of convicted
sexual offenders in order to establish a DNA databank is constitution-
ally permissible). The constitutional right to privacy does not apply
to a private employer that terminates an at-will employee for refusing
to take a drug test. Roe v. Quality Transportation, 67 Wash. App. 604,
608, 838 P.2d 128, 131 (1992).
Constitutional protections have also been applied when officers
take scrapings from an individual's fingernails, Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 295, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2003, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 905 (1973), or
take an individual's fingerprints, Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814,
105 S. Ct. 1643, 1648, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709 (1985). The line drawn
between facial characteristics and voice exemplars, on the one hand,
and blood samples or fingernail scrapings, on the other, may be
explained by the fact that the evidentiary value of the former is
immediately perceivable. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(a),
at 571-73.
Although drawing blood constitutes a seizure, the defendant may
unknowingly consent. For example, a person who drives an automo-
bile may give implied consent to the administration of blood tests in
certain circumstances. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (1987). See
State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 712, 675 P.2d 219, 223 (1984)
(driver gives implied consent to blood testing when arrested for
negligent homicide or when unconscious while being arrested for
driving while intoxicated).
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in
"papers . . . and effects . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although
litigation concerning the search, seizure, and use of the content of
private papers frequently centers on the Fifth Amendment bar against
self-incrimination, see, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473,
96 S. Ct. 2737, 2745, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638 (1976); United States v.
Howell, 466 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Or. 1979), the Fourth Amendment
can act as an additional bar because of the protection accorded
"papers" and "effects." LaFave and other commentators have argued
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that even when the seizure and use of private papers is consistent with
the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment poses an absolute bar
against the use of the highly private content of such papers. 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(e), at 608-17. But see State v.
Farmer, 80 Wash. App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1996) (no
right of privacy in bank account for a person who writes or passes bad
checks); Peters v. Sjoholm, 95 Wash. 2d 871, 876, 631 P.2d 937, 940
(1982) (no need for search and seizure warrant where the seizing
agency has probable cause to believe bank fund belongs to the relevant
taxpayer); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 96 S. Ct. 1619,
1623, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 77 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank records, checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to
bank accounts); Dep't of Revenue v. March, 25 Wash. App. 314, 320,
610 P.2d 916, 920 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in tax records
from legitimate inquiry by tax authorities).
A reasonable expectation of privacy does not continue in personal
effects if the individual's relinquishment of the effects occurred under
circumstances indicating that the individual retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the invaded place. State v. Nettles, 70 Wash.
App. 706, 708, 855 P.2d 699, 700 (1993) (police may properly seize
property discarded by suspects prior to police seizure); State v.
Putnam, 61 Wash. App. 450, 456, 810 P.2d 977, 980 (1991), modified
and superseded on reconsideration, 65 Wash. App. 606, 829 P.2d 787
(1992) (no legitimate expectation of privacy where property was owned
by third party and the item had been abandoned); State v. Toney, 60
Wash. App. 804, 808, 810 P.2d 929, 930 (1991) (object discarded by
suspect who is not in police custody is considered abandoned property
and may be seized by police); State v. Whitaker, 58 Wash. App. 851,
853, 795 P.2d 182, 183 (1990) (police may retrieve voluntarily
abandoned property unless abandonment was result of unlawful police
conduct). While an individual has an expectation of privacy in the
contents of a zipped purse inadvertently left in a store, a police search
for identification was justified after learning that the purse contained
drugs. State v. Kealey, 80 Wash. App. 162, 173, 907 P.2d 319, 323
(1995).
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the holding in California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630, 100 L. Ed. 2d
30, 38 (1988), finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
left at curb for collection. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578,
800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990). But see State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wash.
App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636, 642 (1992) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy in stolen goods hidden in a community garbage receptacle);
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State v. Graffius, 74 Wash. App. 23, 31, 871 P.2d 1115, 1120 (1994)
(no privacy right in garbage can left partially open and exposing
contraband to view).
A reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the contents of first-
class mail and of sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 114, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984); State v.
Jackson, 82 Wash. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945, 950 (1996), review
denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1006 (1997) (seizure of mail occurs when a
package is detained or removed from the normal flow of delivery;
though temporary seizure is justified if authorities have a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bishop, 43
Wash. App. 17, 18, 714 P.2d 1199, 1199 (1986). Senders of mail,
however, have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to their names
and addresses on the mail and to the surrounding area of the package
from a canine sniff. State v. Stanphill, 53 Wash. App. 623, 627, 769
P.2d 861, 863 (1989) (release of information at request of police
regarding arrival of package did not unreasonably intrude into private
affairs). Senders of parcels by common carriers have only a limited
expectation of privacy; common carriers have the right to search parcels
if they have reason to believe that they contain contraband. State v.
Gross, 57 Wash. App. 549, 551, 789 P.2d 317, 319 (1990); State v.
Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 817, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979). See
infra § 5.31.
Placing a beeper inside an object does not in and of itself
constitute a search. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712, 104 S.
Ct. 3296, 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 539-40 (1984); State v. Young, 123
Wash. 2d 173, 182, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994). Monitoring the beeper
and thereby tracking the object may constitute a search of the location
but not of the object. Id. at 722, 104 S. Ct. at 3307, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
549 (tracking of either container into home infringes on privacy interest
in home); cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S. Ct. 1081,
75 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1983) (monitoring beeper in chloroform container
invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy because monitoring
occurred only while container was taken from store and transported in
automobile on public highways and did not occur when container was
moved into a residence); Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181, 867 P.2d at 597.
See also supra § 1.3(e).
1.3(h) Special Environments: Prisons, Schools, and Borders
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in
their cells and effects as citizens generally enjoy in their homes and
effects. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3202,
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82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 405 (1984). Routine searches of inmates' cells are
reasonable because security interests of the institution outweigh the
minimal intrusion into inmates' privacy. State v. Brown, 33 Wash.
App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (reasonableness of an inmate
search must be determined by balancing the need for particular search
against the invasion of personal rights; the strip search of an inmate
after a visit with his wife during which there was considerable contact
was reasonable); State v. Justice, 29 Wash. App. 460, 460, 629 P.2d
454, 454 (1981). Probationers and parolees have a limited expectation
of privacy, permitting a search if reasonable. State v. Lucas, 56 Wash.
App. 236, 240, 783 P.2d 121, 124 (1989); see also In re A, B, C, D,
E, 121 Wash. 2d 80, 92, 847 P.2d 455, 460 (1993) (mandatory HIV
testing of sexual offenders does not violate the right to privacy). See
infra §§ 6.0, 6.2.
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the
border into the United States under 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (1994). United
States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless,
the statute does not obviate the requirement that a particular search or
seizure be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
See Almeida-Sanez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535,
2539, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 602 (1973) (although a statute authorizes
customs searches without probable cause or mere suspicion, no act of
Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution). Customs
officers may not conduct warrantless searches based on less than
probable cause at locations other than an actual border. State v. Quick,
59 Wash. App. 228, 233, 796 P.2d 764, 767 (1990). See infra §§ 6.0,
6.3.
Federal and state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures also applies to school officials acting under the
authority of state. State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 822-23, 787
P.2d 932, 933 (1990) (warrantless search of high school student's car
and locked briefcase fell within "school search" exception to warrant
requirement; initial search of locker in response to a tip revealed $200
in small bills but no marijuana). See infra §§ 6.0-6.1.
1.4 Defining Seizures of the Person
A seizure occurs when an officer, by physical force or by show of
authority, restrains an individual's freedom of movement. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980). Yet, a person may be "seized" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment even when an arrest has not occurred. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
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903 (1968); see also State v. Lyons, 85 Wash. App. 268, 270-71, 932
P.2d 188, 189-90 (1997). However, not every encounter with a police
officer will amount to a seizure. State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wash.
App. 452, 455, 711 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1985).
The objective test for seizure states that a seizure occurs when law
enforcement officers give "a show of official authority such that 'a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."'
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L. Ed.
2d 229, 239 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted); see also
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979, 100
L. Ed. 2d 565, 572 (1988) (finding no seizure when police caught up
with and drove alongside a fleeing individual for a short distance
without any show of authority or command to stop); State v. Thorn,
129 Wash. 2d 347, 352, 917 P.2d 108, 112 (1996) (affirming that the
test is whether under a totality of the circumstances a person would
feel free to leave or decline the officer's requests and terminate the
encounter). For example, an officer's request for identification or other
information relating to one's identity is unlikely to be viewed as an
unlawful seizure unless additional circumstances are present. See
I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L. Ed.
2d 247, 255 (1984) (finding no seizure by INS officers even though
agents were stationed at exits); State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wash.
App. 452, 456, 711 P.2d 1096, 1098 (1985) (finding that police acted
properly in stopping defendants and using "permissive" language to
ask if they had come from the area of the reported vandalism). On the
other hand, the fact that a person is unconscious does not mean that
he or she is not seized. See Seattle v. Sage, 11 Wash. App. 481, 484-
85, 523 P.2d 942 (1974). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.1(a) (3d ed. 1996). For a discussion of the level of proof needed to
make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest) and 2.9(b) (Terry
stop).
However, the United States Supreme Court has shifted to a more
subjective test in determining when a seizure has occurred in the
context of a show of authority absent physical force. California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552, 113 L. Ed. 2d
690, 699 (1991). The federal Hodari D. test shifts the focus onto the
particular defendant's actions by requiring that the defendant actually
submit to the show of authority for a seizure to occur. Id. Washing-
ton courts have rejected the Hodari D. test. Instead, Washington has
a strictly objective test to determine whether a person's private affairs
have been disturbed without lawful authority. State v. Young, 135
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Wash. 2d 498, 510, 957 P.2d 681, 687 (1998) (a seizure occurs when
a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not free to leave,
regardless of what the defendant actually believed).
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters
A consensual encounter with an officer does not trigger the Fourth
Amendment, even when the individual has been approached by, and
is aware of the officer's identity as, an officer. Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236 (1983);
see State v. Belanger, 36 Wash. App. 818, 820, 677 P.2d 781, 783
(1984). Factors reviewed by the court in determining whether the
scope of a Terry stop, infra 2.9(b), has been exceeded and whether an
arrest has occurred are the degree to which the physical intrusion
restrains the suspect's liberty, the duration of the detention, and
whether the detention was related to the initial stop. State v. Armenta,
134 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 948 P.2d 1280, 1285 (1997) (engaging in a
conversation in a public place and asking for identification alone was
not sufficient); State v. Rivard, 131 Wash. 2d 63, 75-76, 929 P.2d 413,
419 (1997) (reading of Miranda rights alone was not sufficient). But
see State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069
(1984) (detaining suspect for thirty-five minutes was excessive).
The degree of intrusion must also be appropriate with regard to
the type of crime under investigation and the probable dangerousness
of the suspect. State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d
1005, 1007 (1987). In State v. Williams, the court specifically
overruled State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977), which
held that "[t]he amendment is triggered, however, when an individual
is not free to leave an officer's presence and is aware that his or her
liberty is restrained, even when the officer couches the forcible stop in
terms of a request." Byers, 88 Wash. 2d at 5-6 n.5, 559 P.2d at 1336
n.5. Thus, the Williams court held that neither the Fourth Amend-
ment nor article I, section 7 was implicated by the suspect being
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car due to concerns for police safety.
See Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 148, 689 P.2d at 1069.
The "free to go" standard has not been abandoned under federal
law. Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74, 108 S. Ct. 1975,
1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572 (1988). The United States Supreme
Court has held that questioning by law enforcement officers remains
consensual until a reasonable person would believe that he or she could
not leave the presence of the officers or until he or she refuses to
respond to their inquiries and the police take further action. I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247,
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255 (1984) (finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual
workers when INS agents moved systematically through the factory
inquiring about the workers' citizenship while other INS agents were
stationed at the exits). See generally infra § 5.10 (discussing what
constitutes consent).
Police action does not exceed the proper purpose and scope of a
Terry stop (see supra § 1.4, infra § 2.9(b)) when the purpose of the stop
is directly related to detaining and investigating the defendant in
connection with a robbery. State v. Thornton, 41 Wash. App. 506,
512, 705 P.2d 271, 275 (1985). While an unfounded hunch is
insufficient to justify a stop, the police may reasonably act on an
individualized hunch or on circumstances that appear incriminating to
the officer based on his or her past experience. State v. Samsel, 39
Wash. App. 564, 570-71, 694 P.2d 670, 675 (1985). See generally,
infra § 4.7(a). For post-Terry analysis, see generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c).
1.4(b) Seizures in Vehicles
A seizure of a person in an automobile occurs as soon as an officer
in a police car switches on the flashing light. State v. DeArman, 54
Wash. App. 621, 624, 774 P.2d 1247, 1248 (1989); State v. Owens, 39
Wash. App. 130, 132, 692 P.2d 850, 851 (1984); State v. Stroud, 30
Wash. App. 392, 394-96, 634 P.2d 316, 318 (1981).
A seizure also occurs when an officer stops automobiles pursuant
to a systematic "spot check" for drivers' licenses or vehicle registration,
or for "sobriety checks." Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 457,
755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 437,
706 P.2d 225, 226 (1985). To determine the reasonableness of spot
checks or vehicle checkpoints, the court will weigh the government's
interest in the checkpoints, the extent the program advances the goals,
and the amount of intrusion on the individual motorist. State v.
Williams, 85 Wash. App. 271, 278-79, 932 P.2d 665, 668 (1997); see,
e.g., Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (finding a statute that
authorized drivers' licenses and vehicle equipment spot checks
unconstitutional because of officers' unbridled discretion and lack of
evidence as to its effectiveness). See 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 10.8(a), at 666-82; see also supra § 1.3(e), and infra § 5.21.
1.4(c) Seizures in Homes
The Fourth Amendment is triggered even though a person is
detained in his or her own home. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
696, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2590-91, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345 (1981); see State
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v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 428, 693 P.2d 89, 90 (1985); see also
supra § 1.3(a).
1.4(d) Civil Offenses
The Fourth Amendment is also triggered by a seizure of the
person even though seizure pertains to civil, and not criminal, offenses.
See State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 514-15, 537 P.2d 268, 274
(1975). However, a seizure cannot occur without some governmental
participation. State v. Jackson, 82 Wash. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d
945, 950 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1006 (1997).
1.5 Defining Seizures of Property
The Fourth Amendment protects a person's possessory interest in
effects as well as his or her privacy interest. See United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 120
(1983). A seizure of property "occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80
L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984); State v. Jackson, 82 Wash. App. 594, 603,
918 P.2d 945, 950 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1006 (1997).
Put differently, an object is seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment when government agents exercise "dominion and control"
over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120, 104 S. Ct. at 1660, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 99; Jackson, 82 Wash. App. at 603-04, 918 P.2d at 950-51.
Thus, impounding a room or securing a home constitutes a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ng, 104 Wash. 2d 763, 770,
713 P.2d 63, 67 (1985) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984)).
In some circumstances, interference with an individual's possesso-
ry interests may also implicate an individual's liberty interests. United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L. Ed.
2d 110, 122 (1983) (seizure of luggage at airport "can effectively
restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of
his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for
its return"); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6, at 307 (3d ed.
1996).
1.6 Standing to Raise Search and Seizure Claim
Traditionally, a criminal defendant alleging an infringement of
Fourth Amendment rights first had to show "standing" to raise the
claim. The defendant's burden was to demonstrate that the interest in
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the outcome of the controversy stemmed from a violation of his or her
rights rather than from the violation of the rights of some third party.
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3, at 116 (3d ed. 1996).
The "automatic standing" exception to this rule was created for
the defendant who is charged with an offense involving possession of
property as an element when the defendant challenges the search or
seizure of the property. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64,
80 S. Ct. 725, 732, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704 (1960); State v. Michaels, 60
Wash. 2d 638, 646, 374 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1962) (adopting the
'automatic standing" exception for Washington).
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court merged the concept of
standing into Fourth Amendment privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 138-40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 427-29, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 397-99
(1978). Under this analysis, a defendant may challenge a search or
seizure only when he or she possesses a personal privacy interest in the
area searched or the object seized. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83, 92, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 623-24 (1980)
(overruling Jones and the concept of "automatic standing"). But see
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980)
(maintaining "automatic standing" for Washington based on protec-
tions under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution). See
also State v. Hayden, 28 Wash. App. 935, 938-41, 627 P.2d 973, 975-
77 (1981) (search and seizure of a stolen purse upheld after defendant
permitted officers to view purse in the glove compartment of the
automobile because defendant had no personal privacy interest in
stolen purse). For example, when an individual has no expectation of
privacy in "checks and deposit slips retained by [the] bank," he or she
may not object to their seizure. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
732, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 474 (1980). A
defendant may not object to the admission of evidence as a violation
of the Fourth Amendment when the evidence "was seized unlawfully
from a third party not before the court." Id., 447 U.S. at 735, 100 S.
Ct. at 2446, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 476.
As the Rakas concept of "personal" privacy interest developed, the
Supreme Court indicated some types of situations in which a defendant
does or does not have such an interest. Generally, an individual "who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to
exclude." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 431 n.12, 58 L.
Ed. 2d at 401 n.12; see also State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 688
P.2d 859 (1984). But, although:
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[P]roperty ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated, property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of
[the] inquiry . . . . [An] illegal search only violates the rights of
those who have "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place."
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92, 100 S. Ct. at 2553, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 628
(internal citation omitted) (unlawful possession of stolen goods stored
in the apartment of another does not confer on thieves a reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the interior of apartment). A person who
resides in an apartment with the permission of the lessee and who has
a key to the apartment may assert a privacy interest in the interior of
the apartment. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-42, 99 S. Ct. at 429-30, 58
L. Ed. 2d at 399-400 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80
S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)).
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal
privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, but may challenge his or
her own seizure. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-50, 99 S. Ct. at 433-34, 58
L. Ed. 2d at 404-05; State v. Takesgun, 89 Wash. App. 608, 611, 949
P.2d 845, 846-47 (1998). Yet, a person who is driving the vehicle with
the owner's permission may also assert a privacy interest in the interior
of the vehicle. United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946 (D.C.
Cal. 1979). See generally Comment, Possession and Presumption: The
Plight of the Passenger Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1027 (1980). An employee who maintains a separate office
secured by a locked door may assert a privacy interest in that office for
public employees. Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 705-06 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 94 L. Ed.
2d 714 (1987). In Ortega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
on the absence of a general inspection policy permitting access by other
employees to the defendant's office to distinguish other decisions in
which the court found no expectation of privacy in the workplace.
Ortega, 764 F.2d at 706. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the
Ninth Circuit's privacy analysis, but applied a reasonableness standard
rather than a probable cause standard for public employees. Ortega,
480 U.S. at 719-21, 107 S. Ct. at 1498-99, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 724-26.
By merging the standing issue with a privacy analysis, the federal
courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619,
629 (1980). Hence, although the Fourth Amendment no longer
governs searches of stolen goods, it does apply to searches of legally
possessed items discovered in the search of stolen goods. For example,
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there is a protected privacy interest in closed boxes contained in a
stolen car. See People v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 467, 470 (Cal. 1979).
Similarly, defendants who claimed that a stolen footlocker belonged to
their brother established a possessory interest as bailees sufficient to
have standing under Rakas. State v. Grundy, 25 Wash. App. 411, 416,
607 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1980). But a defendant may not claim an
expectation of privacy in the interior of an acquaintance's purse into
which he has placed his belongings. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 106, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 642 (1980). For an
examination of the impact Salvucci may have on an accused's rights,
see Note, United States v. Salvucci, The Problematic Absence of
Automatic Standing, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 1045 (1981).
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution invests automatic standing upon anyone
charged with a possessory crime. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d
170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding
the use of "automatic standing" based on the state constitution). See
also State v. Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 793, 793-94 690 P.2d 591, 594
(1984). But see State v. Coss, 87 Wash. App. 891, 895-98, 943 P.2d
1126, 1127-29 (1997), review denied, __ Wash. 2d _, 958 P.2d 318
(1998) (recognizing lack of binding authority for automatic standing in
Washington due to plurality opinion of Simpson); State v. Carter, 127
Wash. 2d 836, 850-51, 904 P.2d 290, 296-97 (1995) (affirming, but
taking issue with Division One's abandonment of automatic standing
doctrine); State v. Zakel, 119 Wash. 2d 563, 569-71, 834 P.2d 1046,
1049-50 (1992) (affirming the decision of Division Two, but refusing
to decide whether the state constitution requires the automatic standing
doctrine because the facts presented did not properly raise the issue).
Although Washington's "automatic standing" doctrine has been
criticized by some courts, it has arguably retained its validity under the
state constitution through Simpson's plurality opinion. See State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 179, 622 P.2d at 1206; see also Carter, 127
Wash. 2d at 850-51, 904 P.2d at 290; Zakel, 119 Wash. 2d at 569-71,
834 P.2d at 1049-50; Coss, 87 Wash. App. at 895-98, 934 P.2d at
1127-29. In fact, the Washington Supreme Court has gone beyond
Rakas on the basis of state statute. Thus, in State v. Williams, 94
Wash. 2d 531, 544, 617 P.2d 1012, 1020 (1980), a defendant was
accorded standing to challenge the use of a codefendant's conversation
that had been recorded in violation of the Washington Privacy Act.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1987). Cf. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 175, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966-68, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187-88
(1969).
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However, in order to invoke the automatic standing exception to
the general standing requirements in Washington, two requirements
must be met: (1) possession must be an "essential" element of the
offense for which the defendant is charged, and (2) the defendant must
be in possession of the seized property at the time of the contested
search. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 181, 622 P.2d at 1206-07; Belieu, SO
Wash. App. 834, 838, 751 P.2d 321, 323 (1988).
The State may not raise the issue of lack of standing for the first
time on its appeal of a suppression order. State v. Grundy, 25 Wash.
App. 411, 415, 607 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1980) (distinguishing Combs v.
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 92 S. Ct. 2284, 33 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1972),
where standing was raised on appeal by the government as respondent).
See also State v. Coss, 87 Wash. App. at 895-98, 943 P.2d at 1127-29
(recognizing that State, as respondent, may raise standing issue on
appeal for the first time).
CHAPTER 2: STANDARDS OF PROOF
2.0 Nature of Probable Cause: Introduction
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections
2.1 and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard; Sections 2.3 through 2.8
discuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause
determination. The final section, 2.9, summarizes the types of searches
and seizures for which probable cause is not required or a lesser
standard is applied.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The probable
cause requirement is a fact-based determination that represents a
compromise between the competing interests of enforcing the law and
protecting the individual's right to privacy. See generally Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)
(probable cause must be based on more than mere suspicion). Police
officers must have probable cause even for searches and seizures in
which no warrant is required. In the case of a valid search or seizure
without a warrant, police may make the initial determination of
whether probable cause exists. The grounds for the search or seizure,
however, must be strong enough to obtain a warrant. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-81, 83 S. Ct. 407, 412-13, 9 L. Ed.
2d 441, 450-51 (1963). For a warrant to be issued, a neutral and
detached magistrate must make the probable cause determination based
on independent grounds. In addition, when a suspect is arrested
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without a warrant, he or she may not be detained for an extended
period of time without a judicial determination of probable cause.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69, 43 L.
Ed. 2d 54, 71-72 (1975). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3.1 (3d ed. 1996).
Similarly, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 7. Because Washington courts have held that this provision provides
more protection than the Fourth Amendment, Washington State has
rejected the federal standard of the totality of circumstances when an
informant tip is the basis of probable cause and, instead, continues to
adhere to the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires a showing of the
informant's basis of knowledge and reliability. State v. Huft, 106
Wash. 2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984).
Federal officers working in concert with state officials must
comply with the state constitution. State v. Johnson, 75 Wash. App.
692, 699, 879 P.2d 984, 988 (1994) (aerial photography by state
officers working in concert with federal drug operation required federal
officers' compliance with state constitution). However, where a federal
warrant is served, the federal standard for probable cause applies even
though the evidence will be used in state courts. In re Teddington, 116
Wash. 2d 761, 772-73, 808 P.2d 156, 161-62 (1991); State v. Cotten,
75 Wash. App. 669, 678 n.8, 879 P.2d 971, 977 n.8 (1994); State v.
Gwinner, 59 Wash. App. 119, 124-25, 796 P.2d 728, 730 (1990); State
v. Stanphill, 53 Wash. App. 623, 632, 769 P.2d 861, 866 (1989). See
also State v. Bradley, 105 Wash. 2d 898, 902-03, 719 P.2d 546, 548-49
(1986).
The validity of a search warrant is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 366, 693 P.2d 81, 84-85
(1985); State v. Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. 244, 248, 864 P.2d 410, 412
(1993); State v. Remboldt, 64 Wash. App. 505, 509, 827 P.2d 282,
284-85 (1992). Both an officer's decision and a magistrate's warrant
authorization are subject to judicial review, but the magistrate's
determination is given great deference by the reviewing court. State
v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 286, 906 P.2d 925, 939 (1995); Huft, 106
Wash. 2d at 211, 720 P.2d at 841; State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329,
352, 610 P.2d 869, 883 (1980); State v. Carter, 79 Wash. App. 154,
158, 901 P.2d 335, 337 (1995); Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. at 248, 864
P.2d at 412. All doubts are resolved in favor of the warrant's validity.
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State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (1994);
State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525, 531, 852 P.2d 1064, 1067
(1993); State v. Partin, 88 Wash. 2d 899, 904, 567 P.2d 1136, 1139
(1977); State v. Olson, 73 Wash. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110, 113-14
(1994); State v. Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. at 248, 864 P.2d at 412;
State v. Wilhe, 55 Wash. App. 470, 476, 778 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1989).
The probable cause requirement may be satisfied even when police
make a reasonable mistake of fact. State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898,
908, 632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (warrant valid even though officer
misidentified tomato plant as marijuana). But when police make a
mistake of law and incorrectly believe that certain conduct is unlawful,
a search or seizure based on that belief is invalid. State v. Melrose, 2
Wash. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552, 555 (1970).
2.1 Probable Cause Standard: Arrest Versus Search
Probable cause to arrest requires the same sufficiency of evidence
as probable cause to search. However in a given situation, probable
cause for a search does not always constitute probable cause for arrest,
and probable cause for arrest does not necessarily justify a search. For
a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the items
to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be found in
the place to be searched. State v. Maxwell, 114 Wash. 2d 761, 769,
791 P.2d 223, 227 (1990). To justify an arrest, an officer must have
probable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being commit-
ted and that the person to be arrested committed the offense. In
addition, searches and seizures must be supported by probable cause
whether or not an arrest is made. State v. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107,
112, 874 P.2d 160, 163 (1994); State v. Harrell, 83 Wash. App. 393,
399, 923 P.2d 698, 701 (1996).
Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has
information which would lead a person of reasonable caution to
conclude that the suspect has committed a crime. State v. Terrovona,
105 Wash. 2d 632, 643, 716 P.2d 295, 301 (1986). Probable cause to
arrest is a nontechnical standard and exists based on the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time. State v. Graham, 130
Wash. 2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227, 234 (1996); State v. Baxter, 68
Wash. 2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d 638, 641 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78
Wash. App. 788, 798, 895 P.2d 418, 423 (1995), aff'd, 130 Wash. 2d
215, 922 P.2d 811 (1996) (two DUI arrests supported by officer's
observations, defendants' driving, and field sobriety tests); State v.
Garcia, 63 Wash. App. 868, 871-75, 824 P.2d 1220, 1222-24 (1992)
(hotel maid's observations of folded papers in a drawer, a diesel fuel
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smell, and telephone calls at all hours were not sufficient by them-
selves, but, when combined with the police information of the suspect's
car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did constitute sufficient probable
cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wash. App. 35, 39, 808 P.2d 1171, 1173
(1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the defendant on a DWI
charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a roadway construction
sign, did not stop in response to police emergency flashers, and
proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wash. App. 339, 343-44, 783
P.2d 626, 629 (1989) (officer observation of drug transactions in area
with reported activity and performed in a manner similar to undercover
buys made by the officer). But see generally State v. Mance, 82 Wash.
App. 539, 918 P.2d 527 (1996) (probable cause cannot be supported
by information subsequently obtained). The facts and circumstances
known to the officer must also be reasonably trustworthy information.
State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 455, 688 P.2d 146, 149 (1984).
2.2 Probable Cause Standard: Characteristics
2.2(a) Objective Test
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause
standard is an objective one. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct.
223, 228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147 (1964); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d
1, 8, 653 P.2d 1024, 1029 (1982); State v. Huff, 64 Wash. App. 641,
645-46, 826 P.2d 698, 700-01 (1992). The officer's subjective belief
is not determinative. An officer's good faith is not enough to justify
a search absent probable cause, and an officer's belief that probable
cause was not present is also not determinative. State v. Rodriguez-
Torres, 77 Wash. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650, 653 (1995); Huff, 64
Wash. App. at 645-46, 826 P.2d at 701; State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash.
App. 679, 681, 544 P.2d 786, 788 (1975).
The probable cause standard is determined with reference to a
reasonable person with the expertise and experience of the officer in
question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897-98, 95 S. Ct.
2585, 2591, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629 (1975) (border patrol officers are
entitled to draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens
and smugglers); State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 906-07, 632 P.2d
44, 49 (1981). As a result, an officer's particular training and expertise
is highly important. State v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d
925, 941 (1995) (officer's drug enforcement experience and ability to
identify marijuana smell). See also State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329,
352, 610 P.2d 869, 883 (1980) (officer's ability to identify marijuana).
The information regarding the basis of knowledge and an officer's
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specific training and experience must be included in the affidavit so
that the magistrate may make an independent determination of
probable cause and establish more than the officer's personal belief.
State v. Johnson, 79 Wash. App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188, 1189-90
(1995), review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1023 (1996).
The affidavit establishing probable cause for a search warrant
must set forth sufficient facts to lead a reasonable person to conclude
that there is a probability that the defendant is involved in criminal
activity and that the evidence of the crime may be found in the place
to be searched. State v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 286, 906 P.2d 925,
939 (1995) (reliable informant and police observation of marijuana
smell established probable cause); State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173,
195, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (1994); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wash. 2d 761,
769, 791 P.2d 223, 226-27 (1990) (informant tips not enough to
substitute for utility consumption information illegally obtained from
utility company); State v. Goble, 88 Wash. App. 503, 509, 945 P.2d
263, 266 (1997) (magistrate did not have probable cause to believe
methamphetamine contraband would be found at a house to be
searched since the informant provided only that the drugs came to the
suspect's post office box); State v. O'Neil, 74 Wash. App. 820, 824-25,
879 P.2d 950, 953 (1994); State v. Bittner, 66 Wash. App. 541, 545,
832 P.2d 529, 531 (1992); State v. Garcia, 63 Wash. App. 868, 871,
824 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1992); State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 365-66,
693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985) (police officer with 13 years substantial drug
identification experience). The item to be seized need not be at the
place to be searched at the time of the issuance of the warrant, but the
magistrate must have reasonable grounds to believe it will be there at
the time of the search. Goble, 88 Wash. App. at 509, 945 P.2d at 266.
See also United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1984). "Facts
arising later are immaterial, unless they were reasonably inferable at the
time of the issuance of the warrant .... . Goble, 88 Wash. App. at
509, 945 P.2d at 266; cf. State v. Mance, 82 Wash. App. 539, 542, 918
P.2d 527, 529 (1996) (information obtained after the event needing
probable cause). See also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.7(d), at
372 (3d ed. 1996).
The facts set forth to establish probable cause need not be
admissible in evidence at trial. Bokor v. Dep't of Licensing, 74 Wash.
App. 523, 526, 874 P.2d 168, 169 (1994). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 49.
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2.2(b) Probability
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence "less than ... would
justify ... conviction," yet "more than [bare] suspicion." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed.
1879, 1890 (1949). To make an arrest, the officer need not have facts
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only
reasonable grounds for suspicion coupled with evidence of circumstanc-
es sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious and disinter-
ested person in believing that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93
Wash. 2d 7, 11-12, 604 P.2d 943, 944-45 (1980) (officers possessing
description of car used in robbery and license number of similar car
used in robbery involving similar modus operandi had probable cause
to arrest persons at address where car was parked).
The exact quantum of evidence is unclear and may depend in part
on the nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense. See
generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e).
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion
Police have probable cause to arrest an individual only if they
possess reasonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has
committed the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct.
338, 344, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979); State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d
449, 454, 688 P.2d 146, 149 (1984). See State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d
638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980); State v. DeArman, 54 Wash. App.
621, 625, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1989).
There must be a sufficient nexus between the suspects to be
searched and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wash. App.
154, 158-61, 901 P.2d 335, 337-39 (1995) (search warrant for "all
persons present" at suspected drug trafficking premises was invalid
because there was not a nexus linking the defendant to the apartment
where the drug transaction took place or to criminal activity).
Several exceptions exist, however, to establish authority of law
without a warrant. Individual suspicion is not required in a plan
involving neutral criteria. But see Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d
454, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (1988) (sobriety checkpoints violate state
constitution); State v. Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 46-47, 834 P.2d 73,
76 (1992) (Terry stop to check validity of license when car had special
license plate tabs indicating restricted license). A warrantless search
without individualized suspicion may also be upheld in order to permit
officers to investigate if the officers reasonably believe that a felony has
been committed and if there is a high probability that the suspect will
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be found in the place to be searched. State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash.
App. 185, 190-91, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980) (roadblock in which
police stopped all cars exiting a ferry because the police had probable
cause to believe that suspects in violent felony were on board).
Individualized suspicion is not required for some administrative
searches as well. See generally infra § 6.4(b) & (c).
2.3 Information Considered: In General
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only
the information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the
warrant was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451-52 (1963);
State v. Murray, 110 Wash. 2d 706, 709-10, 757 P.2d 487, 488 (1988);
State v. Dalton, 73 Wash. App. 132, 136, 868 P.2d 873, 875 (1994).
Probable cause must be based on facts and not on mere conclusions.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1513, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 723, 727 (1964). In addition, probable cause must exist at the
actual time of arrest or search; it may not be stale. See United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3411, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677,
686 (1984).
Affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense,
nonhypertechnical manner. State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 965, 639
P.2d 743, 745 (1982); State v. Barnes, 85 Wash. App. 638, 659, 932
P.2d 669, 681 (1997); State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wash. App. 11, 15, 939
P.2d 706, 708 (1997); State v. Johnson, 79 Wash. App. 776, 780, 904
P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1023 (1996);
State v. Remboldt, 64 Wash. App. 505, 510-11, 827 P.2d 282, 285
(1992); State v. Cahsengnou, 43 Wash. App. 379, 386-87, 717 P.2d
288, 291 (1986). See infra § 2.5. "The support for issuance of a
search warrant is thus sufficient if, on reading the affidavits, an
ordinary person would understand that a violation existed and was
continuing at the time of the application." Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d at 965,
639 P.2d at 745 (quoting State v. Clay, 7 Wash. App. 631, 637, 501
P.2d 603, 607 (1972)). All doubts are resolved in favor of the
warrant's validity. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d
593, 604 (1994); State v. Olson, 73 Wash. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d
110, 113-14 (1994); State v. Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. 244, 248, 864
P.2d 410, 412 (1993); State v. Wilke, 55 Wash. App. 470, 476, 778
P.2d 1054, 1058 (1989).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support
probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S. Ct.
1302, 1309, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889 (1949); Bokor v. Dep't of Licensing,
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74 Wash. App. 523, 526, 874 P.2d 168, 169 (1994). Marital privilege
does not prevent a spouse's statements from being used to establish
probable cause. State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wash. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d
334, 336 (1983). See generally infra § 7.3.
"[A] search warrant [will] not [be] rendered totally invalid if the
affidavit contains sufficient facts to establish probable cause indepen-
dent of the illegally obtained information." State v. Coates, 107 Wash.
2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64, 67 (1987).
2.3(a) Hearsay
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a
warrantless search as long as there is evidence providing reason to
believe that the informant is reliable and has an adequate basis of
knowledge. State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838,
839-40 (1986) (tip regarding marijuana growing operation was found
insufficient because the basis of the informant's knowledge was not
shown); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 433, 688 P.2d 136, 137-
38 (1984); State v. Lund, 70 Wash. App. 437, 449-50 n.9, 853 P.2d
1379, 1387 n.9 (1993); State v. Patterson, 37 Wash. App. 275, 277-78,
679 P.2d 416, 419 (1984); State v. Northness, 20 Wash. App. 551, 554,
582 P.2d 546, 548 (1978). As a result, a magistrate may rely on a
police officer's affidavit or other testimony that relays hearsay
information based on a fellow officer's personal knowledge. State v.
Lodge, 42 Wash. App. 380, 386, 711 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1985). The
affidavit may also relate hearsay from informants as long as there is a
basis for crediting it. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d at 209-10, 720 P.2d at 839-
40; Lund, 70 Wash. App. at 449-50 n.9, 853 P.2d at 1387 n.9.
Multiple hearsay may also be considered if the requirements are
met for each person in the chain of information. See Huft, 106 Wash.
2d at 209-10, 720 P.2d at 840 (concerned citizen information not
sufficient without basis of informant's knowledge); State v. Vanzant,
14 Wash. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786, 789 (1975) (information
passed to second detective by detective with personal knowledge of
informant's reliability sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest).
See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.2(d), at 50-51 (3d ed.
1996).
2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determina-
tion may consider prior arrests and convictions that have probative
value to the specific probable cause inquiry. Brinegar v. United States,
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338 U.S. 160, 173-74, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1309-10, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889
(1949); State v. Sterling, 43 Wash. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357,
1359 (1986) (occupant's two prior convictions for narcotics can be a
factor in determining probable cause). Without additional evidence,
a prior record of the same type of criminal conduct is insufficient to
establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223,
228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 148 (1964); State v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437,
446, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (1980). But prior acts may establish probable
cause when the modus operandi is similar and distinctive. See 4
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4.
A prior criminal record does not justify a warrantless search.
Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d at 446, 617 P.2d at 434; State v. Duncan, 81
Wash. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090, 1095, review denied, 130 Wash. 2d
1001 (1996). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 51-53.
A general assertion of criminal reputation is insufficient to
establish probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416,
89 S. Ct. 584, 589, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 643-44 (1969). But see United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2081-82, 29 L. Ed.
2d 723, 733 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts leading to a
conclusion that a suspect has a bad reputation may be considered. See
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 55-58.
2.3(c) Increased Power Consumption
Standing alone, an increase in power use does not constitute
sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Olson, 73
Wash. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110, 114 (1994); State v. Sterling, 43
Wash. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357, 1360 (1986); State v. McPher-
son, 40 Wash. App. 298, 301, 698 P.2d 563, 564 (1985). Evidence of
increased power consumption is an innocuous fact and cannot
corroborate an anonymous tip of suspected criminal activity, absent
other information. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d
593, 604 (1994). See also State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 211, 720
P.2d 838, 840 (1986) ("[T]here are too many possible reasons for
increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued based on
increased consumption"). When the increase in power consumption
is combined with other factors, however, the increase may be consid-
ered in determining whether probable cause exists. Young, 123 Wash.
2d at 195, 867 P.2d at 604; Sterling, 43 Wash. App. at 851-52, 719
P.2d at 1360 (400-500% increase in power usage combined with
suspicious facts supported probable cause for search warrant). But see
State v. Rakovsky, 79 Wash. App. 229, 239, 901 P.2d 364, 370 (1995)
(evidence of power use three to four times greater than the previous
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occupant's, as well as the absence of accumulated snow on the roof
when neighboring buildings had 20-30 inches, did not constitute
probable cause). An individual has a protected privacy interest in
power usage records such that a disclosure of this information is
prohibited unless there is written notice to the utility company that the
person is suspected of criminal activity. State v. Maxwell, 114 Wash.
2d 761, 767-69, 791 P.2d 223, 225-26 (1990) (telephonic request for
utility record not admissible because request was in violation of WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17.314) (1996); In re Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 615,
717 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1986).
2.4 First-Hand Observation
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a fact-
based inquiry, it is impossible to broadly define when an officer's
observations are sufficient to constitute probable cause. However,
below are some common factual situations that may provide some
general guidance.
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not
always establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two
men park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later
return and repeat their conduct, the officers did not have probable
cause to believe that the cartons contained stolen property. Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 171-72, 4 L. Ed. 2d
134, 139 (1959).
In a Washington case, officers stopped a vehicle after learning that
its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. The police
then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. A
passenger in the car claimed ownership of the set, but was unable to
identify the brand. The court held that the police had reasonable cause
to believe that the television was stolen. State v. Glasper, 84 Wash. 2d
17, 21, 523 P.2d 937, 940 (1974). Similarly, items wrapped in a
blanket on a street and thrown into bushes when police approached
were indicative of stolen property when police had previous experience
with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118 Wash. 2d 335, 337-38,
823 P.2d 1068, 1069 (1992). However, in another case, the existence
of an expensive briefcase in a car not reported stolen was not sufficient
to establish probable cause for a car search. State v. Ozuna, 80 Wash.
App. 684, 688-89, 911 P.2d 395, 397-98 (1996), review denied, 129
Wash. 2d 1030 (1996). See also State v. Lewis, 62 Wash. App. 350,
352, 814 P.2d 232, 233-34 (1991); State v. Connor, 58 Wash. App. 90,
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99-100, 791 P.2d 261, 265-66 (1990) (stolen wallet). See generally 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.6(a) (3d ed. 1996).
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause, as
long as its detection is by someone trained and experienced in detecting
illegal substances. State v. Olson, 73 Wash. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d
110, 114 (1994) (trained officer's detection of marijuana odor); State v.
Vonhof, 51 Wash. App. 33, 41-42, 751 P.2d 1221, 1226 (1988) (odor
combined with experience in smelling the illegal substance constituted
probable cause). The affidavit must set forth the officer's training and
experience in identifying the odor. See State v. Remboldt, 64 Wash.
App. 505, 510, 827 P.2d 282, 285 (1992). Odor may also be used in
concert with other suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See
State v. Huff, 64 Wash. App. 641, 647-48, 826 P.2d 698, 701-02
(1992) (odor of methamphetamine combined with furtive gestures and
lying to police during car stop).
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes
probable cause if the dog's training and reliability are known to the
officers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82
Wash. App. 594, 606-07, 918 P.2d 945, 952-53 (1996), review denied,
131 Wash. 2d 1006 (1997) (alert by police dog after seizure of
temporarily seized Federal Express package constituted probable
cause); State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wash. App. 733, 740-41, 866 P.2d
648, 652-53 (1994) (police tip of entering city with drugs seen placed
in car trunk combined with positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53
Wash. App. 623, 632, 769 P.2d 861, 866 (1989) (express mail
package). See also United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632 (9th
Cir. 1993) (canine sniff alone may constitute probable cause if the
dog's track record is set forth in the warrant application).
Identification of substances must also be accompanied by evidence
of the officer's expertise and training in identifying the substance in
order to establish probable cause. State v. Graham, 130 Wash. 2d 711,
724, 927 P.2d 227, 234 (1996); State v. Solberg, 66 Wash. App. 66, 79,
831 P.2d 754, 761 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 122 Wash. 2d 688,
861 P.2d 460 (1993); State v. Fore, 56 Wash. App. 339, 343-44, 783
P.2d 626, 629 (1989) (officer training relevant to surveillance of drug
transactions in park). Absolute certainty as to the identity of the
substance is not required. Graham, 130 Wash. 2d at 725, 927 P.2d at
234 (quoting Fore, 56 Wash. App. at 345, 783 P.2d at 630). However,
the officer's experience and training on the characteristics of those who
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cultivate illegal substances, without more, is not enough to establish
probable cause. Olson, 73 Wash. App. at 357, 869 P.2d at 115
(officer's experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually hide
records and materials in a safe house under their control does not
satisfy probable cause for search warrant of the safe house premises).
See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.6(b), at 289-306.
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere
association with a person with whom police have grounds to arrest does
not constitute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 587, 68 S. Ct. 222, 225, 92 L. Ed. 210, 216 (1948) (search
of a car passenger unjustified when the driver is arrested for possession
of counterfeit ration coupons). Mere proximity to others suspected of
criminal activity does not in itself establish probable cause to search the
associate. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62
L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979). Race or color alone, including "racial
incongruity" ("a person of any race allegedly being 'out of place' in a
particular geographic area") can never constitute probable cause of
criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-
87, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-83, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 619-20 (1975); United
States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982); State v.
Barber, 118 Wash. 2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068, 1065 (1992).
An individual's presence in a high crime area is not sufficient by
itself. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641, 61
L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979). Suspicion of dangerousness must relate
to the person searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v.
Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146, 148 (1984) (general
practice of frisking individuals in particularly dangerous area of the city
is not justified by probable cause). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.6(g).
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight
A suspect's furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot
establish probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining
whether probable cause exists. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
66-67, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 936-37 (1968)
(probable cause existed when strangers tiptoed from apartment and fled
from police officer); State v. Graham, 130 Wash. 2d 711, 726, 927
P.2d 227, 234 (1996); State v. Hobart, 24 Wash. App. 240, 243, 600
P.2d 660, 662 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 617
P.2d 429 (1980).
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
Furtive gestures, evasive behavior, and flight from police are
circumstantial evidence of criminal activity. Graham, 130 Wash. 2d
at 725-26, 927 P.2d at 234 (concealing item that looked like rock
cocaine in hand, ignoring an officer's request to stop, and profuse
sweating in cold temperature); State v. Glover, 116 Wash. 2d 509, 514-
15, 806 P.2d 760, 762-63 (1991) (defendant's conduct of turning away
from the officers, walking faster, playing with his ballcap, and looking
toward the officers and then looking away, coupled with officer's
disbelief of defendant's statement that he lived at housing complex
constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Baxter, 68
Wash. 2d 416, 421-22, 413 P.2d 638, 642 (1966) (flight is an element
of probable cause); State v. Huff, 64 Wash. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d
698, 701 (1992) (furtive movements and lying to police about identity
support probable cause). Cf. State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 645,
611 P.2d 771, 775 (1980) (suspect's leaving at the time a police cruiser
arrives does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is reasonable
to suspect the person of committing a crime); State v. Rakovsky, 79
Wash. App. 229, 241, 901 P.2d 364, 371 (1995) (Sweeney, J.,
dissenting) (use of alias when talking with police while car was stuck
in the snow and use of real name only when asked for driver's license
was not sufficient).
However, probable cause is not negated merely because it is
possible to imagine an innocent explanation for observed activities.
Graham, 130 Wash. 2d at 725, 927 P.2d at 234 (quoting Fore, 56
Wash. App. at 344, 783 P.2d at 629). Absolute certainty as to the
identity of a suspicious substance is not required. Graham, 130 Wash.
2d at 725, 927 P.2d at 234 (quoting State v. Fore, 56 Wash. App. at
344, 783 P.2d at 630).
2.4(e) Response to Questioning
When combined with other circumstances, a suspect's response to
police questioning can establish probable cause. United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 2588, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629 (1975)
(border patrol may consider nature of responses to questioning to help
establish probable cause). See also Huff, 64 Wash. App. at 647, 826
P.2d at 701-02 (lying to police about identity coupled with furtive
gestures and identification of illegal substance odor); State v. Glover,
116 Wash. 2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760, 762-63 (1991) (officer's
disbelief of defendant's statement that he lived at housing complex,
combined with suspicious gestures, constituted probable cause for
criminal trespass); cf. State v. Rakovsky, 79 Wash. App. 229, 241, 901
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P.2d 364, 371 (1995) (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (lying to police by using
an alias, combined with furtive behavior, not sufficient).
A suspect's failure or refusal to answer an officer's questions,
however, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d
92, 106, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982). See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 53 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2367, 2641 n.3, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 363 n.3 (1979).
See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.6(f). Similarly, a
suspect's silence after Miranda warnings have been given may not be
considered in determining probable cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
610, 617-18, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244-45, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 97-98 (1976).
Nor may the suspect's failure to challenge the officer's actions be
considered. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594, 68 S. Ct. 222,
228, 92 L. Ed. 210, 220 (1948) (officers could not infer probable cause
from suspect's failure to protest arrest or to proclaim innocence).
2.5 Information from an Informant: In General
Traditionally under the Fourth Amendment, information from an
informant could establish probable cause only when the facts and
circumstances available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-
Spinelli test requiring that an informant's basis of knowledge and
reliability be established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-
16, 89 S. Ct. 584, 588-89, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 643 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729
(1.964). See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3, at 121 (3d ed. 1996).
Under the "basis of knowledge" prong of the test, facts must be
revealed that enable the person making the probable cause determina-
tion to decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of
criminal conduct. Under the "veracity" prong, facts must be presented
so that the magistrate can determine either the inherent credibility of
the informant or the reliability of the informant on the particular
occasion. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16, 89 S. Ct. at 588-89, 21 L. Ed.
2d at 643; State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 435, 688 P.2d 136,
138-39 (1984). An informant's tip may provide police with grounds
to stop a person only if there is some indicia of reliability. State v.
Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 455, 688 P.2d 146, 150 (1984) (officers'
reliance on street kids to lead them to suspect is not permissible when
the officers questioned the reliability of children). So long as each link
in the chain of information satisfies the two-prong test, multiple
hearsay may be considered. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983,
986 (7th Cir. 1973); State v. Morehouse, 41 Wash. App. 334, 336, 704
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P.2d 168, 169 (1985); cf. State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 94, 562
P.2d 253, 255 (1977).
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court replaced the Aguilar-
Spinelli test with a totality of the circumstances approach for determin-
ing when an informant's tip may establish probable cause. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2320, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527,
530 (1983). The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has held
that article I, section 7 of the state constitution requires adherence to
the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. A Washington trial court may not
use the "totality of the circumstances" test of Gates. State v. Huft, 106
Wash. 2d 206, 209-10, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984); State v. Adame, 39
Wash. App. 574, 576, 694 P.2d 676, 678 (1985). See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(a), at 97.
2.5(a) Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong
by Personal Knowledge
The best way to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong is to show
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge.
See, e.g., Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S. Ct. at 1514, 12 L. Ed. 2d at
729; State v. Wolken, 103 Wash. 2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319, 321
(1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136, 140
(1984). For example, an informant's statement that he had observed
the defendant selling narcotics will satisfy the basis of knowledge
prong. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 18
L. Ed. 2d 62, 67 (1967). But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 3.3(a), at 91 (criticizing McCray for failing to require a showing that
the informant know the substance was a narcotic). The basis of an
informant's knowledge may also be established by hearsay. See State
v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838, 841 (1986); Jackson,
102 Wash. 2d at 437, 688 P.2d at 140. Similarly, an informant's
statement from which the court may infer the informant's first-hand
knowledge of criminal activity will satisfy this prong. State v.
Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 95, 702 P.2d 481, 489 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). However,
innocuous facts indicating that the informant has personal knowledge
of the defendant are insufficient to satisfy this prong without allega-
tions establishing the informant's personal knowledge of the criminal
act. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593, 603
(1994); Huft, 106 Wash. 2d at 211, 720 P.2d at 840.
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of the
knowledge prong may be remedied by "independent police investigato-
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ry work that corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports the
missing [element] .... " Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 438, 688 P.2d at
140. See also State v. Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. 244, 249-50, 864 P.2d
410, 413-14 (1993); State v. Adame, 39 Wash. App. 574, 576-77, 694
P.2d 676, 678 (1985). Thus, the credibility of an informant may be
established by police verification of the informant's statement of
detailed criminal activity not generally known or readily available.
State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 94-95, 702 P.2d 481, 489 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). The
corroborated information must itself suggest criminal activity. "Merely
verifying 'innocuous details,' commonly known facts or easily
predictable events should not suffice to remedy [the] deficiency.
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984).
See also State v. Kennedy, 72 Wash. App. 244, 249-50, 864 P.2d 410,
413-14 (1993) (innocuous facts combined with suspicious activity in
outdoor resort area suggested drug activity); State v. Maxwell, 114
Wash. 2d 761, 769-70, 791 P.2d 223, 227 (1990) (informant's
observation of frequent visitors, tin foil on windows, and suspicious
conversation not sufficient evidence of illegal activity); State v.
Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 746, 515 P.2d 530, 534 (1973). The
information may also be used to corroborate other cognizable informa-
tion if the informant's basis of knowledge is not shown. State v. Lund,
70 Wash. App. 437, 450 n.10, 853 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 n.10 (1993)
(anonymous police informant's tip of possible drug activity in prison
not enough to establish probable cause, but could be considered in
corroborating another police informant's similar information and for
independent police investigation of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d
706, 712, 630 P.2d 427, 431 (1981). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.3(f).
2.5(b) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Past Performance
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test may be met if the
affidavit supporting the search warrant contains sufficient facts from
which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity of the
informant. See State v. Paradiso, 43 Wash. App. 1, 6, 714 P.2d 1193,
1196 (1986). A mere conclusion that the informant is a "credible
person" is insufficient; reasons for believing the informant to be
credible must be presented. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112, 84 S. Ct. at
1515, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 727; State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 437,
688 P.2d 136, 139-40 (1984); State v. Lund, 70 Wash. App. 437, 449-
50 & n.10, 853 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 & n.10 (1993).
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The fact that an informant's past information has led to convic-
tions is a sufficient showing of reliability. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at
437, 688 P.2d at 139-40. An informant's reliability may also be
established if the informant has previously provided information that
was proven to be reliable, even though it did not result in an arrest.
See 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(b).
Courts have held that an informant who assists in an arrest is
credible. The arrest does not need to be lawful, and the facts learned
following the arrest do not have to verify the informant's tip. Some
courts have read Aguilar to hold that general statements alleging past
reliability of the defendant are sufficient. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.3(b).
In the absence of circumstances showing unreliability, an officer
need not have personal knowledge of the informant's track record, but
may rely on information from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14
Wash. App. 679, 681-82, 544 P.2d 786, 788 (1975). See infra § 2.7(b).
2.5(c) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Admissions Against
Interest and by Motive
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a
warrantless search, as long as there is evidence of reason to believe that
the informant is reliable, including the motive for the informant to be
truthful. State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 469-71, 572 P.2d 1102,
1103-04 (1978) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave
informant a strong motive to provide accurate information); State v.
Lund, 70 Wash. App. 437, 439-40, 449-50 n.9, 853 P.2d 1379, 1382,
1387-88 n.9 (1993) (strong motive for reliable information regarding
drug smuggling into prison provided by inmate informant in return for
benefits to his own criminal case); State v. Estorga, 60 Wash. App.
298, 305, 803 P.2d 813, 817 (1991) (offer to drop charges in exchange
for accurate information established strong motive to be truthful); State
v. Hall, 53 Wash. App. 296, 299, 766 P.2d 512, 514 (1989) (citing
with approval Bean and State v. Smith); State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App.
642, 647, 694 P. 2d 660, 663 (1984) (offer of charge reduction from
felony to misdemeanor gave strong motive to be truthful). A statement
against penal interest can also establish an adequate basis of knowledge.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425, 89 S. Ct. 584, 593, 21 L.
Ed. 2d 637, 649 (1969) (White, J., concurring); State v. Lund, 70
Wash. App. 437, 449-50 n.10, 853 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 n.10 (1993)
(informant heard inmate's admission against penal interest that he was
receiving drugs smuggled into the prison by his attorney).
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2.6 Citizen Informants: Victim/Witness Informants in General
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information
from a citizen informant, such as a victim or witness. Again, multiple
hearsay is acceptable as long as each instance in the chain meets the
two-prong test. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 479 F.2d 936, 940-
41 (7th Cir. 1973) (tip by service station employee about stolen credit
card from phone call to American Express was reliable). See generally
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.4 (3d ed. 1996).
Naming an informant is not a sufficient ground on which to credit
an informer; it is, however, considered in the determination of whether
the informant is actually a citizen informant. State v. Duncan, 81
Wash. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1996), review denied, 130
Wash. 2d 1001 (1996); State v. Rodriguez, 53 Wash. App. 571, 576,
769 P.2d 309, 312 (1989).
2.6(a) Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong
The basis for the citizen informant's knowledge must be estab-
lished. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275
(1980). Information showing the informant personally has seen the
facts asserted and is passing on firsthand information satisfies the basis
of the knowledge prong. State v. Smith, 110 Wash. 2d 658, 663, 756
P.2d 722, 725 (1988); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d. 432, 437, 688
P.2d 136, 140 (1984). However, if the facts come from one who is not
the eyewitness, or when the information requires some expertise, such
as the identification of the odor of marijuana, the basis of the
informant's knowledge must be demonstrated. See 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(b), at 224.
2.6(b) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Partial Corroboration of
Informant's Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen
informants. State v. Ibarra, 61 Wash. App. 695, 698-99, 812 P.2d
114, 117 (1991); see also State v. Woodall, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 77, 666
P.2d 364, 366 (1983); State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d
743, 745 (1982). However, the burden for establishing an identified
citizen informant's credibility is generally a reduced standard. State v.
Ibarra, 61 Wash. App. 695, 699, 812 P.2d 114, 117 (1991); State v.
Franklin, 49 Wash. App. 106, 109, 741 P.2d 83, 85 (1987). The
standard is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant
remains unidentified to the magistrate. State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d
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206, 211, 720 P.2d 838, 841 (1986); Ibarra, 61 Wash. App. at 699, 812
P.2d at 117; State v. Rodriguez, 53 Wash. App. 571, 574-75, 769 P.2d
309, 311 (1989); State v. Northness, 20 Wash. App. 551, 557, 582 P.2d
546, 549 (1978).
Police must present the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to
determine either the informant's inherent credibility or reliability.
State v. Duncan, 81 Wash. App. 70, 76, 912 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1996);
State v. Huff, 33 Wash. App. 304, 307-08, 654 P.2d 1211, 1213
(1982). Naming an informant is not a sufficient ground upon which
to credit an informer; however, independent police corroboration of
criminal activity along the lines suggested by the defendant may
suffice. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136, 140
(1984); State v. Duncan, 81 Wash. App. 70, 77, 912 P.2d 1090, 1095
(1996). Corroboration must suggest criminal activity, not just
innocuous facts. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 195-96, 867 P.2d
593, 603 (1994); State v. Rakovsky, 79 Wash. App. 229, 239, 901 P.2d
364, 370 (1995) (absent information on marijuana growing, no
reasonable inference of criminal activity). The corroborating informa-
tion must point to suspicious activities along the lines suggested by the
informant. State v. Maxwell, 114 Wash. 2d 761, 769, 791 P.2d 223,
227 (1990).
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied
Factors that have been considered in determining whether
sufficient information has been provided include: (1) the particularity
of the description of the offender or the vehicle; (2) the size of the area
in which the perpetrator might be found; (3) the number of persons in
the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the activity or condition of the
person arrested; and (6) the person's knowledge that his vehicle has
been involved in other similar criminal activity. See 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(c), at 236.
When a citizen can identify a suspect by name or by photograph,
the information is sufficient to establish probable cause. The use of
photo identification, however, is subject to challenge on certain
deficiencies. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384-86, 88 S. Ct.
967, 971-72, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 1253-54 (1968) (initial misidentifica-
tion of suspect could be retained on witness' memory).
Washington cases discussing particular fact patterns include the
following: State v. Palmer, 73 Wash. 2d 462, 464-65, 438 P.2d 876,
878 (1968) (finding probable cause for arrest forty-five minutes after
robbery victim identified automobile by make, year, color, and dirty
white top and described suspect by hair color and attire); State v.
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Kohler, 70 Wash. 2d 599, 605, 424 P.2d 656, 660 (1967) (finding
probable cause when two witnesses provided police with descriptions
of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects, and when probability of two
similar cars traveling within limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m. was
slight); State v. Baker, 68 Wash. 2d 517, 520, 413 P.2d 965, 967-68
(1966) (finding probable cause when robbery victims identified make,
color, and license number of suspect vehicle).
2.7 Police as Informants
2.7(a) Satisfying the "Veracity" and "Basis of Knowledge" Prongs
As with citizen informants under federal law, the veracity of police
informants' statements may be presumed. See United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 747, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684,
690 (1965). But see State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681, 544
P.2d 786, 788 (1975) ("[P]robable cause may rest upon hearsay
received from an informant if a reasonable person could conclude that,
first, the present information is reliable; and second, the informant
himself is reliable.").
Generally, there must be a showing that the officer had a basis for
his or her knowledge. In limited, complex situations, when explaining
the grounds for the belief may be difficult, conclusory allegations will
be sufficient. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224-25, 85 S. Ct.
1365, 1370, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 352 (1965) (in tax evasion case, affidavit
need not explain every basis of the allegation).
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer's
assessment. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S. Ct. 1031,
1037, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971) ("fellow officer rule"). However,
probable cause must actually still exist for the arrest to be valid. Id.
at 568-69, 91 S. Ct. at 1037-38, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 313-14. See 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.5(b), at 253 (3d ed. 1996).
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective
information in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of
communication must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wash.
App. 309, 310, 529 P.2d 873, 874 (1974). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5(c).
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2.8 Information from Anonymous or Unknown Informants:
Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong
Generally, an anonymous informant's tip fails to meet the Aguilar-
Spinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity without
further corroboration. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89
S. Ct. 584, 587, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 641-42 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729 (1964);
State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (1994); cf.
State v. Murray, 110 Wash. 2d 706, 711, 757 P.2d 487, 489 (1988).
A named but unknown informant is not presumed reliable. See State
v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (reliability
of named but unknown telephone informant not significantly different
from anonymous telephone informant). If, however, a police investiga-
tion corroborates the informant's information and constitutes more than
public or innocuous facts, the Aguilar-Spinelli test may otherwise be
satisfied. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 195, 867 P.2d at 604; State v.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984).
2.9 Special Searches and Seizures Requiring Greater or
Lesser Levels of Proof
2.9(a) Administrative Searches
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section
7 of the Washington Constitution extend to administrative and
regulatory searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 523-
32, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1727-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 930-38 (1967).
Therefore, such searches must either be conducted pursuant to a
warrant or fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Id.; Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n v.
Thurston County, 85 Wash. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208, 215 (1997),
review denied, 132 Wash. 2d 1010 (1997). Probable cause must exist
for warrants issued for health and safety inspections. Seattle v.
McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 280, 868 P.2d 134, 144-45 (1994)
(McCready I); Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n, 85 Wash. App.
at 183, 931 P.2d at 215. If voluntary consent is given, a warrant is not
required, and therefore, probable cause is not required. Seattle v.
McCready, 131 Wash. 2d 266, 272-73, 931 P.2d 156, 159-60 (1997)
(McCready III); Seattle v. McCready, 124 Wash. 2d 300, 303-04, 877
P.2d 686, 688 (1994) (McCready II); Thurston County Rental Owners
Ass'n, 85 Wash. App. at 183, 931 P.2d at 215; State v. Browning, 67
Wash. App. 93, 96, 834 P.2d 84, 85 (1992) (building inspector's entry
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into apartment without consent of occupant was unlawful because
statute required consent of the occupant).
A municipal court may not issue an administrative warrant for
inspection of a civil infraction, even if the infraction is supported by
probable cause; the authority extends only for criminal violations.
McCready II, 124 Wash. 2d at 309, 877 P.2d at 691 (administrative
warrant issued for search of the common areas of an apartment house
over the objections of the landlords); McCready I, 123 Wash. 2d at
272, 868 P.2d at 140. There is no statutory or rule-based authority to
allow municipal courts to issue warrants on less than probable cause
for suspected civil infractions. McCready I, at 272-76, 868 P.2d at
134-38.
Inventory searches can also be justified without probable cause.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741-42, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 739, 745 (1987) (inventory search of car after drunk driving
arrest). The inventory search must be made pursuant to reasonable
regulations. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635,
109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1990) (opening of locked container during
inventory search held unconstitutional because there were no regula-
tions to give police discretion to open containers). Washington,
however, provides greater protection against inventory searches.
For a discussion of administrative searches in general, see infra
§ 6.4.
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than
probable cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point
toward criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 107
Wash. 2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445, 447-48 (1986); State v. Mitchell, 80
Wash. App. 143, 145, 906 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1995); State v. Pressley,
64 Wash. App. 591, 595, 825 P.2d 749, 751 (1992) (two women on
street corner acted suspiciously by hiding a package and expressing
surprise when police approached); State v. Walker, 66 Wash. App.
622, 626, 834 P.2d 41, 44 (1992). But see State v. DeArman, 54 Wash.
App. 621, 624-25, 774 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (1989).
An investigatory stop requires a lower standard than probable
cause: reasonable suspicion. As a result, a lesser showing as to an
informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge is required to
meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330, 1108 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990).
However, an investigative stop is not justified if there is no indepen-
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dent basis to rely on an anonymous informant's tip. Kennedy, 107
Wash. 2d at 7, 726 P.2d at 448-49; State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43,
47, 621 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (1980); State v. Vandover, 63 Wash. App.
754, 822 P.2d 784 (1992). "'Indicia of reliability' requires: (1)
knowledge that the source of the information is reliable; and (2) a
sufficient factual basis for the informant's tip or corroboration by
independent police observation." State v. Jones, 85 Wash. App. 797,
799-800, 934 P.2d 1224, 1226 (1997) (hand signal from unknown
informant is not sufficient indicia of reliability), review denied, 133
Wash. 2d 1012 (1997).
Officers are also allowed to search and temporarily seize persons
and property when necessary to protect officer safety. State v. King,
89 Wash. App. 612, 618-19, 949 P.2d 856, 860-61 (1998) (temporary
seizure of person who was in the apartment with a gun during a
consent search); State v. Cotten, 75 Wash. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d
971, 980 (1994).
A valid Terry stop may include a search of the interior of a
suspect's car when necessary to guarantee officer safety. Kennedy, 107
Wash. 2d at 12, 726 P.2d at 451; State v. Larson, 88 Wash. App. 849,
855, 946 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). But see State v. Henry, 80 Wash.
App. 544, 553, 910 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1995). Similarly, frisking a
suspect for weapons is justified if the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the person is armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2dat 910-11; State v. Hudson, 124
Wash. 2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160, 164 (1994); State v. Hobart, 94
Wash. 2d 437, 441, 617 P.2d 429, 431 (1980).
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, when
a blood sample is taken, it is a search and seizure that must be
supported by probable cause. State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 711,
675 P.2d 219, 222 (1984); State v. Dunivin, 65 Wash. App. 501, 507,
828 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1992). In one case, the court upheld the seizure
of blood when officers believed a defendant who committed vehicular
homicide was driving while intoxicated. Dunivin, 65 Wash. App. at
507, 828 P.2d at 1154 (authority under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.308(1) (1998)); State v. Rangitsch, 40 Wash. App. 771, 775,
700 P.2d 382, 385 (1985). If there is probable cause, neither an
adversarial hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a
search warrant to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v.
Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525, 534-36, 852 P.2d 1064, 1069-70 (1993)
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(search warrant to obtain a blood sample from a suspect who had been
arrested but not charged).
The Fourth Amendment allows warrantless searches, including
body searches of convicted persons, even without probable cause or
individualized suspicion. State v. Audley, 77 Wash. App. 897, 904,
894 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1995) (no greater protection under state
constitution). But general privacy rights must be protected by
requiring "special needs beyond normal law enforcement" for
withdrawing blood. State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d
1076, 1086 (1993) (DNA testing of convicted violent or sex offenders).
CHAPTER 3: SEARCH WARRANTS
3.0 Introduction: Fourth Amendment Requirements
for Search Warrants
The Fourth Amendment provides that ... no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision was
enacted partly in response to the evils of general warrants in England
and writs of assistance in the colonies. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 626-27, 6 S. Ct. 524, 530, 29 L. Ed. 746, 749-50 (1886);
State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 128, 530 P.2d 284, 285 (1975). Such
warrants and writs had provided law enforcement officers virtually
unlimited discretion to search whenever, wherever, and whomever they
chose. In adopting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to
curb the abuses that accompanied these unconstrained licenses to
search. This chapter focuses on the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment's requirements for a valid search warrant and its
execution.
Searches and seizures must generally be made pursuant to a
warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85
S. Ct. 741, 744, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 687 (1965). The basic purpose of
the warrant process is to interpose a neutral and detached magistrate
between the law enforcement authorities and the individual whose
effects are to be search.. Once issued, the warrant also serves the
purpose of limiting the scope of the search to the areas and items
specified in the warrant. In order to be lawful, a warrant must meet
the following requirements: (1) it must be issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate; (2) the magistrate must determine whether there
is probable cause to search or arrest and must support this determina-
tion by oath or affirmation; and (3) the warrant must describe with
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particularity the place to be searched and the items or persons to be
seized. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369,
92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948); see also United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d
1238, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
There are, however, a number of situations when searches and
seizures may be made without warrants-even when it would be
feasible to obtain them-and there are some circumstances when
warrants alone are insufficient. See infra § 3.3(a)-(d). For the most
part, the standards discussed below apply to arrest as well as to search
warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are discussed in
Chapter 4.
3.1 Types of Items That May Be Searched and Seized
Warrants may be issued not only for contraband or instrumentali-
ties of crime, but also for "mere evidence." When the State seeks a
warrant for evidence, it must show cause to believe that the evidence
will aid in apprehending or convicting the suspect. Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 782, 792 (1967); see also WASH. CR.R. 2.3(b); CR.R. L. J.
2.2(a). Warrants may be issued for evidence containing incriminating
statements; the Fifth Amendment protects a person only from
producing evidence, not from its production by others. Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2745, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627,
638 (1976).
3.2 Who May Issue Warrants: Neutral and Detached
Magistrate Requirements
One aspect of the protection provided by a warrant is the
determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate
rather than by a police officer. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment that often is not grasped by
zealous officers is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences that reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists of requiring that those usual inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
In Washington State criminal matters, a district court's territorial
jurisdiction is within the boundaries of the county. WASH. REV.
CODE § 3.66.060 (1996). Thus, on probable cause, a district court
judge may issue a warrant for the search and seizure of controlled
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substances outside the court's district, but within the county, without
the approval of the prosecutor. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.509
(1996); State v. Uhtoff, 45 Wash. App. 261, 264, 724 P.2d 1103, 1106
(1986).
A district court may issue a warrant relating to the case even after
felony information has been filed in superior court. State v. Stock, 44
Wash. App. 467, 475, 722 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE § 69.50.509 (1996). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.2(a)-(f) (3d ed. 1996).
3.2(a) Qualifications of a "Magistrate"
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules identify the
requirements for qualification of a magistrate. The Fourth Amend-
ment does not require that a magistrate be an attorney or a judge so
long as he or she is "neutral and detached" and "capable of determin-
ing whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search."
Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S. Ct. 2119, 2122-23, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 783, 788 (1972); State v. Porter, 88 Wash. 2d 512, 515, 563
P.2d 829, 830-32 (1977). But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.2(c), at 446 (because search warrants are more complex than arrest
warrants, the use of nonlawyers to issue search warrants should be
constitutionally suspect).
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title,
he or she must make an independent probable cause determination and
may not simply rubber-stamp warrants. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 727 (1964); State v.
Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 517, 537 P.2d 268, 275-76 (1975).
States may impose more stringent requirements than those
required by the Fourth Amendment. Washington limits the power to
issue warrants to magistrates, which are identified as supreme court,
court of appeals, superior court, and district court judges, and "all
municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the
duties of district judges." WASH. REV. CODE § 2.20.020 (1996). Case
law has also specifically included court commissioners. See Porter, 88
Wash. 2d at 524, 463 P.2d at 830. But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.2(c), at 447-49.
3.2(b) Neutrality
A magistrate who is capable of determining probable cause may
nevertheless be disqualified from issuing a warrant for failing to meet
the "neutral requirement." Thus, a state officer who acts as prosecutor
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or investigator in a case is automatically disqualified from acting as a
magistrate in the same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
450, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2029-30, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 573 (1971). Similarly,
an unsalaried magistrate who receives a fee for each search warrant
issued is not considered neutral. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245,
250, 97 S. Ct 546, 548, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444, 448 (1977) (having a
pecuniary interest in issuing warrants compared with denying them
renders a magistrate neither neutral nor detached).
For the same reason, an administrative "warrant" signed by the
parole officer conducting a search is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95
Wash. 2d 822, 825-26, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1981). Similarly, the
magistrate's involvement in the execution of a warrant may constitute
nonneutrality. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27, 99
S. Ct. 2319, 2324, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 928-29 (1979) (a judge who
accompanied police on a raid of pornographic bookstore was not
neutral and detached when he added new materials observed at the
store to the previously signed search warrant).
On the other hand, the per se rule of Coolidge was held not to
apply to a case in which the pro tempore judge issuing the warrant was
also a prosecutor, but had not been involved in the prosecution of that
particular case. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841,
943 (1977). A search warrant's issuance has been upheld, however,
when the issuing judicial officer was aware from the affidavit that he
might be a witness against the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wash.
App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.2(b), at 444-45.
Washington has also refused to apply the Coolidge rule of per se
disqualification to a judge who issued a search warrant in a case that
was before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund, 103 Wash. 2d 79,
88, 690 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1984). In Neslund, the judge had been
appointed to investigate the suspected criminal activity of the
defendant and one of the defendant's brothers. During the special
inquiry proceedings, the judge asked another brother some questions;
the judge did not, however, question other witnesses, discuss the
investigation, or discuss the brother's testimony with anyone else
involved in the investigation. The Neslund court did not per se
disqualify the judge from issuing warrants authorizing a search of the
defendant's premises and the seizure of particular items of the
defendant's personal property; rather, the court based its holding in
part on the fact that the warrants were not issued in subsequent court
proceedings "arising" from the inquiry. Id. at 82-83, 690 P.2d at
1156; cf WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.180 (1996) (special-inquiry judges
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disqualified from participating in subsequent court proceedings arising
from special inquiry).
A magistrate's initial probable cause determination is not a final
order. Principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata do not preclude
the government from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial
officer so long as the government notifies the second officer that the
application was previously denied. The presentation of the same
evidence to a second magistrate is not tantamount to forum shopping
unless the government visits numerous magistrates before convincing
one to issue the disputed warrant. United States v. Savides, 658 F.
Supp. 1399, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.2(e), at 454-55; cf. United States v. Davis, 346 F. Supp.
435 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (magistrate shopping to obtain a warrant after
party has been denied by another magistrate has been condemned).
3.2(c) Burden of Proof
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of
Coolidge, the defendant bears the burden of proving a magistrate's lack
of neutrality. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841,
843 (1977).
3.3 Content of the Warrant
3.3(a) Oath or Affirmation; Multiple Affidavits
The oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment requires
that the person presenting the supporting affidavit swear to the
information the affidavit contains. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
Washington Supreme Court has upheld a warrant, however, when the
affidavit was not sworn to, but was signed in the presence of the
magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wash. 2d 303, 309-10, 428 P.2d 535,
539 (1967). Lower courts have split on the question of whether a
fictitious name affidavit is defective. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.3(f), at 476-78 (3d ed. 1996).
3.3(b) Information Considered
The information establishing probable cause must not be stale at
the time it is presented to the judge. "It is not enough ... to set forth
[the fact] that criminal activity occurred at some prior time. The facts
or circumstances must support the reasonable probability that the
criminal activity was occurring at or about the time the warrant was
issued." State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192,
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1194 (1980) (one sale of a small amount of marijuana did not provide
probable cause to search two weeks later); see also State v. Petty, 48
Wash. App. 615, 621, 740 P.2d 879, 882-83 (1987) (factors to be
considered: the amount of time between the known criminal activity
and the issuance of the warrant, the nature and scope of the suspected
criminal activity, and the nature of the items to be seized); State v.
Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 95, 702 P.2d 481, 490 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987) (evidence must
be sufficient to support a magistrate's decision that evidence sought is
still on the person or premises to be searched); cf. supra § 2.3.
The fact that a valid warrant could have been obtained had the
affiant provided sufficient information to the magistrate will not
validate a warrant issued in the absence of that information. See
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565-
66, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 311-12 (1971). Thus,
an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by a later
production of information that the affiant possessed, but did not
disclose, to the magistrate when seeking the warrant. Id. (permitting
the record to be expanded with information known to the police, but
not disclosed to the magistrate, would "render the warrant require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment meaningless"); cf. Seattle v. Leach,
29 Wash. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159, 162 (1981) (affidavit in support
of administrative warrant not sufficient when it alleged comprehensive
inspection program but failed to describe the program). But see State
v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976) (warrant
to search for documents valid and not overbroad).
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court has ruled that
when a warrant is facially valid and an omission is neither intentional
nor made with a reckless disregard for the truth, the warrant can be
valid even though it is based on an affidavit containing an omission.
See State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 368-69, 693 P.2d 81, 85-86
(1985). In Cord, the court held that although an affidavit in support
of a search warrant failed to state the altitude at which the officer
allegedly observed marijuana plants, the affidavit otherwise provided
a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to conclude that a crime had
probably been committed. But see id. at 371, 693 P.2d at 87 (Wil-
liams, C.J., dissenting) (when aerial views are the means utilized to
show probable cause, the affidavit must reveal the altitude from which
the identification was made so that courts can guard against the
issuance of warrants following unreasonably low, intrusive searches and
so that courts make sure officers do not engage in unreasonably high
views of questionable reliability).
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An affidavit must set forth the underlying facts; conclusory
information sworn to by the prosecutor is not enough to establish
probable cause. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 47 S. Ct.
250, 251, 71 L. Ed. 505, 508 (1927); cf. State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d
509, 517-18, 537 P.2d 268, 276 (1975). A prima facie showing of
criminal activity is not required, although the affidavit must go beyond
mere suspicion or personal belief that evidence of a crime will be found
on the premises to be searched. State v. Chasengnou, 43 Wash. App.
379, 385, 717 P.2d 288, 291 (1986) (citing State v. Rangitsch, 40
Wash. App. 771, 780, 700 P.2d 382, 388 (1985)); State v. White, 44
Wash. App. 215, 218, 720 P.2d 873, 875 (1986). At the same time,
however, affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a common-
sense manner rather than hypertechnically. State v. Olson, 73 Wash.
App. 348, 355, 869 P.2d 110, 114 (1994) (citing State v. Garcia, 63
Wash. App. 868, 871, 824 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1992)). Generally, an
affidavit establishes probable cause to support a search warrant if the
affidavit sets forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable person to
conclude both that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and
that evidence of the crime can be found at the place to be searched.
See State v. Maxwell, 114 Wash. 2d 761, 769, 791 P.2d 223, 227
(1990).
Evidence from a prior warrantless search conducted under an
exception to general search and seizure rules may be used by the
issuing magistrate in determining probable cause. A magistrate may
also rely on hearsay statements from a police officer's affidavits.
Chasengnou, 43 Wash. App. at 384, 717 P. 2d at 291; see also supra
§ 2.7(b).
3.3(c) Oral Testimony and Oral Warrants
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single
affidavit, on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. WASH. CR.R.
2.3(c); CR.R. L. J. 2.2(a). The judge must record a summary of any
additional evidence on which the warrant was based. WASH. CR.R.
2.3(c).
Some states, including Washington, permit oral search warrants
in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement to a judge.
WASH. CR.R. 2.3(c); WASH. J.CR.R. 7.5(b). See State v. Ringer, 100
Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1983), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151, 720 P.2d 436, 440
(1986). However, when other means are available to memorialize an
affiant's sworn testimony, the State is not allowed to instead use a
reconstruction of the entire telephonic affidavit if no original recording
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of the statement exists. WASH. CR.R. 2.3; State v. Myers, 117 Wash.
2d 332, 338, 815 P.2d 761, 765, 768 (1991). For a discussion of
various objections to this procedure, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.3(c), at 469.
3.3(d) Administrative Warrants
An administrative warrant may be based either on specific
evidence of an existing violation or on a general inspection program
based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards that are
derived from neutral sources. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
320, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 316 (1978); Seattle v.
Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159, 161-62 (1981). See
generally infra § 6.4. However, an administrative warrant issued by a
magistrate without authority is no more valid than a warrant signed by
a private citizen. Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 272, 868
P.2d 134, 140 (1994) (invalidating a warrant to enforce housing codes
issued on less than probable cause). A right of entry does not
authorize the issuance of search warrants for enforcement purposes
unless there is probable cause or a statute authorizing the court to issue
warrants on less than probable cause. Id. at 278, 868 P.2d at 143.
3.4 Particular Description of Place to Be Searched
3.4(a) General Considerations
By requiring a particular description of the places to be searched,
the Fourth Amendment furthers two purposes: (1) it limits the risk
that a search will be conducted in the wrong location, and (2) it helps
determine whether probable cause is present. Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416, 69 L. Ed. 757, 760 (1925). The
description must be such that "the officer with a search warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended." Id.;
State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 648-49, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984).
The Fourth Amendment requirement that the places to be searched be
described with particularity serves to prevent general searches and
leaves nothing to the discretion of the officers executing the warrant.
See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72
L. Ed. 231, 237 (1927); State v. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d 538, 545, 834
P.2d. 611, 614-15 (1992); State v. Rivera, 76 Wash. App. 519, 522,
888 P.2d 740, 742 (1995). However, carelessness on the part of the
officers executing the warrant will not necessarily render the warrant
insufficient. Officers executing a warrant need only use "reasonable
effort" to confine their search to the areas delineated in the warrant.
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See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wash. 2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32, 37 (1984)
(warrant identified place to be searched but did not list an address;
officers attempted to serve warrant on persons outside the described
area); see also State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743,
746-47 (1982).
If a warrant is invalid because it fails to specifically describe the
place to be searched, a search under the warrant cannot be upheld on
the ground that a magistrate made a probable cause determination;
however, the evidence seized may sometimes be admissible. See
generally infra § 7.2. The use of a generic term or general description
in a warrant is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment if a
more specific description is impossible and if probable cause is shown.
Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d at 547, 834 P.2d at 616; see also State v. Riley,
121 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1993) ("When the nature
of the underlying offense precludes a descriptive itemization, generic
classifications such as lists are acceptable."). Furthermore, if a warrant
separately and distinctly describes two targets and it is thereafter
determined that probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant as
to one target, but not the other, the warrant may be treated as
severable and upheld as to the one target. State v. Halverson, 21
Wash. App. 35, 37, 584 P.2d 408, 409 (1978); see also 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.6(f), at 582-83 (3d ed. 1996). On the other hand,
the severability doctrine must not be applied when doing so would
render the particularity standards of the Fourth Amendment meaning-
less. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d at 588, 834 P.2d at 621 (holding that a
warrant authorizing a general search of materials protected by the First
Amendment was impermissibly broad and invalid in its entirety).
The initial determination of whether a description is adequate is
made with reference only to the warrant itself. See State v. Stenson,
132 Wash. 2d 668, 691-93, 940 P.2d 1239, 1252-54 (1997). The
affidavit and other incorporated documents may be considered if they
are attached to the warrant. A description may appear adequate on its
face, but on execution be found to be ambiguous or to contain errors.
Id. Whether such a warrant will be deemed sufficient depends on the
availability of other information that permits the officer to identify the
intended premises with reasonable certainty. Id.; State v. Rood, 18
Wash. App. 740, 743-44, 573 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (1977).
Three types of information may be considered in determining a
warrant's adequacy: (1) physical descriptions of the premises contained
in the warrant or in the attached affidavit; (2) information based on the
officer's personal knowledge of the location or its occupants; and (3)
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the officer's personal observations at the time of execution. Rood, 18
Wash. App. at 744-45, 573 P.2d at 1328; see also State v. Smith, 39
Wash. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984) (search warrant
identifying place to be searched as 2415 Carl Road, Sumas, Washing-
ton, rather than correct address of 2415 Carl Road, Everson, Washing-
ton was such that police officer could, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify intended place); State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 604,
576 P.2d 933, 936 (1978) (requiring only reasonable particularity). See
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(a)-(e), at 512-48.
Earlier Washington cases include State v. Davis, 165 Wash. 652, 654-
55, 5 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1931) (warrant sufficient despite incorrect street
name because name listed was properly known and no one could have
been misled) and State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609, 612, 238 P. 638,
639 (1925) (warrant's error in house number was immaterial when
officer knew where accused lived and officer searched the correct
house).
3.4(b) Particular Searches: Places
In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address.
The address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that
a particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wash. App. 519,
522-23, 557 P.2d 368, 370 (1976) (warrant describing premises as two-
story, white-frame house located directly behind particular address
sufficient when no evidence presented that more than one house met
description or that premises failed to conform to description except for
incorrect address); see also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 283,
499 P.2d 81, 84 (1972) (warrant that failed to specify street location
was sufficiently clear when officers could identify premises with
reasonable certainty and when reason for failure to specify street was
included in affidavit for warrant). Rural areas may be described by a
legal description of the property. See State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App.
600, 603-04, 576 P.2d 933, 935-36 (1978).
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party
challenging the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a
search of the wrong premises. State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 967,
639 P.2d 743, 747 (1982); see also State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642,
649, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984) (although incorrect town identified in
warrant, search upheld because the defendant made no showing that a
similar address existed that could have been mistakenly searched or
even that a street of the same name existed in the wrongly identified
town). Even so, the test is not whether an officer could hypothetically
or theoretically search the wrong premises, but whether, under the
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circumstances presented, an officer could reasonably determine the
correct premises to be searched. State v. Bohan, 72 Wash. App. 335,
339, 864 P.2d 26, 28 (1993). If an officer can so determine, the
warrant will be valid. Id.
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living units
of a multiple-occupancy building, the description must single out a
particular subunit. People v. Avery, 478 P.2d 310, 312 (Colo. 1970).
But if the building looks like a single occupancy structure from the
outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a multiple-
unit structure, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify a
subunit. Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. at 282-83, 499 P.2d at 83.
Another exception, the "community living unit" rule, will
generally apply when several people occupy the entire premises in
common, but have separate bedrooms. Under the community living
unit rule, a single warrant describing the entire premises is valid and
justifies a search of the entire premises. State v. Alexander, 41 Wash.
App. 152, 156, 704 P.2d 618, 619 (1985).
Additional exceptions to the particularity rule are outlined in
United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983). A
warrant may authorize a search of an entire street address while
reciting probable cause as to only a portion of the premises if the
premises are occupied in common rather than individually; a multiunit
building is used as a single entity; the defendant is in control of the
whole premises; or if the entire premises is suspect. Id. at 1008. See
also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(b), at 531.
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the
defendant's apartment. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wash. App. 448,
453, 836 P.2d 239, 242 (1992). The Llamas-Villa court concluded that
because the storage locker did not comprise a separate building and
was not intentionally excluded from the warrant, the officers did not
exceed the scope of the warrant when they searched the locker.
However, in another situation, the officers' search of "outbuildings"
exceeded the scope of a search warrant that authorized the search of a
residence and the attached carport, but did not authorize the search of
"outbuildings," which included a barn and a garage. State v. Kelley,
52 Wash. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1988). Probable cause
to search a house does not provide probable cause to search outbuild-
ings when the outbuildings are under the control of other persons.
State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wash. App. 11, 16-17, 939 P.2d 706, 709-10
(1997).
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Under a search warrant for a premises, the personal effects of the
owner may be searched so long as they are likely repositories for items
named in the warrant. State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892, 683
P.2d 622, 624 (1984). Such personal effects include articles of clothing
left on the floor, even though the clothing does not belong to the
owner or resident of the premises. State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641,
647, 870 P.2d 313, 316 (1994).
Although search warrants for vehicles are uncommon because of
the many exceptions allowing warrantless searches, see infra § 5.21,
such warrants are governed by the same principles discussed above.
See State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 604, 576 P.2d 933, 936
(1978); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(b), at 541. A warrant
issued to search a defendant's premises includes the defendant's
automobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Huff, 33 Wash.
App. 304, 309-10, 654 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1982) (reasoning that the
automobile was defendant's personal property and, thus, subject to a
search under the warrant). However, a warrant to search a house does
not include a search of a vehicle that is not within the curtilage-the
area contiguous to the occupant's home. State v. Graham, 78 Wash.
App. 44, 51-52, 896 P.2d 704, 710 (1995). Additionally, when the
automobile is neither owned nor under the control of the defendant,
such warrantless searches violate the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Rivera, 76 Wash. App. 519, 525-26, 888
P.2d 740, 744 (1995) (overruling State v. Frye, 26 Wash. App. 276,
613 P.2d 152 (1980) insofar as Frye authorized the search of vehicles
unrelated to the occupant of a premises); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.10(d), at 668-69.
3.4(c) Particular Searches: Persons
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places,
if there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has
evidence on his or her person. State v. Rollie M., 41 Wash. App. 55,
58, 701 P.2d 1123, 1124-25 (1985). When a search warrant is issued
for a person, the general rule requiring particularity applies. State v.
Martinez, 51 Wash. App. 397, 399-400, 753 P.2d 1011, 1012 (1988)
(a warrant is sufficient if it provides a detailed description of the
person to be searched, including the person's place of residence); State
v. Douglas S., 42 Wash. App. 138, 140, 709 P.2d 817, 818 (1985) (a
warrant is insufficient if it does not have a description of the persons
to be searched); Rollie M., 41 Wash. App. at 88, 701 P.2d at 1124-25
(warrant that authorized search of a person found in general vicinity of
a specified place was found insufficient); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
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AND SEIZURE § 4.5(e), at 542. Additionally, if officers have a warrant
to search a person, they may conduct a strip search of the defendant
to procure evidence if such search is conducted in a reasonable manner
and place as prescribed by statute. State v. Colin, 61 Wash. App. 111,
114-15, 809 P.2d 228, 230 (1991).
For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(a).
Generally, when a premises search warrant is executed, police may
conduct a warrantless search of a person only if they have individual-
ized probable cause to search that person. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245 (1979); State
v. Rivera, 76 Wash. App. 519, 524, 888 P.2d 740, 743 (1995); see also
infra § 5.1. Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search of all
persons present at a location to be searched will be upheld if the
warrant establishes a nexus between all persons present and the
criminal activity. See State v. Carter, 79 Wash. App. 154, 161, 901
P.2d 335, 339 (1995).
3.5 Particular Description of Things to Be Seized
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of
prior cases generally are not referred to when determining whether a
warrant describes the things to be seized with sufficient particularity.
See State v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 117 (1975).
Instead, courts look to the purposes of the "particular description"
requirement to: (1) prevent general exploratory searches; (2) protect
against "seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall
within" the warrant; and (3) ensure that probable cause is present. See
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.
Ed. 231, 237 (1927); State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 691, 940
P.2d 1239, 1252 (1997); State v. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d 538, 545, 834
P.2d 611, 614-15 (1992). Although a description need not be detailed,
a search warrant must describe an officer's actions so that the
reviewing court is able to determine that the search was based on
probable cause and particular descriptions. United States v. Gomez-
Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 1984). See State v. Weaver, 38
Wash. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1984) (although cardboard
box bearing defendant's name would not generally be considered
"paper," police could seize box because the obvious purpose of the
warrant was seizure not only of controlled substances, but also of
evidence enabling state to demonstrate defendant's dominion and
control over the premises); see also Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 693-94,
940 P.2d at 1253 (holding that a warrant was sufficiently particularized
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because it contained language that limited items to be seized to
business, financial, and personal records that indicated a relationship
between the parties involved); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 212,
687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) ("the phrase 'any other evidence of homicide'
specifically limited the warrant to the crime under investigation [and]
specific items listed, such as a shotgun and shotgun shells[J,] provided
additional guidelines for the officers conducting the search"); State v.
Lingo, 32 Wash. App. 638, 641, 649 P.2d 130, 132 (1982) (warrant not
constitutionally defective when items to be seized are limited). But see
Weaver, 38 Wash. App. at 24, 683 P.2d at 1140 (Ringold, J.,
dissenting) (because the box with defendant's name was not seized to
show dominion and control, but solely to carry contraband that had
been uncovered during the warrant search, majority's "dominion and
control" argument is merely a post hoc attempt to justify seizure, and
cocaine later found in the box should have been suppressed). See
generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.6(a)-(f) (3d ed. 1996).
3.5(a) General Rules
A few general principles can be gleaned from the cases to indicate
when a warrant is sufficiently definite to allow the executing officer to
identify the property with reasonable certainty:
(1) More ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See
State v. Withers, 8 Wash. App. 123, 127, 504 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1972).
(2) A more general description will suffice when the precise
identity of items sought cannot be determined at the time the warrant
is issued and if probable cause is shown. See Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d
at 547, 834 P.2d at 616. However, in such instances, "the search
warrant must [also] be circumscribed by reference to the crime under
investigation." State v. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d 22, 29, 846 P.2d 1365,
1369 (1993) (a warrant functions ". . . not only to limit the executing
officer's discretion, but to inform the person subject to the search what
items the officer may seize").
(3) A less precise description is adequate for controlled substanc-
es. See State v. Cowles, 14 Wash. App. 14, 19, 538 P.2d 840, 844
(1975) (when an affidavit states that narcotics and, specifically,
marijuana were observed, a search warrant authorizing seizure of
"controlled substances" is "reasonable and practical under the
circumstances and thus satisfie[s] the constitutional requirement of
'particularity").
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(4) Failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more
circumscribed search. See State v. Salinas, 18 Wash. App. 455, 461,
569 P.2d 75, 78 (1977).
(5) An error is not fatal if the officer was able to determine what
was intended from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v.
Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 601, 604, 576 P.2d 933, 936 (1978).
(6) Greater care is required for documents than for physical
objects because of the potential for intrusion into personal privacy. See
Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d at 692, 940 P.2d at 1252.
(7) Greater care and particularity is required when property
sought is "inherently innocuous" as opposed to property that is
"inherently illegal." See State v. Olson, 32 Wash. App. 555, 557-58,
648 P.2d 476, 478 (1982).
3.5(b) Circumstances Requiring Greater Scrutiny
Search warrants for documents and for telephone conversations
require greater scrutiny because of the potential for intrusion into
personal privacy. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96
S. Ct. 2737, 2749 n.11, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 643 n.11 (1976). At the
same time, the Supreme Court has upheld a search warrant that listed
specific documents pertaining to a particular crime but that then added
the catch-all phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and
evidence of crime." Id. at 479, 96 S. Ct. at 2748, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642.
In Andresen, the search was constitutional because the catch-all phrase
was to be read as authorizing a search only for evidence relating to the
defined crime. Id. at 480-82, 96 S. Ct. at 2748-49, 49 L. Ed. 2d at
642-43; see also State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172,
175 (1978) (citing Andresen as authority for the proposition that each
item seized need not have been specified in the warrant so long as the
item is related to the crime charged); cf. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203,
212, 687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) (holding that a search warrant suffi-
ciently limited officer's discretion when the warrant described the items
to be seized, including "any other evidence of the homicide"). But see
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(d), at 573-75. (Andresen
should not be read as approval for loose descriptions because the
Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that the description was as
specific as possible). When a search is for particular contents of
documents, the invasion of privacy can be minimized by impounding
the documents and then imposing conditions on a further search. See
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(d), at 575 n.104.
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The particularity requirement is afforded its most exacting
enforcement when the items to be seized implicate First Amendment
rights, including warrants for books, pictures, films, or recordings. See
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 56
L. Ed. 2d 525, 541 (1978); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85
S. Ct. 506, 511-12, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437 (1965); Perrone, 119 Wash.
2d at 547, 834 P.2d at 616 (holding that allegedly obscene publications
and films implicate First Amendment protections). In addition, the
officers executing the search warrant are constitutionally prohibited
from using their own discretion to determine whether materials are
unlawful. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325, 99 S. Ct.
2319, 2324, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 927-28 (1979). The need to particular-
ize in the warrant the specific papers sought does not apply, however,
to papers that merely evidence ownership or control over premises.
State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 540-41, 581 P.2d 172, 175 (1978).
Circumstances indicating that an individual has taken precautions
to ensure privacy may cause greater court scrutiny. See, e.g., State v.
Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 156, 737 P.2d 1297, 1299-1300
(1987). In Butterworth, the police located the defendant's residence by
requesting his address from the telephone company. The court noted
that the listing was unpublished, indicating that the defendant
specifically requested privacy regarding his address and phone number.
Because the defendant had taken precautions regarding his privacy, the
police were required to obtain a warrant or subpoena prior to seizing
information. The holding in Butterworth, however, has not been
extended to protect addresses located on the outside of envelopes and
postal packages. See State v. Stanphill, 53 Wash. App. 623, 627, 769
P.2d 861, 863 (1989).
3.6 Execution of the Warrant: Time of Execution
Washington is one of several states that by court rule requires
warrants to be executed within a certain time period. The warrant
"shall command the officer to search, within a specific period of time
not to exceed 10 days." WASH. CR.R. 2.3(c). See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.50.509 (1996) (three-day limit for execution of search warrant for
controlled substances); see also State v. Thomas, 121 Wash. 2d 504,
507, 512-13, 851 P.2d 673, 675, 678 (1993); State v. Wallaway, 72
Wash. App. 407, 414, 865 P.2d 531, 535-36 (1994). A delay in
execution may render a warrant invalid because it may mean that
probable cause no longer exists at the time the warrant is executed.
See State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194
(1980); see generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
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A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.7(a), at 584-88 (3d
ed. 1996).
Unlike other states, Washington does not restrict the execution of
warrants to daytime hours. See WASH. CR.R. 2.3(c) (providing that
a warrant may be served at any time of day); see also State v. Smith, 15
Wash. App. 716, 719-20, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976) (nighttime
search is not unreasonable). The United States Supreme Court has not
decided whether the Fourth Amendment requires additional justifica-
tion for nighttime search warrants. But see Gooding v. United States,
416 U.S. 430, 460, 94 S. Ct. 1780, 1795, 40 L. Ed. 2d 250, 269 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the restriction upon
nighttime searches was to limit such intrusions to those instances
where there is 'some justification for it'); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.7(b), at 588-89 nn.22-24 (constitutionality of a
nighttime search depends on whether it was necessary to make the
search at that time).
A search warrant may be executed even when the occupants are
not present. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 44 (3d
Cir. 1973) (presence of occupant while search warrant is being executed
is neither a common law nor a constitutional requirement); see also 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.7(c), at 593-97.
3.7 Entry Either Without Notice or by Force:
"Knock and Announce" Requirement
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a warrant must
give notice of their authority and purpose prior to entering the private
premises. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-40, 83 S. Ct. 1623,
1632-33, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740-42 (1963). This "knock and
announce" or "knock and wait" requirement applies to the execution
of both arrest and search warrants. Id.; State v. Alldredge, 73 Wash.
App. 171, 178, 868 P.2d 183, 187 (1994). The Supreme Court
determined that the common law knock and announce requirement was
governed by the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment and
left the lower courts to determine when an unannounced entry might
be reasonable. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936, 115 S. Ct. 1914,
1919, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 984 (1995). See infra §§ 5.16-5.19 for a
discussion of exigent circumstances.
Washington is one of many states that has codified the knock and
announce requirement. Washington law provides that "[t]o make an
arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner
door, or windows of a dwelling house or other building or any other
enclosure, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused
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admittance." WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 (1996). Although the
statute expressly refers to arrests, it applies to the execution of search
warrants as well. State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 217, 455 P.2d 595,
598 (1969); State v. Shelly, 58 Wash. App. 908, 910, 795 P.2d 187,
188 (1990).
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are: (1) to reduce
the potential for violence; (2) to prevent the physical destruction of
property; and (3) to protect privacy. See United States v. Bustamante-
Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1,
5, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980); State v. Garcia-Hernandez, 67 Wash.
App. 492, 496, 837 P.2d 624, 627 (1992). Strict compliance with the
knock and announce rule is required unless the State can demonstrate
either exigent circumstances or futility of compliance. Coyle, 95 Wash.
2d at 9-11, 621 P.2d at 1260-61; State v. Richards, 87 Wash. App.
285, 289, 941 P.2d 710, 713 (1997). But see State v. Reid, 38 Wash.
App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) (entry is in conformity with
the knock and announce statute when compliance is substantial).
An officer's actions are judged by a standard of reasonableness,
determined both by the purposes supporting the knock and announce
rule and by the particular facts and circumstances of the individual
case. See, e.g., Ker, 374 U.S. at 33, 83 S. Ct. at 1629-30, 10 L. Ed.
2d at 737; Alldredge, 73 Wash. App. at 176-77, 868 P.2d at 186-87.
See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.8(a) (3d ed. 1996).
3.7(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice
The phrase "break open" in the Washington knock and announce
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving
forcible breaking. See Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 5-6, 621 P.2d at 1258-59
(knock and wait statute violated when officers grabbed occupant who
had opened door just as police were about to knock and announce
themselves; officers then entered through open door without alerting
other occupants); State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d
241, 244-45 (1972) (execution of search warrant unlawful when police
entered through partially opened door without knocking or announcing
their purpose). A consensual entry, however, is not a "breaking open."
State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410, 418, 550 P.2d 63, 69 (1976)
(finding that because defendant's wife invited unidentified officer into
house, entry was consensual and announcement of purpose was not
required).
Notice is required for entry by use of a pass key. Ker, 374 U.S.
at 37-41, 83 S. Ct. at 1631-34, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 740-42. Notice is also
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required for entry through a closed but unlocked door. Miller, 7
Wash. App. at 416, 499 P.2d at 243. Although courts in other
jurisdictions are divided on the question of whether passage through
an open door requires notice, Washington courts require notice in such
situations. See id. (finding that Fourth Amendment and WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.31.040 prohibit an officer executing a search warrant from
entering a house without providing notice of office and purpose, even
though door through which officer entered was open far enough to
permit passage); see also State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484, 490-91,
543 P.2d 348, 352-53 (1975) (holding that officer entering dwelling
must give notice of his office and purpose even though door to
apartment was partially open). However, an officer's failure to knock
and announce himself before entering a fenced backyard through an
unlocked gate does not violate WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 when
the officer can observe that the backyard is unoccupied and, thus, can
establish that there is little risk of violating the purposes of the rule.
State v. Schimpf, 82 Wash. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1996).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that when consent to
enter is obtained by deception, it is still effective consent. State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 553, 689 P.2d 38, 42 (1984). Thus, an
officer who deceives a suspect into allowing him or her to enter need
not announce his office and purpose. In Myers, the police had been
aware that the doors and windows to the defendant's house were
covered by iron bars. They had also been told by an informant that
the defendant kept a handgun within reach whenever he opened the
door. The police prepared a fictitious warrant for the defendant's
arrest for a traffic offense, knowing that the defendant had no
outstanding traffic violations. Upon being permitted to enter his house
to execute the arrest warrant, the police executed the search warrant.
The court held that even though the officers failed to announce their
office and purpose, the occupant of the house had granted "valid
permission" for them to enter. Id. at 554, 689 P.2d at 42; see also
State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 621 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980).
Courts have reasoned that an occupant's right to privacy is not
infringed by the fact that permission to enter was obtained by ruse,
because the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess a valid
search warrant. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d at 555, 560, 689 P.2d at 43, 45-
46 (Dimmick, J., concurring in result) (execution of search warrants
requires case-by-case evaluation of tactics used to reduce violence and
to prevent destruction of property; prohibiting use of a ruse may result
in police having to approach houses massively armed and with weapons
drawn, or in police having to destroy building entrances).
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Entry by ruse, subterfuge, or deception is not a violation of the
knock and announce statute because no "breaking" occurs within the
term of the statute. State v. Williamson, 42 Wash. App. 208, 211, 710
P.2d 205, 207 (1985). Such an entry is approved because the interests
underlying the statute are well served by an entry gained with
permission of the occupant. Id.; see also State v. Hashman, 46 Wash.
App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651, 655 (1986) (officer used ruse to gain
entry in order to obtain probable cause to support a search warrant;
court held that police may use ruse to gain entry when they have
justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity in a
residence).
Washington Courts of Appeal cases involving entry by deception
include State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428, 432
(1978) (when officer was unable to gain entry through use of a false
name, subsequent forcible entry absent exigent circumstances was
unlawful without compliance with the knock and wait statute); and
State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 35, 37 (1976)
(when undercover officers gain entry into suspect's home with suspect's
consent and for apparent purpose of drug transaction, knock and
announce statute inapplicable); cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
87 S. Ct. 424, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1966) (entry lawful when undercover
officer telephoned suspect and misrepresented his identity in order to
gain invitation into suspect's home). But see State v. Collier, 270 So.
2d 451, 453-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (undercover officer who
leaves gathering at defendant's home that appears to be a "pot party"
may not return and reenter home in order to execute a search warrant
without first providing "due notice of his authority and purpose"
within the meaning of the Florida knock and announce statute, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 933.09 (West 1971)). Subsequent to the court's
decision in Collier, the Florida courts have permitted re-entry without
a knock and announce if there is an implied invitation to return. See
State v. Schwartz, 398 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
State v. Steffani, 398 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See
generally James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes
Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private
Premises-State Cases, 70 A.L.R. 3d 217 (1976).
The Washington knock and announce statute requires notice prior
to entry through inner as well as outer doors. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.040 (1996). But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.8(c), at 610 (federal rule does not require separate notice for
different rooms in one house).
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3.7(b) Compliance with Requirements
The police must identify themselves as police officers and indicate
to the person in apparent control of the premises that they are present
to execute a warrant. State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d
428, 432 (1978). It is not sufficient to make this announcement
simultaneously with a forcible entry. Id.; State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash.
App. 155, 157, 528 P.2d 1010, 1011-12 (1974) ("Announcing your
identity as you kick in the door is not compliance with the general
[knock and wait] rule."). Police are not required, however, to give a
detailed or completely accurate description of their purpose, as long as
they comply with the statute. But see State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d
548, 555, 689 P.2d 38, 43 (1984) (use by police of fictitious arrest
warrant to gain entry into defendant's house in order to execute a valid
search warrant did not violate knock and announce requirements
because officers announced identity and stated that purpose was to
execute a warrant); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 210-11, 687
P.2d 861, 866-67 (1984).
After giving notice, officers must allow the occupants an
opportunity to "refuse admittance" before entering. State v. Garcia-
Hernandez, 67 Wash. App. 492, 495, 837 P.2d 624, 626 (1992).
However, the officers need not wait until occupants affirmatively deny
their entry. Id.; State v. Jones, 15 Wash. App. 165, 167, 547 P.2d 906,
908 (1976) (officers' entry after ten-second wait held reasonable
considering the nighttime hour and the fact that defendant and his
family were in bed). The holding in Jones is questioned by Wayne R.
LaFave in 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(c), at 608.
Denial of admittance may be implied from the occupant's lack of
response. State v. Schmidt, 48 Wash. App. 639, 643, 740 P.2d 351,
355 (1987). The length of time that officers must wait before using
force to enter a residence depends on the circumstances of each case.
Id. at 646, 740 P.2d at 354. However, the waiting period ends not
later than when the purposes of the knock and announce rule have
been fulfilled. See State v. Richards, 87 Wash. App. 285, 290, 941
P.2d 710, 713-14 (1997) (holding that officers need not wait for
defendant to permit entry once they have announced their identity and
purpose); State v. Alldredge, 73 Wash. App. 171, 181-82, 868 P.2d
183, 184 (1994) (holding that the waiting period is over once "the door
of the premises is open, attended by an occupant, and the police have
announced their identity and purpose while face-to-face with the
occupant").
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In executing a search warrant, police officers must act reasonably.
See generally State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984).
Whether an officer acted reasonably is "a factual determination to be
made primarily by the trial court and depends on the circumstances of
each case." Garcia-Hernandez, 67 Wash. App. at 496, 837 P.2d at 627
(finding police acted reasonably when they identified themselves and
their purpose before entering without defendant's consent, and yelled
"police" before entering defendant's bedroom); State v. Berlin, 46
Wash. App. 587, 593-94, 731 P.2d 548, 552 (1987) (when the
defendant's wife answered the officer's knock but failed to open the
door after a thirty-second wait, the officers were justified in opening
the door after the wait, entering, and restating their identity and
purpose; the fact that the police had been told that the defendant had
weapons and a history of violence was not enough to waive compliance
with the knock and announce rule, but did "bear upon the reasonable-
ness of the length of time that the police waited after announcing
themselves"); Schmidt, 48 Wash. App. at 646, 740 P.2d at 356
(holding that officers' delay of 3 seconds after they knocked and
announced and before they entered to be reasonable); State v. Woodall,
32 Wash. App. 407, 411, 647 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 666 P.2d 364 (1983) ("[I]n light of the
information concerning the number of people at the party, danger of
violence, the concern for destruction of the evidence, and the deputy's
testimony that someone inside the clubhouse saw [the officers] long
before they reached the door," a three or four-second wait after the
officers announced their identity and purpose made the entry reason-
able.); State v. Haggerty, 20 Wash. App. 335, 336-38, 579 P.2d 1031,
1033 (1978) (when officers knocked on door and announced office and
purpose, and when door opened after thirty-second wait, officers were
justified in believing door was opened in response to announcement
and did not need to repeat office and purpose); Lowrie, 12 Wash. App.
at 157, 528 P.2d at 1012 ("Failure to answer a knock at the door
within fifteen seconds and then merely walking away from door is
insufficient" refusal when officers have not announced their identity
and purpose nor explicitly demanded entry, even if occupant might
have recognized one of the officers).
Circumstances must reasonably indicate that the occupant has
consented to the officer's entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wash. App.
181, 183, 730 P.2d 93, 94 (1986) (holding that the knock and announce
statute was violated when the police knocked, the defendant shouted
"yeah," and the police entered the apartment). Washington courts
have also rejected the contention that the officers' failure to wait long
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enough to permit the occupants a reasonable opportunity to grant or
deny admission violated the knock and announce rule. See State v.
Lehman, 40 Wash. App. 400, 404, 698 P.2d 606, 609 (1985). In
Lehman, the plain-clothes police officers knocked and a defendant
opened the door approximately twelve inches. The officers displayed
their badges and advised the defendant that they had a warrant to
search the house. One officer looked through the open door and saw
two men sitting in the living room. Without waiting for the defendant
to grant or deny permission to enter, the officers entered the house and
conducted the search. The Lehman court distinguished the case from
Coyle by noting that, unlike in Coyle, there was an announcement by
the police. It was not necessary that all occupants be aware of the
announcement; hence, the court found sufficient compliance with the
knock and announce statute. Lehman, 40 Wash. App. at 404, 698 P.2d
at 608.
The announcement of office and purpose may be made to the
person answering the door even when that person is not in possession
of the premises. See State v. Sainz, 23 Wash. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596
P.2d 1090, 1094 n.3 (1979).
Unnecessary roughness in executing a warrant "does not rise to
constitutional magnitude ... or negate prior compliance with [WASH.
REV. CODE] § 10.31.040." Id. at 538-39, 596 P.2d at 1095.
The fact that an undercover agent is present who could legally
seize the evidence does not excuse other officers from knocking and
waiting. See State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 77, 528 P.2d 274,
276 (1974).
3.7(c) Exceptions
Under the "useless gesture" exception, compliance with the knock
and announce rule is excused if the authority and purpose of the police
are already known to those within the premises. See Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 55, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1640, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 750-51
(1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1,
11, 621 P.2d 1256, 1261-62 (1980); State v. Shelly, 58 Wash. App.
908, 911, 795 P.2d 187, 188 (1990). Washington has required that
officers be "virtually certain" that occupants of a dwelling are aware of
the officers' presence. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 11, 621 P.2d at 1261-62.
See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(f), at 620-21.
Once the defendant has opened the door and the police officers
have identified themselves and their purpose, any grant or denial of
entrance by the defendant was held to be a useless gesture. See Shelly,
58 Wash. App. at 911, 795 P.2d at 188 (holding strict compliance with
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the waiting period to be a useless gesture when the police, armed with
a valid search warrant, could enter the premises whether defendant
granted or denied them permission); see also Lehman, 40 Wash. App.
at 404, 698 P.2d at 608-09.
The useless gesture exception has also been applied by implication
to justify a police officer's forcible entry when the officer identified
himself, but was unable to state his purpose before the suspect tried to
close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wash. App. 713, 717, 519 P.2d 1328,
1330 (1974). But closing a door on an officer not in uniform, under
ambiguous circumstances, will not excuse the officer from complying
with the knock and announce rule. State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123,
127, 584 P.2d 428, 431 (1978); see also Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 13, 621
P.2d at 1262.
Police need not comply with the knock and announce requirement,
but may instead enter immediately and with force when exigent
circumstances are present. Ker, 374 U.S. at 37-40, 83 S. Ct. at 1632-
33, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 740-42; State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 214, 455
P.2d 595, 598 (1969).
A police officer's reasonable belief that the items identified in the
search warrant will be destroyed or removed constitutes one type of
exigent circumstance. The fact that the items could easily be destroyed
is insufficient. The police must possess specific information indicating
that the items are in actual imminent danger of destruction or removal.
See Young, 76 Wash. 2d at 215-16, 455 P.2d at 597-98 (belief of
exigent circumstances cannot be based on suspicion or ambiguous acts);
Coleman v. Reilly, 8 Wash. App. 684, 687, 508 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1973)
("[T]here must be more than mere suspicion on behalf of the police
officers that evidence will be destroyed before [the police] are justified
in making an unannounced entry."); see also State v. Harris, 12 Wash.
App. 481, 492-94, 530 P.2d 646, 653-54 (1975) (police justified in not
complying strictly with knock and announce requirements when they
had reliable information that suspect kept heroin in condoms that he
would swallow if confronted by police).
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts,
which permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily
disposed of items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360,
362, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981); see also State v. Edwards, 20 Wash.
App. 648, 652, 581 P.2d 154, 157 (1978). Specific factual situations
are discussed in State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 81-82, 528 P.2d
274, 278 (1974). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.8(d), at 610-16.
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A police officer's reasonable belief that announcing his or her
office and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is a second
type of exigent circumstance. See Reid, 38 Wash. App. at 208, 687
P.2d at 866-67; State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318, 321, 584 P.2d
990, 992 (1978). A mere good faith concern for safety, however, is not
sufficient. Police must know from prior information or from direct
observation that the suspect both keeps weapons and has a propensity
to use them. Jeter, 30 Wash. App. at 363, 634 P.2d at 314 (no exigent
circumstances exist when officer had prior knowledge only of defen-
dant's possession of gun but not of any propensity for defendant to use
it to resist arrest); see also State v. Allyn, 40 Wash. App. 27, 30, 696
P.2d 45, 48 (1985) (police knew from undercover agent that the
defendant had several firearms in his dwelling and had a strong
propensity to use them; hence, police were justified in executing a
search warrant without complying with the knock and announce rule);
Dugger, 12 Wash. App. at 82, 528 P.2d at 278; People v. Dumas, 512
P.2d 1208, 1214 (Cal. 1973) (information that defendant habitually
answered door armed with firearm constituted exigent circumstances);
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(e), at 616-20.
For a discussion of exigent circumstances justifying the absence
of a warrant, see infra §§ 5.16-5.19.
Finally, law enforcement officers need not comply with the notice
requirements when covert entry of the premises is the only way to
effectively execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
247, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1688, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 186 (1979) (covert entry
onto premises to install listening device authorized by warrant is
constitutional, even when entry is not specifically authorized by
warrant); State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 550, 689 P.2d 38, 40
(1984) (police justified in using ruse to gain entry when informant had
stated that defendant usually had handgun within reach when
answering door and all doors and windows were covered by bars).
3.8 Search and Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
3.8(a) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] "are plausible repositories for
the objects named in the warrant." State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d 641,
643, 870 P.2d 313, 317 (1994) (holding that the search of sweatpants
found on the floor do not constitute an impermissible search of
defendant's person, thus overruling State v. Lee, 68 Wash. App. 253,
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842 P.2d 515 (1992)); State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892, 683
P.2d 622, 624 (1984).
A premises search warrant or a warrant to search the person and
premises of one occupant does not authorize a search of other
occupants or visitors who happen to be on the premises while the
search is taking place, nor does it automatically justify a search of
personal effects belonging to such other occupants or visitors. See
State v. Douglas S., 42 Wash. App. 138, 140-42, 709 P.2d 817, 818-19
(1985) (frisk of a juvenile entering the residence not justified when
there were no grounds to believe that the juvenile had dominion and
control over the objects specified in the warrant because the father had
admitted that the marijuana plants found on the premises were his);
State v. Galbert, 70 Wash. App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d 310, 314 (1993)
(rejecting "mere presence" of contraband as a justification to search
persons who are merely located at the search scene); see also 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.9(b), at 629 (3d ed. 1996).
Although some states have approved the use of warrants authoriz-
ing "search of all persons present," those states limit that use to
situations when the evidence tendered to the issuing "magistrate
supports the conclusion that it is probable [that] anyone in the
described place when the warrant is executed is involved in the
criminal activity in such a way as to have evidence [of the criminal
activity] on his person." 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(e),
at 546-47. Washington courts, however, have held that such a rule
fails to establish a sufficient nexus between the persons present and the
criminal activity. State v. Rivera, 76 Wash. App. 519, 524, 888 P.2d
740, 743 (1995). "[I]ndividualized probable cause is a prerequisite to
an evidence search of any person on the premises." Id. (citing Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245
(1979)).
There are several circumstances, however, in which persons on the
premises may be searched. First, a warrant may describe a person to
be searched. See supra § 3.4(c). Because warrants are to be interpreted
with common sense, a warrant stating that there is probable cause to
believe evidence is concealed on a person allows a search of that person
even though the command portion of the warrant mentions only
"places and premises." State v. Williams, 90 Wash. 2d 245, 246, 580
P.2d 635, 636 (1978). Second, a search may be conducted incident to
arrest. State v. Cottrell, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 133, 542 P.2d 771, 773
(1975), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d 771 (1975);
see also infra § 5.1. In Cottrell, the warrant authorized a search of the
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defendant's residence or "person ... if found thereon." Cottrell, 86
Wash. 2d at 131, 542 P.2d at 771. The court upheld the search of the
defendant's person once the officer had probable cause to place the
defendant under control because the defendant exited a car parked in
front of the residence. Id. at 131, 542 P.2d at 772.
When the warrant itself gives no express or implied authorization
to search persons on the premises and the police do not have probable
cause to arrest them, officers may search such persons in two situa-
tions. First, a person not named in the warrant but present on the
premises may be searched if the police "have reasonable cause to
believe [that the person] has the articles for which the search is
instituted upon his person." State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35,
38, 584 P.2d 408, 410 (1978) (citations omitted). "Reasonable cause"
requires that the person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Id.
Thus, in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics, police were
justified in searching an occupant's fists when at the time of the
officer's entry, the occupant was observed kneeling in front of a
weighing scale and then rising with his fists clenched. Id. at 36-37,
584 P.2d at 408-10. Police were not justified in searching an
occupant's purse, however, when the occupant gave no evidence of
suspicious behavior. State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 893, 683
P.2d 622, 624 (1984); cf. State v. Carter, 79 Wash. App. 154, 162, 901
P.2d 335, 339 (1995) (finding no probable cause to search defendant
during a valid premises search when defendant was asleep and officers
testified that they did not believe defendant was armed and dangerous).
See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(c), at 631-32.
Courts are divided over whether persons who enter a place being
searched may legally be searched without a warrant if they have no
opportunity to conceal any named items. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.9(c), at 632-33. In these situations, the scope of the
search of a bystander is limited to that necessary for detecting the
items sought. Thus, police may not search a person if the search
warrant is for a television set. Id. at 632 n.30.
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons to
protect themselves during the execution of the warrant. See, e.g.,
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93, 100 S. Ct. at 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 247;
Halverson, 21 Wash. App. at 38, 584 P.2d 408, 409-10 (1978); State
v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975);
Worth, 37 Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624. The police must,
however, have a reasonable suspicion that the person searched is
armed. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-94, 100 S. Ct. at 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d at
246-47. Moreover, the search must be limited to ascertaining whether
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the individual is armed. State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 172, 606
P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (holding that an officer conducting a pat down
of an individual who knocked on the door of a residence being searched
may not examine the contents of a wallet found on the individual
"after satisfying himself that the 'bulge' [wallet] was not a weapon");
cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889, 911 (1968) (holding that police may conduct limited weapons
search to protect themselves during lawful investigatory stop). Slightly
different considerations may control in search situations, as opposed to
Terry stops, because the encounter in the search situation is more
lengthy than that in a Terry stop. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.9(d), at 636-38.
3.8(b) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
A valid search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search
is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct.
2587, 2595, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351 (1981) (footnotes omitted). The
authority to detain exists even if the occupant is initially found outside
the home. State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wash. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d
648, 652 (1994).
A brief detention is permissible even when the police do not have
probable cause to believe that the objects of the search are on the
person detained. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S. Ct. at 2595, 69 L.
Ed. 2d at 351. In addition, the police may ascertain whether any
individual arriving on the scene might interfere with the search and
may determine what business, if any, the individual has at the
premises. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. at 201, 540 P.2d at 446 (citing
State v. Howard, 7 Wash. App. 668, 502 P.2d 1043 (1972)). Such a
limited stop, however, is not a license to detain and frisk all persons
approaching within 100 feet of the location of the search. State v.
Melin, 27 Wash. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1980); see also
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(d), at 636.
3.9 Permissible Scope and Intensity of Search
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with
the requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible
scope and intensity of the search. "As a general rule search warrants
must be strictly construed and their execution must be within the
specificity of the warrant." State v. Cottrell, 12 Wash. App. 640, 643,
532 P.2d 644, 646 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 130,
542 P.2d 771 (1975).
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Just how intense a search may be is governed by the nature of the
items to be seized. Generally, a premises search warrant "justifies a
search of personal effects of the owner found therein [that] are
plausible repositories for the objects specified in the warrant." State
v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 662, 624 (1984) (citing
State v. White, 13 Wash. App. 949, 538 P.2d 860 (1975)); see also
State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 702 P.2d 481 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987) (holding that a
warrant to search for clothing used in a robbery extended to the entire
residence where clothing might be found, including the inside of a
garbage-can-sized commercial vacuum cleaner). Similarly, a valid
search warrant for a defendant's home, trailer, and vehicles is sufficient
means by which to obtain a blood test. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.
2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1993).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that officers
searching for documents must, out of necessity, examine documents
not specifically listed in the warrant. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 482 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 n.11, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 643 n.11
(1976). In the course of such a search, officers may also seize evidence
found that is not specifically described in the warrant if "it will aid in
a particular apprehension or conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus
with the crime under investigation." State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d
668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239, 1254 (1997) (finding that officers did not
exceed the scope of the search warrant when they examined and seized
documents not specifically listed in the warrant).
Once the purpose of the warrant has been carried out, the
authority to search ends. See State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 541,
581 P.2d 172, 176 (1978) (holding that a warrant permitting a search
in a bedroom for papers linking defendant to the premises did not
justify a search of a small box after such papers had been discovered).
3.9(a) Area
A search may extend to the entire area covered by the warrant's
description. See generally Cottrell, 12 Wash. App. at 644, 532 P.2d at
647. But, police "must execute a search warrant strictly within the
bounds set by the warrant." State v. Kelley, 52 Wash. App. 581, 585,
762 P.2d 20, 22 (1988). A warrant that authorizes the search of a
house but that does not mention outbuildings does not include a search
of outbuildings not under defendant's control, and vice versa. Kelley,
52 Wash. App. at 585-86, 762 P.2d at 23 (suppressing evidence
located in a barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see
also State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wash. App. 11, 939 P.2d 706 (1997). A
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search of a padlocked locker and a storage room that did not comprise
a separate building does not exceed the scope of a warrant to search the
premises. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wash. App. 448, 452-53, 836
P.2d 239, 241-42 (1992).
Police may enter areas not explicitly named in the warrant when
such entry is necessary to execute the warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693, 60 L. Ed. 2d
177, 193 (1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly authorizing planting
of hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert entry onto premis-
es). Additionally, officers may search for items thrown outside of the
premises if such action was provoked by the knowledge of police
presence at the premises. State v. Dearinger, 73 Wash. 2d 563, 567,
439 P.2d 971, 973 (1968) (finding that officers acted within ambit of
warrant in seizing a sack and its contents thrown by occupant into the
adjoining yard during the search).
On the other hand, authority to search a vehicle does not include
authority to break into a garage where the vehicle was parked when the
officers knew at the time they applied for the warrant that the vehicle
was in the garage, and they could have included the garage in the
warrant. People v. Sciacca, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (N.Y. 1978). It
has been suggested that police may enter adjacent areas if they
reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.10(a), at 659 (3d ed. 1996).
3.9(b) Personal Effects
Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to the
occupant may be searched if the effects can reasonably be expected to
contain the described items. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d
641, 643, 870 P.2d 313, 314 (1994); Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892,
683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984). Ordinarily, however, the police may not
search those effects that they know belong to other occupants. See
Worth, 37 Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624-25. Even when a
warrant authorizes a search of the entire premises, it does not justify
the search of another person residing on the premises who was not
mentioned in the affidavit, nor does it justify a search of a purse
belonging to that other person if she was holding the purse or in
proximity to it. Id.
In Worth, the court rejected a distinction between personal effects
worn on or held by the person and those effects nearby the person at
the time of the search. Id.; cf. State v. Biggs, 16 Wash. App. 221, 556
P.2d 247 (1976). "A narrow focus on whether a person is holding or
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wearing a personal item would tend to undercut the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment and leave vulnerable readily recognizable effects,
such as [a] purse, which an individual has under [her] control and
seeks to preserve as private." Worth, 37 Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d
at 625; cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(b), at 661
(suggesting that the proper test in a case involving visitors is whether
police have a reasonable belief that the items described would be
concealed in the visitor's belongings); State v. Scott, 21 Wash. App.
113, 117, 584 P.2d 423, 425 (1978) (holding that a warrant authorizing
search of "spa" business records to uncover evidence of prostitution
did not permit search of employees' purses for customers' names).
One court has attempted to avoid this problem by holding that one has
no privacy interest in items left at another's house. Biggs, 16 Wash.
App. at 224-25, 556 P.2d at 249 (visitor who departed without his
jacket no longer had expectation of privacy regarding the jacket and
thus jacket could be searched).
For a case involving abandoned personal effects, see United States
v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986). In Oswald, the defendant
abandoned his briefcase containing cocaine in the locked trunk of an
automobile and made no effort to recover it or to notify authorities.
The Oswald court held that such abandonment carries no expectation
of privacy and it makes no difference that the defendant may have had
some hope of regaining possession of the briefcase in the future. Id.
at 667 (noting that a determination of true abandonment is individual-
ized to the particular circumstances of the instant case). See 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(b), at 579-80.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that there is no expectation
of privacy in garbage left beyond the curtilage of a home, Washington
has recognized a privacy right in one's garbage, thus requiring a
warrant to search such refuse. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 210-41, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 36-37
(1988), with State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 576-77, 800 P.2d
1112, 1115 (1990) (rejecting Greenwood on state law grounds). See also
supra § 1.3 (g).
3.9(c) Vehicles
Police who have authority to search a residence for illegal drugs
also have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the
defendant and that are located on the premises to be searched. State
v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186, 1191 (1984). But
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(d), at 539-40 (evidence
must tend to show that vehicles on the premises were likely places of
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
concealment for the items to be seized). However, police have no
authority to search vehicles that are not within the curtilage-the area
contiguous to a home in which the occupant has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 78 Wash. App. 44, 51-52,
896 P.2d 704, 709-10 (1995) (holding that a truck parked next to and
slightly in, a public street where there was no fence or other barrier
between the occupant's yard and the street is not within the curtilage
of the house); State v. Pourtes, 49 Wash. App. 579, 581, 744 P.2d 644,
645-46 (1987) (holding that the street and the shoulder of the roadway
are not within the curtilage of the residence); State v. Niedergang, 43
Wash. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576, 579 (1986) (vehicle is not within
the curtilage of a house when it is parked in a space that lawfully could
be used by anyone coming to the adjoining house on legitimate
business). A trailer that is used as a residence is treated as a residential
outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wash. App.
11, 16, 939 P.2d 706, 709 (1997).
3.10 Seizure of Unnamed Items: Requirements in General
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the
seizure falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70,
917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (search incident to arrest); State v. Rose, 128
Wash. 2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996) (open view); State v.
Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332, 346, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (1991) (plain view).
For a discussion of search incident to arrest see infra § 5.1. See
generally infra ch. 5.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant require-
ment that applies after police lawfully invade an area where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d at 345-46,
815 P.2d at 769. The plain view doctrine requires that (1) the officers
have prior justification for the intrusion, and (2) the officers immedi-
ately recognize they have found contraband. Id. Traditionally,
inadvertent discovery was a third requirement. That element is no
longer required under the Fourth Amendment and has never been
required under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.
See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S. Ct. 2301,
2309-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 125 (1990); State v. Goodin, 67 Wash.
App. 623, 627, 838 P.2d 135, 138 (1992).
Under the plain view doctrine, officers have justification for
seizing contraband not specified in the warrant if it is found during the
course of a valid search and is within the scope of a valid warrant.
Goodin, 67 Wash. App. at 627, 838 P.2d at 138; see also State v.
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Wright, 61 Wash. App. 819, 810 P.2d 935 (1991) (holding that a
handgun discovered at the crime scene was within the plain view
exception). However, officers do not have justification under the plain
view doctrine for seizing contraband discovered during a general
exploratory search after they have found what they sought under the
warrant. State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 542, 581 P.2d 172, 176
(1978) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.
Ct. 2022, 2024, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 583 (1971)) ("Plain view doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges.").
The open view doctrine differs from the plain view doctrine in
that the open view doctrine applies when officers discover contraband
from a nonintrusive vantage point. State v. Dykstra, 84 Wash. App.
186, 191-92, 926 P.2d 929, 932 (1996). For example, a residential
front porch may be considered a nonintrusive vantage point if it has a
"natural access route to the residence and is impliedly open to the
public." Rose, 128 Wash. 2d at 391-92, 909 P.2d at 283; see also
Myers, 117 Wash. 2d at 345, 815 P.2d at 769 (contraband was in open
view when police officers approached home in daylight by direct access
and spoke with occupant from porch and did not "spy" or act
secretively); State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 905, 632 P.2d 44, 48-
49 (1981) (slight deviation from the most direct route was not
unreasonable intrusion on occupant's privacy). However, officers
violate the open view exception when they intrude on the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d
263, 266-67, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (violation occurred when officer
questioned a suspect outside the residence and a second officer walked
around a vehicle in the driveway to look into an obscure garage at the
back of the lot).
3.11 Delivering Warrant and Inventory: Requirements
for Execution of Warrants
Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the execution
of warrants beyond those mandated by the federal Constitution.
Washington court rules provide:
The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the
person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken a
copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken. If no such
person is present, the officer may post a copy of the search warrant
and receipt. The return shall be made promptly and shall be
accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. The
inventory shall be made in the presence of the person from whose
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possession or premises the property is taken, or in the presence of
a least one person other than the officer. The court shall upon
request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from whom or
from whose premises the property was taken and to the applicant for
the warrant.
WASH. CR.R. 2.3(d). The requirement that an inventory be made in
the presence of another person is designed to prevent error in the
inventory. The requirement is satisfied by the presence of another
police officer. State v. Wraspir, 20 Wash. App. 626, 624, 581 P.2d
182, 184 (1978).
Washington follows the majority rule that defects relating to the
return of a search warrant are ministerial and do not compel invalida-
tion of the warrant, absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Smith, 15
Wash. App. 716, 719, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976). But see 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.12(c), at 721-22 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that if no
return was made, the search should be unconstitutional).
3.12 Challenging the Content of an Affidavit
3.12(a) Informant's Identity
Although a defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit
in order to challenge whether the warrant was issued on probable
cause, the court may excise portions of the affidavit that identify a
confidential or unnamed informant to protect the State's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of such informants. Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667,
682 (1978); State v. Mathiesen, 27 Wash. App. 257, 260, 616 P.2d
1255, 1257 (1980); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(5) (1995)
("[A] public officer shall not be examined as a witness as to communi-
cations made. in official confidence, when the public interest would
suffer by disclosure."); WASH. CR.R. 4.7(f)(2) (State's insistence on an
informant's secrecy is based on the "informant's privilege," recognized
by both statute and court rule). When the information is secret,
however, the defendant lacks access to the very information he or she
needs to challenge the veracity of an affidavit. State v. Casal, 103
Wash. 2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234, 1238 (1985). Thus, "fundamental
fairness" may require the disclosure of an informant's identity when
the informant's potential testimony at trial would be relevant to the
determination of the defendant's innocence. See Casal, 103 Wash. 2d
at 815-16, 699 P.2d at 1236-37 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957)). A defendant under
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these circumstances is entitled to an in camera hearing on the truthful-
ness of the informant's information if the defendant "casts a reasonable
doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant."
State v. White, 50 Wash. App. 858, 865, 751 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1988)
(quoting Casal, 103 Wash. 2d at 820, 699 P.2d at 1238). All the
defendant must show is a "minimal showing of inconsistency." White,
50 Wash. App. at 865, 751 P.2d at 1206 (quoting United States v.
Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761 (D. R.I. 1981)). Even so, "a Casal hearing is
required only whe[n] a search warrant affidavit contains no other
independent basis for establishing probable cause." White, 50 Wash.
App. at 865 n.4, 751 P.2d at 1206 n.4.
When the defendant presents evidence that casts doubt on the
veracity of representations in the officer's affidavit and the officer has
related information provided by a secret informant, the court, in its
discretion, may order an in camera hearing to examine the informant.
Casal, 103 Wash. 2d at 820-21, 699 P.2d at 1239. If the informant
verifies the affiant's story and the judge is convinced that probable
cause existed, the informant's identity is not to be disclosed. Id. at
822, 699 P.2d at 1239. But if the judge finds a substantial showing of
falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id.
3.12(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in Affidavit
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d
667, 672 (1978). The defendant must first make a substantial showing
that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was either made knowingly
and intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) was
necessary or material to the finding of probable cause. Id. at 155-56,
98 S. Ct. at 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69; State v. Garrison, 118
Wash. 2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388, 1389-90 (1992). The Franks test
also applies to allegations of material omissions. State v. Cord, 103
Wash. 2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985). The substantial showing
must be based on specific facts and offers of proof rather than on
conclusory assertions. Garrison, 118 Wash. 2d at 872, 827 P.2d at
1389. "'Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insuffi-
cient."' State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44, 50
(1981) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684, 57 L. Ed.
2d at 682); State v. Olson, 74 Wash. App. 126, 131-32, 872 P.2d 64,
68 (1994); State v. Taylor, 74 Wash. App. 111, 116, 872 P.2d 53, 56
(1994).
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If the defendant fails to meet these formidable preconditions, the
inquiry ends. But if the defendant is successful in proving the truth
of his allegations and the false statements or omitted material is
relevant to the establishment of probable cause, the affidavit must be
examined. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, 57 L. Ed.
2d at 682; Garrison, 118 Wash. 2d at 873, 827 P.2d at 1390. Once
false statements are deleted or the omissions are inserted into the
affidavit, if the affidavit then supports a finding of probable cause the
defendant's motion to suppress fails and no hearing is required.
Garrison at 873, 827 P.2d at 1390. However, if the modified affidavit
is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the Fourth Amendment.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682;
Garrison, 118 Wash. 2d at 873, 827 P.2d at 1390.
3.13 Special Situations
3.13(a) First Amendment Limitations
The Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity in the
description of items to be seized is afforded its most scrupulous
enforcement when the items implicate First Amendment rights, such
as in the case of literature, pictures, films, and recordings. Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437
(1965); State v. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d 538, 546-47, 834 P.2d 611, 616
(1992). Furthermore, "the constitutional requirement that warrants
must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the
most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis
for their seizure is the ideas [that] they contain." Stanford, 379 U.S.
at 485, 85 S. Ct. at 511-12, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 437; State v. J-R Distrib.,
Inc., 111 Wash. 2d 764, 774, 765 P.2d 281, 286 (1988). When the
First Amendment is involved, nothing should be left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485, 85 S.
Ct. at 512, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 437.
Thus, a warrant that commands the executing officer to seize
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist
Party of Texas," fails the scrupulous exactitude requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 478, 85 S. Ct. at 508, 13
L. Ed. 2d at 433 (holding that a general search for objectionable
publications was constitutionally intolerable).
However, the scrupulous exactitude standard has not been
extended to all searches and seizures involving the First Amendment.
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State v. Walter, 66 Wash. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440, 444 (1992)
(determining that greater scrutiny was not required merely because
photographs were involved); see also New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475
U.S. 868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 1615, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871, 880 (1986)
(rejecting contention that more than warrant was required to seize
photographs from newspaper office); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483,
490, 93 S. Ct. 2789, 2793, 37 L. Ed. 2d 745, 752-53 (1973) (holding
that the First Amendment does not require a hearing prior to seizure
of a film so long as the seizure does not prevent the film from being
exhibited).
The scrupulous exactitude standard is typically triggered when the
warrant commands the seizure of allegedly obscene material. See
Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d at 553, 834 P.2d at 619; see also 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.6(e), at 578 (3d ed. 1996). Clearly, a warrant
authorizing the seizure of material that the executing officer deems to
be "child pornography" provides the executing officer broad discretion
and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment and the scrupulous
exactitude standard. Perrone, 119 Wash. 2d at 553, 834 P.2d at 619.
"Rather, what is required is a description of these materials by title or
[by] similar identifying characteristic, or by a specific statement as to
the type of contents [that] would render the materials presumptively
obscene." 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(e), at 579.
3.13(b) Intrusions into the Body
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
physical intrusion into a person's body violates due process and
determined that due process is violated if the intrusion "shocks the
conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205,
209, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190 (1952) (concluding that stomach pumping
without a warrant to obtain evidence violated due process). Subse-
quent to Rochin, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself, and
applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L. Ed. 2d
1081, 1091 (1961). Consequently, the Court has not relied on the
Rochin "shocks the conscience" standard exclusively but has instead
applied a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in cases like
Rochin that involve highly intrusive searches and seizures. See
generally United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.
Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105
S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 766-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 917-20
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(1966). Thus, for example, "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an
individual's body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable'
even if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Winston, 470 U.S. at
759, 105 S. Ct. at 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 668. But see Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 770-72, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 916-20 (holding
that blood alcohol content may be obtained under certain circumstanc-
es). An intrusion that is reasonable is one in which:
(1) there is a clear indication, rather than a mere chance, that the
intrusion will produce the desired evidence;
(2) the intrusive procedure is reasonably suited to obtaining the
evidence, as for example, a blood test used for determining blood
alcohol levels; and
(3) the intrusive procedure is performed in a reasonable manner,
as, for example, a blood test performed by medical personnel rather
than by officers at the station house. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.1(e), at 413.
Thus, for example, taking a blood sample from a defendant
charged with negligent homicide is valid when the police have probable
cause to believe that evidence of intoxication will be found and that the
test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and performed
in a reasonable manner. State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 185, 804
P.2d 558, 564 (1991), abrogated by State v. Berlin, 133 Wash.2d 541,
947 P.2d 700 (1997). See also State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525,
532, 852 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1993) (valid search warrant based on
probable cause is constitutionally sufficient to obtain blood sample
from suspect); State v. Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d
1025, 1031 (1985) (probable cause established if person appears
intoxicated and intoxication is an element of the crime for which the
suspect is arrested).
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in cases of
putative fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 739, 612
P.2d 795, 798 (1980), and has upheld mandatory HIV and DNA
testing of convicted sexual offenders, see State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.
2d at 536, 852 P.2d at 1070 (mandatory HIV testing of sexual
offenders presents a minimal Fourth Amendment intrusion for which
the State's reasons are compelling). See also State v. Olivas, 122
Wash. 2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1993) (statute requiring
mandatory DNA testing of convicted sexual offenders in order to
establish DNA databank is constitutionally permissible).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environ-
ments such as prisons and jails. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
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560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1885, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 482 (1979) (full body
cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unreason-
able, even when searches are routine and not based on probable cause);
State v. Harris, 66 Wash. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402, 405 (1992)
(exigent circumstances justify strip search of juvenile before placement
in holding cell when police had prior experience with gang members
taping razor blades to their skin). Similar intrusive procedures may be
allowed at borders. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 537, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3308, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 388-89 (1985)
(suspect fitting profile for alimentary canal drug smuggler may be
subjected to rectal cavity search when search warrant was based on
profile and suspect's unwillingness to eat, drink, or defecate during
sixteen-hour confinement). See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3
(borders).
The Washington State Constitution affords no greater protection
to an arrestee for warrantless body strip searches than does the federal
Constitution. State v. Audley, 77 Wash. App. 897, 907, 894 P.2d
1359, 1364 (1995) (warrantless strip search of arrestee in local
detention center is reasonable when security needs of local jail outweigh
privacy interest of arrestee).
Other factors considered include whether the search is necessary
for a fair determination of the charges and whether opportunities for
an adversary hearing and interlocutory appellate review are available.
See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1(d), at 424; see also
Winston, 470 U.S. at 762, 105 S. Ct. at 1617-18, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 670
(holding that the community's interest in determining the guilt or
innocence of a party is a balancing measure).
3.13(c) Warrants Directed at Nonsuspects
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
provides the same special protections against search and seizure for the
possessor of evidence who is not the suspect of a crime. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978, 56 L. Ed.
2d 525, 537-38 (1978) (holding that probable cause to issue a valid
search warrant merely requires that officers demonstrate that the fruits,
instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime be located on the premises to
be searched). Critics have argued that a search warrant of a third party
is per se unreasonable and that a subpoena duces tecum can adequately
protect law enforcement interests. See Note, The Reasonableness of
Warranted Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, 44 ALB. L. REV. 212,
232-35 (1979) (criticizing Zurcher for failing to adopt a less drastic
alternative or less intrusive practice test in Fourth Amendment cases).
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In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 (PPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-12 (1994). See S. REP. NO.
96-874 at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3950. The
PPA prohibits the government from searching or seizing any work
product material "possessed by a person reasonably believed to have
a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast,
or other similar form of public communication" without first issuing
a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 99(a). The PPA "affords
the press and certain other persons not suspected of committing a
crime with protections not provided currently by the Fourth Amend-
ment." S. REP. No. 96-874 at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3950, 3950. Such protections of nonsuspects, however, has not been
extended outside the media. See United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d
254, 258 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding a warrant to search an attorney's
office on probable cause that attorney was evading taxes); O'Connor v.
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (finding that the
protections of client confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, attorney
work product, and a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel
cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through documents
in search of items to be seized when such officers possess a warrant to
search an attorney's office). See also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.1(f)-(h), at 434-37.
CHAPTER 4: SEIZURE OF THE PERSON:
ARRESTS AND STOP-AND-FRISKS
4.0 Seizure: Introduction
This chapter deals with principles that are unique to seizure of the
person. Related issues are discussed supra ch. 2 (probable cause); supra
§ 3.7 (knock and announce); and infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest).
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when
an officer, by physical force or by show of authority, restrains an
individual's freedom of movement. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509
(1980). Restraint amounting to a seizure occurs when a reasonable
person would not feel free to leave the area. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903 (1968). This
objective test considers the coercive effect of the officer's conduct in
the particular situation to determine the impression conveyed to a
reasonable person in a similar situation. See Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572
(1988).
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court shifted to a more
subjective test in defining Fourth Amendment seizures when they are
based on a show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1991). The
Court shifted the focus to the defendant's behavior rather than the
officer's conduct by requiring that for a seizure to occur, the defendant
must submit to a show of authority. Id. (holding that although
officer's pursuit was a show of authority, there was no seizure because
defendant fled instead of submitting to that authority).
In contrast, the Washington Constitution has generally been
interpreted as providing greater protection for individual privacy
interests than does the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Young, 86
Wash. App. 194, 201-02, 935 P.2d 1372, 1376 (1997), aff'd, 135
Wash. 2d 498, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). Thus, the Washington Supreme
Court has rejected the Hodari D. test and has not required a defen-
dant's submission to authority in order for a seizure to occur. See
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58-63, 720 P.2d 808, 811-13
(1986).
Under Washington law, a seizure occurs when a reasonable
person, under the totality of the circumstances, would not feel free
either to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests. WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7; State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 352, 917 P.2d
108, 112 (1996). Whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave
is not based on the defendant's behavior, but on the officer's coercive
conduct. See id. at 353, 917 P.2d at 112; see also State v. Knox, 86
Wash. App. 831, 839, 939 P.2d 710, 714 (1997). Moreover, the
officer's coercive conduct is established by a series of acts, rather than
a single act, that convey a seizure. See State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash.
App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1992) (when officer asked
defendant both whether he had drugs on his person and whether the
officer could search him, the situation was of such a nature as to
prevent a reasonable person from feeling free to leave); cf. State v.
Toney, 60 Wash. App. 804, 807-08, 810 P.2d 929, 931 (1991) (holding
no seizure because there was no evidence that the officer drove
aggressively or intentionally singled defendant out).
4.1 Arrest
Although a seizure restrains an individual's freedom of movement,
not all seizures amount to an arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 624-25, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549-50, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 696
(1991) (defining arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the person'
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"); see also State v. Lyons,
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85 Wash. App. 268, 270, 932 P.2d 188, 189-90 (1997). For instance,
police activities such as requesting identification or engaging citizens
in conversation do not convert casual encounters into seizures. See
State v. Knox, 86 Wash. App. 831, 838, 939 P.2d 710, 714 (1997).
Thus, the relevant inquiry to determine whether a person is in custody
is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have
thought he or she was in custody. See State v. Rivard, 131 Wash. 2d
63, 75, 929 P.2d 413, 419 (1997) (finding no arrest because defendant
was not physically apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, placed in a
police vehicle, or approached by officers who had weapons drawn).
It is no defense to a criminal prosecution that a defendant was
illegally arrested. However, the legality of the arrest affects the legality
of the searches and confessions taking place subsequent to the arrest
and affects the admissibility of evidence derived from the arrest. See
generally infra ch. 7.
4.2 Arrests Without Warrants: Public Versus Home Arrests
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as
searches, and an officer may make a warrantless felony arrest with
probable cause in a public place even though he or she had time to
obtain a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422-23,
96 S. Ct. 820, 827-28, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 608-09 (1976); United States
v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.1(b), at 14-15 (3d ed. 1996). Nonetheless, such
arrests must still be supported by probable cause. Probable cause,
however, is not subject to calculation by formula or by mathematical
certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wash. App. 208, 212, 896 P.2d
731, 733 (1995). Thus, a defendant is entitled to a prompt judicial
determination of probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
126, 95 S. Ct. 854, 869, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 72 (1975); see also infra
§ 4.5(c).
Although police may make a warrantless arrest in a public area,
in the absence of exigent circumstances they may not make a warrant-
less arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home. Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 639, 652-53 (1980). Exigent circumstances exist when the time
required to obtain a warrant would result in the suspect's escape, injury
to either the officers or the public, or the destruction of evidence. See
Gooch, 6 F.3d at 679. Fact patterns constituting exigent circumstances
are described in detail, infra §§ 5.16-5.20. See generally, William C.
Donnino & Anthony J. Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless
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Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90 (1980). The Payton prohibition on
a warrantless nonconsensual entry of a suspect's home has been applied
to several Washington cases, including State v. White, 129 Wash. 2d
105, 109, 915 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (1996) (declining to extend Payton
beyond the protection of the home) and State v. Griffith, 61 Wash.
App. 35, 41, 808 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1991).
Under the Fourth Amendment, police who make a warrantless
arrest outside an arrestee's home may then accompany the arrestee into
his or her home even if the arrestee, with the officer's consent, enters
the home for such purpose as obtaining identification. See Washington
v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778,
785-86 (1982) (risk of danger to officer and possibility of confederates'
escape justified police officer's act of accompanying arrested person
into dwelling; police need no affirmative indication of likelihood of
danger or escape).
Washington, however, has rejected the bright-line rule that an
officer may, in all circumstances, accompany an arrestee into the
arrestee's home. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 820-21,
676 P.2d 419, 423 (1984). Under article I, section 7, when a person
is arrested for a minor violation, the arresting officer may not follow
the arrestee into his or her home unless the officer can reasonably
conclude that the officer's safety is endangered, that evidence might be
destroyed, or that escape is a strong possibility. See Gooch, 6 F.3d at
679 (reiterating factors that constitute exigent circumstances). A police
officer may accompany an arrestee into his or her residence without a
warrant if the officer knows of specific, articulable facts that indicate
a threat to the officer's safety. State v. Wood, 45 Wash. App. 299,
308-09, 725 P.2d 435, 440 (1986) (finding that sufficient reason existed
to accompany the arrestee into residence for security purposes when
officer was executing an arrest warrant for a felony parole violation).
An officer may also enter a home without a warrant in response
to a medical emergency. State v. Angelos, 86 Wash. App. 253, 258,
936 P.2d 52, 54-55 (1997) (evidence of drugs not excluded when
officer entered home in response to a 911 emergency call for drug
overdose and searched for drugs upon learning that small children were
in the home because he perceived a safety hazard to the children).
In contrast, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway
of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See
State v. Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460, 465 (1993)
(citing State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91
(1985)). As such, for Fourth Amendment purposes the location of the
suspect, and not the location of the officer, is material to the issue of
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whether an arrest occurs in the home. See Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d at
429, 693 P.2d at 91. Thus, an officer is prohibited from arresting a
suspect standing in the doorway of the home without a warrant unless
exigent circumstances exist. See Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d at 697, 861
P.2d at 465. However, an arrest of a suspect who is on a front porch,
as opposed to in the doorway, is considered a public arrest. See id. at
698, 861 P.2d at 466 (stating that the "conclusion that a warrantless
arrest on a porch is an illegal arrest conflicts with authority from other
Washington decisions, other jurisdictions, and scholarly comment").
4.3 Arrests Without Warrants: Felony Versus Misdemeanor Arrests
4.3(a) Felony Arrest
The following section discusses differences in the warrant
requirements for felony and misdemeanor arrests. For a discussion of
custodial arrests for misdemeanor offenses, see infra § 4.4(d). Under
the common law standard and the Fourth Amendment, an officer's
authority to make a warrantless arrest in public generally applies to
felonies. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422-23, 96 S. Ct.
820, 827-28, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 608-09 (1976). While some states
have placed restrictions on warrantless felony arrests, Washington has
codified the common law rule. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (1996
& Supp. 1998).
4.3(b) Misdemeanor Arrest
Under the common law, an officer may arrest a person who
breaches the peace. See Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wash. 2d 210, 218,
943 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1997) (citing Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 605,
606-07, 225 P. 633, 633-34 (1924)); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5. 1(b),
at 13 (3d ed. 1996). Thus, an officer is required to have probable
cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed in his
presence. State v. Thompson, 69 Wash. App. 436, 441, 848 P.2d 1317,
1320 (1993). The common law misdemeanor rule has not been held
to be constitutionally required, and many states have enacted statutes
applying the misdemeanor rule to felonies. See United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-21, 96 S. Ct. 820, 825-27, 46 L. Ed. 2d
598, 606-08 (1976). Some states that require warrants for misdemean-
ors have held that a statutory, as opposed to a constitutional, violation
is not grounds for the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of
the arrest. See, e.g., State v. Eubanks, 196 S.E.2d 706, 708-09 (N.C.
1973).
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Similarly, Washington permits an officer to make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest only when the offense is committed in the officer's
presence. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
However, the statute sets out several exceptions that permit an officer
to make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest if the offense is not
committed in the officer's presence. An officer may make a warrant-
less misdemeanor arrest if the offense: (1) involves physical harm or
the threat of physical harm to persons or property, (2) is for possession
of marijuana, (3) is for violation of a restraining order, (4) is witnessed
by another officer, or (5) is for one of a number of specified traffic
offenses. See id. But compare State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom
County Dist. Ct., 92 Wash. 2d 35, 38, 593 P.2d 546, 547 (1979)
(officer may not make an arrest at a location other than the accident
scene), with State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 654-55, 577 P.2d
147, 149-50 (1978) (officer may make lawful misdemeanor arrest for
offense committed four hours earlier when offense involves physical
harm to property).
The "in the presence" requirement of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.100 is satisfied whenever the officer directly perceives facts
permitting a reasonable inference that a misdemeanor is being
committed. See Snohomish v. Swoboda, 1 Wash. App. 292, 295, 461
P.2d 546, 548-49 (1969). Questions arise as to whether the officer
must view all the elements of a crime and as to what types of
information may be used to fill in "gaps." Id. (satisfying "in the
presence" requirement when from 150 feet away, police officers, as part
of "sting" operation, observed person handing an object to another;
even though police could not positively identify the object, the nature
of the operation permitted a reasonable inference the object was
contraband); see also State v. Silverman, 48 Wash. 2d 198, 202-03, 292
P.2d 868, 870-71 (1956) (satisfying "in the presence" requirement for
possession of obscene pictures with intent to show them when officer
entered establishment as member of public and viewed "peep shows").
Originally, the misdemeanor offense of possessing or consuming
alcohol by a person under twenty-one years of age (WASH. REV. CODE
§ 66.44.270 (1955)) was not committed in an officer's presence if the
officer did not witness the person's ingestion of the alcohol. However,
the legislature realized that such a requirement was overly burdensome.
Thus, in 1987, the legislature amended WASH. REV. CODE
§ 66.44.270 to allow an officer to arrest a person under the age of 21
for possessing or consuming alcohol if the officer had probable cause
to believe that the person had alcohol or other drugs in his system.
See State v. Preston, 66 Wash. App. 494, 497-98, 832 P.2d 513, 515-
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16 (1992) (citing State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash. 2d 120, 713 P.2d 71
(1986)). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(c).
4.4 Arrest with Warrants
The principles governing the procurement and execution of search
warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See supra ch. 3; WASH. CR.R.
2.2; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.31.030, .040 (1996). Thus, an invalid
warrant will not support an arrest. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 568-69, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971); 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(g), at 55 (3d ed. 1996).
A seizure is lawful if an officer has reasonably articulable grounds
to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee named in the
warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 453-54, 688 P.2d 146, 149
(1984). If doubt arises as to the identity, the officer is expected to
immediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny whether the
warrant applies to the person being held. Id. at 454, 688 P.2d at 149.
The initial arrest, however, must be based on more than the individu-
al's similarity to the general physical description set forth in the
warrant. See Smith, 102 Wash. 2d at 454, 688 P.2d at 149 (applying
the test articulated in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379
(D.C. App. 1975), the Smith court found seizure of "chako sticks" to
be unlawful).
4.5 Arrests: Miscellaneous Requirements
4.5(a) Use of Force
Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to use
reasonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could use deadly
force if such force reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a suspect's
escape from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13-
15, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1702-03, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10-12 (1985). The
common law rule has been restricted, however, and an arresting officer
may use deadly force only when he or she "has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others." Id. at 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694,
1696-97, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 3 (police not permitted to shoot unarmed,
fleeing burglary suspect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is
governed by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent with
Garner. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.050 (1996) ("If after
notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee[s] or
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forcibly resist[s], the officer may use all necessary means to effect the
arrest."); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040 (1996) (listing specific
situations in which officer is justified in using deadly force).
In a Washington case decided before Garner, the court upheld the
use of a chokehold to prevent destruction of evidence even though the
officers did not fear harm to themselves or to the public. See State v.
Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 666, 676 P.2d 504, 506 (1984) (chokehold
used to prevent defendant from swallowing balloons suspected of
containing heroin did not violate due process or Fourth Amendment
rights because defendant was capable of breathing when chokehold was
applied); cf infra §§ 5.2(a) and 5.18(a). The legislature specifically
limited the use of deadly force under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A. 16.040(1)(c) in instances in which the officer has "probable cause
to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious
physical harm to the officer ... or others." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.16.040(2) (1996). The use of deadly force by a public officer is
justified "when necessar[y] ... to overcome actual resistance to the
execution of the legal process .. .or in the discharge of a legal duty."
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(1)(b) (1996). In particular, deadly
force is justified when either a public officer or a person acting under
his command and in the officer's aid assists the officer by:
i) arrest[ing] or apprehend[ing] a person who the officer reason-
ably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is
committing, or is attempting to commit a felony;
ii) prevent[ing] the escape ... or in retak[ing] a person who
escapes from a [federal or state correctional] facility; or
iii) prevent[ing] the escape of a person from a county or city jail
... if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or
convicted of a felony; or
iv) lawfully suppress[ing] a riot if the actor or another participant
is armed with a deadly weapon.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(1)(c) (1996).
In construing a prior statute, the Washington Supreme Court held
that deadly force may be used even when a felony has not in fact
occurred so long as the officer reasonably believes that a felony has
been committed. See Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 374, 379-80, 503
P.2d 64, 69-70 (1972). In Reese, the court stated that "[g]reat caution
must be exercised by an officer in the use of deadly force and it must
be resorted to by an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to
apprehend a person fleeing from a lawful arrest for a felony have
failed." Id. at 382-83, 503 P.2d at 71 (emphasis in original). In light
of Garner and recent amendments to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.050,
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an officer must now show probable, rather than merely reasonable,
cause.
4.5(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged:
Pretextual Arrests
Courts differ as to the significance of a suspect being booked for
one offense yet being formally charged with another. Conflicting
considerations underlie the decisions. On the one hand, if the booking
and formal charges need not be similar, police can use an arrest as a
pretext for detaining a suspect for questioning about an unrelated crime
for which the police lack probable cause. On the other hand, at the
time police first establish probable cause for one crime, they may not
possess sufficient information to establish probable cause for another.
See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(e) (3d ed. 1996).
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the booking
charge. See State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 655-56, 577 P.2d
147, 150 (1978). The booking charge has no significance after a formal
charge has been lodged, and booking "for investigation" is permissible
provided that probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present.
See State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d 598, 606-07, 364 P.2d 527, 532
(1961).
When a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in
the officer's presence, the arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has
knowledge of a felony for which the suspect could have been arrested.
See State v. Stebbins, 47 Wash. App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353, 1355
(1987).
4.5(c) Judicial Review
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest
probable cause determination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95
S. Ct. 854, 863, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 65 (1975) ("Once the suspect is in
custody .... the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's
neutral judgment evaporate."). A neutral and detached magistrate
must make the probable cause determination, but the hearing may be
exparte. See id. at 119-23, 95 S. Ct. at 865-68, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 68-71.
The issue of whether a violation of the Gerstein rule requires
suppression of evidence seized after the arrest has not been resolved.
See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(f), at 48; see also Williams
v. State, 348 N.E.2d 623, 627-28 (Ind. 1976) (defendant's voluntary
confession suppressed when, following probable cause arrest, defendant
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was held for eight days without judicial determination of probable
cause and confession was made during that detention).
4.5(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
probable cause always justifies an arrest. Lower court decisions,
however, have held that for certain offenses an arrest is unconstitution-
al in the absence of a special need for custody. See generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(h).
When civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings are involved,
custodial arrests may be improper. The Washington Supreme Court
has held unconstitutional a statute authorizing the custodial arrest of
any person against whom a paternity complaint is filed. See State v.
Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975). Thus, in the absence
of a contrary showing, the usual summons and complaint procedure for
civil cases is deemed adequate for securing the defendant's presence at
trial. See id. at 522, 537 P.2d at 278. However, criminal cases are
treated differently because the public interest in restraining the
defendant is greater. See id. at 520, 537 P.2d at 277; see also 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(h), at 61-62.
Under Washington law, "as a matter of public policy ...
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted,
and impermissible if the defendant signs [a] promise to appear" in
court. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527, 528
(1978); cf. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(e), at 86. In one
case, the Washington Supreme Court held that an officer was
prohibited from making a custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation
unless the officer had "other reasonable grounds [for the arrest] apart
from the minor traffic violation itself." Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 50,
578 P.2d at 529. In 1979, the legislature amended WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.015 to clarify when an officer must issue a citation and when
an officer may arrest without a warrant. See State v. Reding, 119
Wash. 2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1992). Thus, custodial
arrests for minor traffic violations are limited to situations involving
specific statutory violations, a defendant's refusal to sign a promise to
appear, and nonresident arrestees. See State v. Terrazas, 71 Wash.
App. 873, 876, 863 P.2d 75, 77 (1993).
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for offenses that are
not minor such as reckless driving. See Reding, 119 Wash. 2d at 688,
835 P.2d at 1020. Further, a custodial arrest is not inappropriate
merely because the offense is traffic-related. See State v. Carner, 28
Wash. App. 439, 444, 624 P.2d 204, 207 (1981) (arrest proper when
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minor tried to evade police on his motorcycle); cf. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.015 (1996) (police may detain suspect who refuses to sign a
promise to appear in court).
A police officer may make a custodial arrest for a traffic violation
when the violation is a crime rather than merely a traffic infraction, or
when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring the
violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wash. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033, 1036
(1987) (finding that officers' decision to move arrestee to another
location to complete arrest for reckless driving was proper when hostile
crowd gathered in parking lot); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 756-64, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2101-04, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 747-52
(1984) (White, J., dissenting) (finding that State acted within its proper
police power in dealing with perceived seriousness of drunk driving
when it enacted a statute permitting a warrantless arrest for the
misdemeanor); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 573, 576, 712 P.2d
319, 321 (1986) (finding arrest justified when arrestee for misdemeanor
traffic violation had no identification, did not claim to own the vehicle
he was driving, and related a suspicious account of his activities).
4.6 Stop-and-Frisk: Introduction
Police investigatory stops that fall short of arrests may be based
on proof less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27,
88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 (1968). Although these
brief detentions fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the
public interest in crime detection and the relative nonintrusiveness of
a stop permit a lower standard of proof. See id. at 20-27, 88 S. Ct. at
1879-83, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905-09. Thus, the investigatory stop is
tested against the Fourth Amendment's general proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures, rather than by the Amendment's
probable cause requirement. See id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 905.
Regardless of whether article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution or Fourth Amendment protection is at issue, for a seizure
to be permissible, an officer must have "specific and articulable facts
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880,
20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. Reasonable suspicion is not based on the officer's
subjective belief, but on an objective view of all of the facts. See id.
at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906; see also State v. Mitchell,
80 Wash. App. 143, 145, 906 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1995). See generally
supra § 2.9(b).
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Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S.
Ct. 2248, 2255, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 834 (1979). The reasonableness of
the officer's conduct may be determined by the circumstances of the
stop, including whether the officer was following standard procedures
or routine practices in effecting the stop. State v. Chapin, 75 Wash.
App. 460, 468, 879 P.2d 300, 305 (1994). Further, an investigatory
stop will be held "reasonable" when "the limited violation of individual
privacy" is outweighed by the public's "interests in crime prevention
and detection." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209, 99 S. Ct. at 2255, 60 L.
Ed. 2d at 834. Although a balancing test determines the permissible
scope of a stop, once an intrusion is substantial enough to constitute
an arrest, probable cause is necessary regardless of how substantial the
public's interest is. See id. at 212-16, 99 S. Ct. at 2256-58, 60 L. Ed.
2d at 835-38 (custodial detention requires probable cause even when
charges not filed and suspect not told that he is under arrest). But cf.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S. Ct. 3304,
87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (special governmental interest in detaining
smugglers at border justifies holding suspect sixteen hours based on
reasonable suspicion of transporting contraband); see also infra § 6.3.
Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may ripen
into probable cause for arrest if the totality of the circumstances would
lead a reasonably cautious and prudent police officer with the arresting
officer's experience to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.
State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 583-84, 712 P.2d 323, 326
(1986) (suspects' inability to give rational account of appearance and
presence in a high burglary area late at night, absence of identification,
and presence of what appeared to be burglar's tools gave rise to
probable cause to arrest). A temporary seizure of a suspect that falls
short of an arrest does not require that the officer give the suspect
Miranda warnings because a Terry stop is not a custodial interrogation.
State v. King, 89 Wash. App. 612, 624-25, 949 P.2d 856, 863 (1998).
However, if the officer's suspicion ripens into probable cause for arrest,
a Miranda warning must be given. State v. Mercer, 45 Wash. App.
769, 777, 727 P.2d 676, 682 (1986); see also State v. Cameron, 47
Wash. App. 878, 885-86, 737 P.2d 688, 692 (1987); State v. Marshall,
47 Wash. App. 322, 324-25, 737 P.2d 265, 267 (1987).
Terry stops are permitted both to prevent ongoing or future
criminal activity and to investigate completed crimes. See United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1985). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable suspicion
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standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools) and 6.3
(border). See generally Peter Preiser, Confrontations Initiated by Police
on Less Than Probable Cause, 45 ALB. L. REV. 57 (1980); 4 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.1(a)-(e) (3d ed. 1996).
4.7 Satisfying the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
4.7(a) Factual Basis and Individualized Suspicion
The reasonable suspicion standard requires the officer's belief to
be based on objective facts. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979). See also State v. Perea, 85
Wash. App. 339, 340-42, 932 P.2d 1258, 1259-60 (1997); State v.
Seitz, 86 Wash. App. 865, 869, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (1997). The facts must
be both "specific and articulable"; thus, an "inarticulate hunch" is not
sufficient. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 842,
613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1,
105 S. Ct. 308, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1984); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 422, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981). As
a result of his or her experience, however, an officer may be able to
perceive a reasonable suspicion in conduct that an ordinary citizen
would consider to be innocent. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884-85, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 619
(1975); see also State v. Rice, 59 Wash. App. 23, 29, 795 P.2d 739, 742
(1990) (holding that an officer's experience will be considered when
determining whether suspicion of wrongdoing was justified).
Individualized suspicion is generally required for a Terry stop.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2640-44, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362; State
v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 45-46, 684 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1984),
aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). There are, however,
several exceptions. For example, in some circumstances a stop may be
based on less than individualized suspicion when "carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2640-41, 61
L. Ed. 2d at 362. Border checkpoints may constitute such a circum-
stance. See infra § 6.3. When individualized suspicion is lacking,
however, officer discretion must be limited. For example, police
officers stopping vehicles for driver's license and vehicle registration
checks may not select the vehicles at random. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74 (1979).
See also State v. Thorp, 71 Wash. App. 175, 856 P.2d 1123 (1993)
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(holding that officers who lack probable cause or a reasonable suspicion
may not randomly stop moving vehicles for questioning). For a
discussion of stops not requiring individualized suspicion, see infra
§§ 6.3 (stops at or near borders) and 5.24 (vehicle spot checks). See
generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9 .3 (c) (3d ed. 1996).
4.7(b) Particular Applications: Informants
When stops are based on information provided by informants, the
information does not have to meet the same criteria required for
probable cause. See, e.g., Adams v. Wiliiams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92
S. Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972). See generally supra
§ 2.5. The information must, however, carry some "indicia of reliabili-
ty." Adams, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S. Ct. at 1924, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617
(finding sufficient indicia when the informant was known personally to
the officer and had provided information in the past). See also United
States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
detailed information provided by the informant plus independent
observations by the officers involved were sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify stop); State v. Conner, 58 Wash. App. 90, 95, 791
P.2d 261, 263 (1990) (stating that a stop based solely on information
provided by an informant is impermissible absent either (1) circum-
stances suggesting the informant's reliability, or (2) some corroborative
observation suggesting either the presence of criminal activity or that
the information was reliable). However, the Washington Supreme
Court has distinguished between the reliability of information provided
by a citizen and the reliability of information provided by an infor-
mant. See State v. Garcia, 125 Wash. 2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369,
1370 (1994) (holding that information provided by a citizen does not
require a showing of the same degree of reliability as an informant
because a citizen is not a "professional" informant).
Potential danger to the public is a factor that bears on the
reasonableness of a police officer's temporary investigatory detention
of the suspect. State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 413, 704 P.2d
666, 669 (1985) (finding an investigatory stop justified when an
anonymous informant observed a person displaying a gun in a public
restroom and a police officer verified the informant's report of the
person's attire and location). For a summary of cases interpreting
Adams, see 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 220-21.
Police may also make a Terry stop on the basis of information
provided by other divisions or agencies. See United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 230, 105 S. Ct. 675, 681, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 615 (1985);
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
see also Butler, 74 F.3d at 920 (noting probable cause may be demon-
strated through the collective knowledge of the officers involved in an
investigation). Furthermore, the "fellow officer" rule justifies an arrest
on the basis of a police bulletin, such as a hot sheet, as long as the
issuing agency has sufficient information for probable cause. See
Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568,
91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 313 (1971). However, the
arresting officer is not insulated from problems concerning the
sufficiency or reliability of the information. State v. Mance, 82 Wash.
App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527, 529 (1996). Consequently, if the issuing
agency lacks probable cause, so does the arresting officer. Id. Further,
an investigatory stop may be based on information regarding a
completed crime provided by other police agencies so long as the
length and the intrusiveness of the detention do not exceed that which
would have been effected by the police agency providing the informa-
tion. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash. App. 459, 470, 698 P.2d 1109, 1115-
16 (1985).
In Washington, police must have some reason to believe that an
informant is reliable and possesses "[s]ome underlying factual justifica-
tion for the informant's conclusion" that a crime is being committed.
State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980). No
reliability may be inferred from an anonymous informant or from a
named but unknown telephone informant, nor may the basis for the
informant's knowledge be inferred from conclusory allegations. Id.
Conclusory allegations may be sufficient, however, when independent
police observations corroborate the presence of criminal activity or the
reliability of the manner in which the information was obtained. See
id.; see also State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243, 246
(1975); State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984),
aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); State v. Sykes, 27 Wash.
App. 111, 115-16, 615 P.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1980); State v. McCord,
19 Wash. App. 250, 254, 576 P.2d 892, 895 (1978).
An informant's tip may be sufficiently reliable to support a stop
even when it would not support an arrest. See, e.g., State v. Moreno,
21 Wash. App. 430, 436-37, 585 P.2d 481, 483 (1978) (finding cause
to stop, but not to arrest, when defendant arrived on flight specified by
anonymous informant); State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 748-49,
515 P.2d 530, 535 (1973) (finding that an officer's failure to establish
an anonymous informant's reliability by failing to obtain a description
of the informant and by failing to learn both the informant's purpose
for being at scene of crime and reason for wanting to remain anony-
mous does not invalidate the investigative stop, but because circum-
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stances did not indicate probable cause, the subsequent search was
invalid).
The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that when the tip
involves a serious crime, less reliability is required for a stop than is
required in other circumstances. State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d at 944-
45, 530 P.2d at 246; Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d at 50, 621 P.2d at 1276. See
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 229, for a discussion of
State v. Lesnick and the argument that lesser indicia of reliability
should be necessary for serious crimes.
4.7(c) Particular Applications: Nature of the Offense
Terry stops have been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated
robbery, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 604 (1985), to possession of narcotics, Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). For arguments
that Terry stops should be limited to investigations of serious offenses,
see Adams, 407 U.S. at 151-53, 92 S. Ct. at 1926-27, 32 L. Ed. 2d at
619-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 9.2(c). Cf. State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 434,
585 P.2d 481, 483 (1978) (characterizing possession of narcotics as a
"serious" offense).
4.7(d) Examples of Satisfying or Failing to Satisfy the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high crime area will not
justify a stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641,
61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979). See also State v. Barber, 118 Wash.
2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068, 1075 (1992) (holding that a person of a
specific race being "out of place" in a particular geographic area can
never amount to a reasonable suspicion); State v. Seitz, 86 Wash. App.
865, 867-70, 941 P.2d 5, 7-8 (1997) (holding that officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop where officers saw occupants of a car
speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did not observe drugs, money,
or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash. App.
20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1992) (stating that merely walking in the
street in a known drug area late at night does not suggest that someone
has committed criminal activity).
A person leaving a crime scene when police arrive is not the
proper subject of a stop in the absence of other circumstances. Brown,
443 U.S. at 51, 99 S. Ct. at 2639, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 360; State v.
Walker, 66 Wash. App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41, 45 (1992). Similarly,
officers may not stop an individual merely because the individual is in
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proximity to others who are suspected of criminal activity. State v.
Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). See supra
§ 4.7(b). But cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct.
2587, 2595-96, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351 (1981) (valid search warrant for
residence allows detention of occupants during search). See generally
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(d), (g), (i) (discussing and
evaluating state and federal case law on the common Terry stop
situations).
Washington case law continues to support an officer's use of a
Terry stop. See State v. Garcia, 125 Wash. 2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d
1369, 1370 (1994) (information given to police combined with an
officer's experience in narcotics and knowledge of location as high
crime area justified investigative restraint); State v. Little, 116 Wash.
2d 488, 497-98, 806 P.2d 749, 753 (1991) (officers had sufficient
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where officers were generally familiar
with residents of a complex, the officers did not recognize suspects,
and the defendant subsequently fled from the officers); State v. Young,
86 Wash. App. 194, 201, 935 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1997) (suspect
dropping a soda can when illuminated by an officer's spotlight, in an
area known for drug activity, supported an investigatory stop); State
v. Alcantara, 79 Wash. App. 362, 366-67, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995)
(holding that to permit a warrantless search would impermissibly blur
the distinction between a Terry stop and those cases where the evidence
provides probable cause for arrest); State v. Rodriguez- Torres, 77
Wash. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650, 652 (1995) (reasoning that the
Terry rationale for limited searches for potential weapons was based on
concern for officer safety).
Other Washington decisions upholding Terry stops include: State
v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 917 P.2d 108 (1996); State v. Pressley, 64
Wash. App. 591, 597, 825 P.2d 749, 752 (1992) (finding that the
manner in which the defendant reacted to the officers' presence was
consistent with behavior suggesting a drug buy); State v. Rice, 59
Wash. App. 23, 28, 795 P.2d 739, 742 (1990) (firing of shots indicates
the presence of firearms and probable illegal conduct).
4.8 Dimensions of a Permissible Stop
4.8(a) Time, Place, and Method
An investigatory stop may be based on less than probable cause
when the intrusion on individual freedom is relatively minor. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,
911 (1968). When an investigatory stop becomes as intrusive as an
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arrest, the stop is considered an arrest and requires probable cause.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L.
Ed. 2d 824, 838 (1979).
A valid stop must be limited as to length, movement of the
suspect, and investigative techniques employed. Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 299, 238 (1983).
See also State v. Mitchell, 80 Wash. App. 143, 143-45, 906 P.2d 1013,
1013-15 (1995); State v. Fowler, 76 Wash. App. 168, 172-73, 883 P.2d
338, 339-40 (1994) (holding that an officer exceeded the scope of a
permissible stop when he removed a cigarette pack containing LSD
from the suspect's pocket knowing that it was not a weapon). See
generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(f) (3d ed. 1996). Generally, the
level of suspicion required for an investigative stop of a pedestrian is
the same as required for an investigative stop of a vehicle. See State
v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445, 448 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute
limit on the permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes
or hours. The duration of a stop is evaluated in terms of whether "the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the [suspect]." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616 (1985). See
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238 (noting
that a stop may "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop").
Detaining a suspect to preserve the "status quo" while police
investigate suspicious circumstances justifying an investigatory stop
may not exceed the scope of a Terry stop. See State v. Perea, 85
Wash. App. 339, 342, 932 P.2d 1258, 1259-60 (1997) (holding that
officers may temporarily detain a suspect pending results of a police
radio check); State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 695, 726 P.2d 1263,
1265 (1986) (finding a proper Terry stop where an officer detained a
suspect in room approximately twenty minutes while a robbery victim
was brought to the room for identification and appellant was not
searched or otherwise restrained in the interim). The means of
investigation need not be the least intrusive available, provided the
police do not act unreasonably "in failing to recognize or to pursue" a
less intrusive alternative. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687, 105 S. Ct. at 1576,
84 L. Ed. 2d at 616. For example, a Washington court has held that
an officer did not use the least intrusive means reasonably available to
confirm or dispel his suspicion that a house was being burglarized
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when he ordered three juveniles out of the house at gunpoint. State v.
Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 793, 798-99, 690 P.2d 591, 594 (1984).
The investigative methods employed in a Terry stop must be less
intrusive than those employed in arrests in all respects, not merely
duration. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-11, 99 S. Ct. at 2255-56, 60 L.
Ed. 2d at 834-35. For example, police may not transport a noncon-
senting suspect in a patrol car to the police station and subject the
suspect to custodial interrogation based only on a reasonable suspicion.
See id. at 212, 99 S. Ct. at 2256, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 836; see also Hayes
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-18, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d
705, 710-11 (1985) (finding that police may not transport a suspect to
the police station for fingerprinting absent probable cause; although
based on reasonable suspicion, police may take fingerprints while
stopping and questioning suspect); Royer, 460 U.S. at 496, 103 S. Ct.
at 1323, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 235 (finding that seizing a suspect's luggage
at an airport and directing the suspect to a room for interrogation
constituted an arrest); State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 396, 731
P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986) (noting that handcuffing and transporting a
suspect to a police station before probable cause to arrest arises, i.e.,
before knowledge that a crime has been committed, may constitute an
illegal arrest under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7).
A radio call summoning the investigating officers to an apparently
unrelated crime scene, however, may give rise to a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to justify the officers transporting the suspect with them. See
State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 232-33, 721 P.2d 560, 564 (1986);
cf. State v. Byers, 85 Wash. 2d 783, 787, 539 P.2d 833, 836 (1975)
(discussing transportation to crime scene).
Transporting a suspect a short distance to obtain identification is
within the permissible scope of a Terry stop when the police have
knowledge of a reported crime, but the search may not be proper when
there is only an observation of suspicious conduct. See State v.
Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1987); State
v. Hoffpauir, 44 Wash. App. 195, 198, 722 P.2d 113, 115 (1986)
(suspect voluntarily consented to transportation to the crime scene for
identification purposes); see also Sweet, 44 Wash. App. at 232-33, 721
P.2d at 564 (finding that a suspect's demonstrated propensity to flee
justified his being placed in patrol car and transported to an apparently
unrelated crime scene).
Other Washington cases involving Terry stops include: United
States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that it would be
reasonable for an officer to assume that a dealer in narcotics could be
armed and dangerous if he had recently used cocaine); State v. Collins,
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
121 Wash. 2d 168, 173-74, 847 P.2d 919, 922 (1993) (holding that a
Terry stop was justified where darkness prevented the officer from
seeing clearly and the defendant had previously been arrested on an
outstanding felony warrant); State v. Glover, 116 Wash. 2d 509, 514,
806 P.2d 760, 762 (1991) (finding that under the totality of circum-
stances presented to the officer, including the officer's experience, the
location, and the conduct of the defendant, sufficient reasonable
suspicion existed to justify an investigatory stop); State v. Randall, 73
Wash. App. 225, 230-31, 868 P.2d 207, 210 (1994) (holding that the
officer had a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop when he observed
two males fitting the description of the robbery suspects standing in a
park six blocks from the site of the robbery); State v. Biegel, 57 Wash.
App. 192, 195, 787 P.2d 577, 578 (1990) (stating that although an
officer was justified in making a Terry stop where the officer suspected
the defendant was engaged in a drug buy, the officer lacked probable
cause to arrest without more justification).
4.8(b) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
The Washington Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth
Amendment the mere fact of an individual's proximity to one
independently suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a
stop. State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 842, 613 P.2d 525, 528
(1980) (a stop based on driver's parking violation does not reasonably
provide grounds to require identification of passengers absent an
independent cause to question passengers). Cf. State v. Serrano, 14
Wash. App. 462, 466-68, 544 P.2d 101, 104-05 (1975). See generally
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(b) and (c).
4.9 Constitutional Limitations on Compelled Responses to
Investigatory Questions
Guarantees under the Fourth Amendment prohibit an officer from
forcibly stopping an individual in the absence of at least a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.
Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979). However, even
when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion and forcibly
detains and questions the suspect, the officer may not compel the
suspect to answer. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S.
Ct. 1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681 n.6 (1969); State v. White,
97 Wash. 2d 92, 105-06, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982). Furthermore,
a suspect's refusal to answer an investigating officer's questions cannot
provide the basis for an arrest. See White, 97 Wash. App. at 105-06,
640 P.2d at 1069.
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A number of states, including Washington, have enacted stop-
and-identify statutes or other legislation designed in part to facilitate
police investigation of ongoing or imminent crimes. See, e.g., id. at 95,
640 P.2d at 1063; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct.
1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (addressing a California statute
requiring loiterers to identify themselves to peace officers when
requested). Some of these statutes have been struck down as unconsti-
tutionally vague. See, e.g., White, 97 Wash. 2d at 98-101, 640 P.2d
at 1065-66; Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361, 103 S. Ct. at 1860, 75 L. Ed.
2d at 911. The statutes can be challenged on a number of grounds,
such as the implication of (1) the First Amendment free speech right;
(2) the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; (3) the
Fourteenth Amendment due process right; and (4) the Fourth
Amendment right. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 97 nn.1 & 2, 640 P.2d at
1064 nn.1 & 2. See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(f) (3d
ed. 1996). Thus, a Terry stop that survives a Fourth Amendment
challenge may collapse under a challenge brought under another
amendment.
4.10 Grounds for Initiating a Frisk
An officer conducting a Terry stop may conduct a limited search
for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or persons nearby
from physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968); State v. Alcantara, 79 Wash.
App. 362, 366, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995). Even such a limited
intrusion, however, is a "search" within the Fourth Amendment.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 910.
The prerequisites to a pat-down for weapons is that the officer is
legitimately in the presence of the party to be frisked and has grounds
for a forcible stop. See id. at 32-33, 88 S. Ct. at 1885-86, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 912-13 (Harlan, J., concurring). A frisk may then be undertaken
if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect "may be armed and
presently dangerous" to the officer or others and if nothing in the
course of an initial investigation dispels that fear. Id. at 30, 88 S. Ct.
at 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911. A frisk may not be used as a pretext to
search for incriminating evidence when the officer has no reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspect is armed. Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 64, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1903, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 935 (1968).
Lower federal courts have read Terry to mean that for certain
crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the right to conduct
a protective search is "automatic"; for other crimes, such as possession
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of marijuana, additional circumstances must be present. See 4 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.5(a), at 254-57 (3d ed. 1996).
Washington requires that the officer have an individualized
suspicion that the suspect is presently dangerous. State v. Collins, 121
Wash. 2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d 919, 922 (1993). See State v. Smith, 102
Wash. 2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146, 148 (1984) (noting that the fact
that detention occurs in high crime area is not in itself sufficient to
justify search); State v. Harper, 33 Wash. App. 507, 511, 655 P.2d
1199, 1201 (1982) (an officer must have a "sufficient basis" to believe
that an individual is armed in order to conduct a self-protective
search). Thus, police may not take intrusive protective measures when
they cannot articulate a reason for believing that a suspect is dangerous
other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his car from the scene
of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 740-41,
689 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1984). An overt, threatening gesture is not
a condition precedent to a seizure. State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App. 481,
484-86, 704 P.2d 625, 628-29 (1985) (an officer's observation of a gun
on the floor of suspect's car, the driver's bloodshot eyes, and the smell
of alcohol constituted reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect
was armed and might gain access to the weapon). Frisks have been
permitted in a variety of situations. For example, in State v. Guzman-
Cuellar, 47 Wash. App. 326, 332, 734 P.2d 966, 970 (1987), the officer
was justified in initiating a frisk where the suspect matched the
description of a murder suspect. See also State v. Sweet, 44 Wash.
App. 226, 232-33, 721 P.2d 560, 565 (1986) (a suspect's flight from a
high crime area when he saw officers and the fact that he dropped a ski
mask when apprehended justified reasonable suspicion he was armed
and dangerous); State v. Harvey, 41 Wash. App. 870, 875, 707 P.2d
146, 149 (1985) (an officer was justified in making a protective search
of a burglary suspect on the grounds that it is well-known that burglars
often carry weapons); State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 202, 540
P.2d 444, 446 (1975) (the defendant entered an apartment during
execution of a search warrant and suspiciously kept his hand in his
overcoat pocket during police questioning); State v. Howard, 7 Wash.
App. 668, 673-74, 502 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (1972) (the defendant
parked a car near a residence being searched, and an officer had prior
knowledge that defendant carried a concealed knife); State v. Brooks,
3 Wash. App. 769, 774-75, 479 P.2d 544, 548 (1970) (the defendant
matched the description of a suspect who had fired shots at other
officers moments before the stop).
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Under certain circumstances, a search may be conducted pursuant
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the
suspect is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may
seize property from a suspect if the suspect's actions give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that evidence of crime is in danger of being
destroyed or lost. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash. App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d
1109, 1117 (1985) (an officer detaining a suspect for questioning about
credit card theft observed the suspect shaking his coat so as to
apparently dislodge an envelope from the coat pocket that could have
contained credit cards).
4.10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk
A frisk must be justified not only in its inception, but also in its
scope. State v. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160, 163
(1994). The scope of a valid frisk is strictly limited to what is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968). See also State v. Alcantara,
79 Wash. App. 362, 366, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995) (a search
exceeded the scope of Terry stop because the officer gave no indication
that the search was based on concerns for officer's safety). Cf. infra
§ 5.1 (discussing search incident to arrest). Pat-down searches are
permitted if the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a
suspect is armed and presently dangerous. State v. Broadnax, 98
Wash. 2d 289, 293-94, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (1982); State v. Hobart, 94
Wash. 2d 437, 441, 617 P.2d 429, 431 (1980). See also State v.
Samsel, 39 Wash. App. 564, 573, 694 P.2d 670, 676 (1985) (holding
that a frisk was reasonable when officers stopped suspects seen entering
a taxicab in close spacial and temporal proximity to a robbery, the
suspects matched the victim's description of the robbers, and, after
stopping the taxicab, officers observed marijuana and a gun holster on
the floor of the passenger compartment). A frisk need not conform to
the conventional pat-down. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147-49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617-18 (1972)
(finding an officer was justified in reaching through a window and
removing a revolver from the suspect's waistband when, after the
officer had received information that a narcotics suspect was seated in
a nearby car and carried a gun in his waistband, the first suspect
refused to comply with officer's request to step out of the car); see also
4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(b), at 271; supra § 4.7(c)-(d).
A Washington court has upheld an officer's grab at a suspect's
hand when the suspect furtively withdrew his hand from his pocket
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
and thrust it behind his back. State v. Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462,
469, 544 P.2d 101, 106 (1975). Although the court reasoned that the
officer's reflexive action was not actually a search, the Terry principle
that officers may act to protect themselves also justified the interfer-
ence. Id.
While the scope of the search should be sufficient to assure the
officer's safety, it should be strictly limited to the purpose for which
it is permitted. State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 414, 704 P.2d
666, 670 (1985) (finding that a search of a suspect's tote bag is allowed
when (1) an officer is informed that the suspect had a gun, (2) the
officer immediately confronted the suspect, and (3) the suspect
admitted that a weapon was in the tote bag). When in the course of
a frisk an officer feels what may be a weapon, the officer may take only
such action as is necessary to examine the object. Terry, 392 U.S. at
30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911. Once police ascertain
that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a limited
search ends. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d. at 111, 874 P.2d at 163 (once an
officer ascertains that the defendant has no weapon, the officer's
limited authority to search is spent absent probable cause). See also
Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d at 446, 617 P.2d at 433. See generally 4
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(c).
4.10(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
Police may not frisk persons present on the premises of a place
being lawfully searched absent a reasonable suspicion that such persons
are armed. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 238 (1979); supra § 3.8(a). Similarly, police may not take
protective measures such as searching the purse of a vehicle's passenger
when the driver is stopped on the basis of a traffic violation absent a
reasonable suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal conduct.
State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980).
When an officer makes a lawful investigative stop and has objective
reasons for believing that there may be a weapon in the vehicle, the
officer may make a limited search of the passenger compartment for
weapons within the area of control of the suspect and any other
passenger in the vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 726
P.2d 445, 451 (1986). Thus, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a
traffic offense committed by the driver may be frisked if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that he is armed and dangerous. See
State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 582-83, 712 P.2d 323, 325
(1986) (investigating officer noticed the driver was armed with a knife
and saw a weapon-like object under front seat of the car); see also State
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v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 620 P.2d 116 (1980) (when the driver
is lawfully stopped for reasons pertaining to handgun possession and
threats of violence, a protective frisk of a passenger is permitted). One
commentator suggests that the appropriate inquiry is whether the
officer is under a reasonable apprehension of danger-a determination
that depends on the nature of the crime, the time and place of the
arrest, the number of officers and suspects, and whether the companion
has made any threatening movements. See 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.5(a), at 263-64.
4.10(c) Other Protective Measures Besides Frisks
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk.
For instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly
stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is
suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under
investigation is a serious one. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337 (1977) (noting that
intrusion is de minimis while risks confronting an officer are substan-
tial). See also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
Lower courts have not agreed on whether Mimms extends to passen-
gers. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(h), at 97-98.
4.10(d) Search of Area: Measures Besides Frisks
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger
compartment of a detained person's vehicle when the police have a
reasonable belief that the suspect is both dangerous and within easy
access of a weapon in the vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049-50, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220 (1983). See
also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (1986)
(while stopping a suspect's vehicle for investigation of possible drug
buy, an officer observed the suspect leaning forward as though to place
something under seat); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 582-84,
712 P.2d 323, 325 (1986) (finding a search appropriate when the driver
of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object visibly
protruded from under passenger seat); State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App.
481, 485, 704 P.2d 625, 629 (1985). A police officer may search a
container carried by a suspect who is detained for questioning if the
officer reasonably believes that the suspect possesses a weapon and that
the suspect has told the officer that a weapon is in the container. See
State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666, 670 (1985)
(backpack). For a discussion of whether an officer may search items
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carried by a suspect, see generally 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 9.5(e).
CHAPTER 5: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
5.0 Introduction
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable . . .subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed.
2d 576, 585 (1967) (footnotes omitted). See also Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371-72, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L. Ed. 2d
334, 343-44 (1993); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55,
91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576 (1971).
The following sections examine the various "jealously and
carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 454-55, 91 S. Ct. at 2031-32, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 564; State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 569 (1996). Note
that the burden of proof is on the State to show that a warrantless
search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment requirement. State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 447,
909 P.2d 293, 302 (1996). In addition, even when a search or seizure
falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, it may
be invalid if other rights are infringed. See, e.g., United States v.
Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1977) (plain view seizure of
photographs of sexual activity invalid; the officers' determination that
photographs were obscene violated the First Amendment).
5.1 Search Incident to Arrest
Police may conduct a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary item must, of course, be governed by a like
rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
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trol"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or,
for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the
absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the
authority of a search warrant.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2039-40,
23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 693-94 (1969).
The "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant require-
ment applies only when: (1) there was a valid arrest, and (2) the
search incident to the arrest was "restricted in time and place in
relation to the arrestee and the arrest" as opposed to "wide-ranging,
exploratory[] rummaging[] [and] ransacking." State v. Smith, 88
Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970, 974 (1977).
As the following section will demonstrate, the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement is subject to a different
analysis under the Washington Constitution than under the Fourth
Amendment.
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest
The criteria for a lawful arrest are discussed in Chapter 4, supra.
If the arrest is invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid.
State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978); State
v. Terrazas, 71 Wash. App. 873, 878, 863 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1993). Cf.
State v. Rife, 133 Wash. 2d 140, 150, 943 P.2d 266, 270 (1997) (the
police conducted an unauthorized warrant check after stopping a
pedestrian for jaywalking and illegally seizing the defendant; the court
found that heroin discovered during the subsequent search incident to
the arrest was inadmissible).
If an arrest is lawful, then a search incident to that arrest is
permissible. State v. Johnson, 77 Wash. App. 441, 443, 892 P.2d 106,
108 (1995), aff'd, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). See also
State v. White, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 112, 915 P.2d 1099, 1102-03 (1996)
(a warrantless search is not presumed to be invalid under the Fourth
Amendment if it is made incident to a lawful arrest); State v. Stroud,
106 Wash. 2d 144, 164, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1986). Even when an
arrest is valid, however, a search is not properly "incident" to the
arrest if the arrest is merely a pretext for conducting a search to obtain
evidence of a different offense. State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239,
242-43, 427 P.2d 705, 707 (1967). Cf. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App.
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439, 445, 624 P.2d 204, 208 (1981) (holding that a second body search
made after the decision to release the defendant and in retaliation for
his remarks was invalid, even when the arrest and initial search were
valid).
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to
prosecute the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which
the person was initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not
merely a pretext to conduct a search for evidence of some other
offense. State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025, 1029
(1992) (finding that after a lawful arrest for consuming liquor in
public, drug paraphernalia found in the defendant's fanny pack during
the search was admissible). See also State v. Gammon, 61 Wash. App.
858, 863, 812 P.2d 885, 888 (1991); State v. LaTourette, 49 Wash.
App. 119, 127-29, 741 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (1987); State v. White, 44
Wash. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118, 119 (1986).
The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest.
See Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 50, 578 P.2d at 529. In Washington, a
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is generally not permitted.
With limited exceptions, moreover, officers are required to cite and
release motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses if the motorist gives
a signed promise to appear in court. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.015 (1996); State v. Reding, 119 Wash. 2d 685, 689-90, 835
P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (1992). Moreover, under Washington law, officers
explicitly do not have the authority to arrest after witnessing only a
minor traffic infraction. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.020 (1996).
Thus, a search incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation is
generally unlawful. See State v. Terrazas, 71 Wash. App. 873, 875,
863 P.2d 75, 77 (1993).
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a
traffic violation if: (1) the motorist refuses to sign a written promise
to appear in court; (2) the motorist is a nonresident arrestee; or (3) the
violation is one of the "nonminor" traffic violations specifically
designated in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (1996). See WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.64.015(1)-(3) (1996). So long as one of these three
conditions is met, police need no additional justification for a search.
In the absence of one of these conditions, however, police need other
reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a valid search incident to
arrest if a motorist is stopped for a "minor" traffic violation. See State
v. Reding, 119 Wash. 2d 685, 691-92, 835 P.2d 1019, 1022-23 (1992)
(upholding custodial arrest for the nonminor offense of reckless
driving); Terrazas, 71 Wash. App. at 875-78, 863 P.2d at 77 (an
officer may arrest a defendant for driving without a valid driver's
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license only if facts suggest the defendant will not appear in court if
cited and released).
5.1(b) "Immediate Control"
In determining whether, under the Fourth Amendment, the area
searched or the object seized was within the "immediate control" of the
defendant, courts have recognized that "there can be no hard and fast
rule." People v. Williams, 311 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ill. 1974). Factors
that have been considered include: (1) whether the arrestee was
physically restrained; (2) the position of the officer in relation to the
defendant and the place searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining access
into the container or enclosure searched; and (4) the number of officers
present as compared with the number of arrestees or other persons.
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.3(c), at 306-07 (3d ed. 1996). See
also 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1(b), at 438-40. For the
purposes of a search incident to an arrest, an object or container is
considered to be within the control of an arrestee if the object is within
the arrestee's reach immediately prior to, or at the moment of, the
arrest. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d at 681-82, 835 P.2d at 1029 (upholding
search of a fanny pack that was within one or two steps of the
defendant at the time of the arrest). See also United States v. Turner,
926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under arrestee's
pillow); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir.
1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee).
Under the Fourth Amendment and in certain limited situations,
some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident to an
arrest in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee's immediate
control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to
gather clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee
and search the rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers,
where the arrestee has been. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 6.4(a), at 313-15. Courts have also permitted police to search
premises to determine whether accomplices who could aid the arrestee
are present, id. § 6.4(b), at 320, and to conduct a protective sweep of
the premises when the officers fear that third parties may offer
resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 323-25. See also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325, 333-36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098-99, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 288 (1990).
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides
greater restraints on the police than the Fourth Amendment when the
arrestee is in his or her home. Entry into rooms beyond the immediate
control of the suspect requires a reasonable fear for police safety or a
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belief that the arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape. See
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 821, 676 P.2d 419, 423 (1984);
State v. McKinney, 49 Wash. App. 850, 857, 746 P.2d 835, 839 (1987)
(finding a warrantless entry into a home justified by the risk that the
suspect identified in a search warrant might escape); cf. Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 785
(1982); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 6.3(c), at 305-06; 6.4(a)-
(c), at 312-35; 7.1(b), at 438.
For a discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra
§ 5.2(b).
5.2 Immediate Control or Permissible Scope: Particular Applications
5.2(a) The Defendant
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee
who has been taken into custody even when the officer does not believe
that the arrestee is armed or in possession of evidence of the crime for
which the suspect was arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 440-41 (1973). The
lawful arrest establishes the authority to search the arrestee; the
arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an arrestee is
armed or will destroy evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,
263-64, 94 S. Ct. 488, 491, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 460 (1973). Thus, the
rule applies even when the custodial arrest follows a stop for a minor
traffic violation unless such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414
U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. at 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 440-41. See State v.
Reding, 119 Wash. 2d 685, 691-92, 835 P.2d 1019, 1022-23 (1992).
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an
arrestee has a diminished expectation of privacy that permits an officer
to search an arrestee's clothing, including small containers found on it.
State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 681-82, 835 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1992)
(upholding search of fanny pack following lawful arrest); State v.
Gammon, 61 Wash. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885, 888 (1991)
(upholding search of prescription pill bottle found on defendant
following lawful arrest); State v. White, 44 Wash. App. 276, 278, 722
P.2d 118, 120 (1986) (upholding police examination of cosmetic case
found in arrestee's coat pocket). However, a greater expectation of
privacy is extended to possessions that are not closely related to the
person's clothing, such as "purses, briefcases or luggage," and some
additional reason justifying the search of those items must be present.
White, 44 Wash. App. at 279, 722 P.2d at 121. See also State v.
Kealey, 80 Wash. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d 319, 324 (1995) (stating
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that "a purse is inevitably associated with an expectation of privacy").
In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actual physical
possession of a container at the time of the search, so long as the
container is within the arrestee's reach. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d at 681,
835 P.2d at 1028-29; Gammon, 61 Wash. App. at 863-64, 812 P.2d at
888. Note that purses voluntarily left in automobiles may be searched
incident to a lawful arrest of either the passenger or driver as part of
the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile. State v.
Fladebo, 113 Wash. 2d 388, 395, 779 P.2d 707, 711-12 (1989). For
a discussion of the search of purses in conjunction with automobile
searches, see infra § 5.2(b).
Evidence seized pursuant to the search of an arrestee's person does
not need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested,
nor must the grounds for the initial search encompass the evidence
seized. See Smith, 119 Wash. 2d at 681, 835 P.2d at 1029 (allowing
admission of drug paraphernalia found in a fanny pack during a search
subsequent to a lawful arrest for consuming liquor in public); see also
Gammon, 61 Wash. App. at 863, 812 P.2d at 888; State v. LaTourette,
49 Wash. App 119, 127-28, 741 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (1987); White, 44
Wash. App. at 278, 722 P.2d at 119.
An intrusion into a suspect's body, such as by drawing blood
samples, is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 7 of the state constitution, and is not, therefore,
justifiable under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16
L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Dunivin, 65 Wash. App. 501, 507, 828
P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (1992). However, such intrusions may be justified
by the exigent circumstances exception. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-
71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20. See generally infra
§ 5.18(a) and supra § 3.13(b); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(c), at
135 (3d ed. 1996). In Washington, blood tests of motorists arrested
for vehicular homicide are authorized by statute and justified by the
implied consent exception to the warrant requirement. WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.20.308 (1996); State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 184-85,
804 P.2d 558, 564-65 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Berlin, 133 Wash. 2d 541, 547-49, 947 P.2d 700, 703 (1997).
The Schmerber rule does not apply to less intrusive physical
measures such as a chokehold intended to prevent a suspect from
swallowing apparent contraband. See State v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App.
664, 666-67, 676 P.2d 504, 506 (1984); State v. Williams, 16 Wash.
App. 868, 871-72, 560 P.2d 1160, 1163 (1977). Officers attempting
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to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may not, however,
prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect's blood
supply to the head, although they may pinch his mouth shut.
Williams, 16 Wash. App. at 872, 560 P.2d at 1163. More aggressive
conduct, such as jumping on the suspect, is likely to violate due
process rights. Id. at 870, 560 P.2d at 1162. See Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209-11, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190 (1952).
See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(i). For a brief
discussion of post-detention body searches, see infra § 6.2(d).
5.2(b) Vehicles and Containers
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police
may search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search
incident to the arrest of an occupant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460-62, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864-65, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775-76
(1981); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441
(1986). See also State v. Hill, 68 Wash. App. 300, 308, 842 P.2d 996,
1000 (1993) (search of passenger compartment incident to arrest of
passenger was valid under article I, section 7). Under the Fourth
Amendment, the passenger compartment is considered within the
arrestee's immediate control even after the arrestee has been placed in
police custody. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864, 69 L. Ed.
2d at 774.
Under article I, section 7, however, such a search must take place
"immediately subsequent" to the suspect's arrest and his or her
placement in the police car. State v. Fladebo, 113 Wash. 2d 388, 395-
97, 779 P.2d 707, 712 (1989); Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d
at 441; State v. Cass, 62 Wash. App. 793, 795-97, 816 P.2d 57, 58-59
(1991). When a subject has stepped out of a vehicle during a lawful
investigative stop, the officer may make a limited search of the
passenger compartment for weapons within the area of the suspect's
control and the control of any other passenger in the vehicle if the
police officer has objective reasons for believing that there may be a
weapon in the vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12-13, 726
P.2d 445, 451-52 (1986) (finding that a limited search was justified
after an officer saw the defendant lean forward as if putting something
under the seat); State v. Larson, 88 Wash. App. 849, 850-51, 946 P.2d
1212, 1214 (1997). The justification for a warrantless search incident
to an arrest is lost if the defendant is removed from the scene. State
v. Boyce, 52 Wash. App. 274, 277-78, 758 P.2d 1017, 1018-19 (1988).
Under the Fourth Amendment, any containers in the passenger
compartment may be searched, whether the containers are locked or
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unlocked. Belton, 453 U. S. at 460-61, 101 S. Ct. at 2864, 69 L. Ed.
2d at 768. Under article I, section 7, the search may not include any
locked containers, including a locked glove compartment. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 440; State v. Perea, 85 Wash. App. 339,
343-44, 932 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1997). The lawful scope does, however,
extend to "all space reachable without exiting the vehicle," including
the sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig. State v. Johnson, 77
Wash. App. 441, 444-45, 892 P.2d 106, 109 (1995) (citing 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1(c), at 450-51), aff'd, 128 Wash. 2d 431,
909 P.2d 293 (1996). See also State v. Davis, 79 Wash. App. 355,
360-62, 901 P.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1995).
Purses voluntarily left in the passenger compartment may be
searched incident to arrest of an occupant whether the purse is owned
by the arrestee or another occupant. See Fladebo, 113 Wash. 2d at
395-96, 779 P.2d at 711-12; State v. Parker, 88 Wash. App. 273, 280,
944 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1997). Washington courts currently disagree as
to whether the search of a purse is lawful when the defendant
involuntarily leaves her purse in the vehicle. Compare State v. Nelson,
89 Wash. App. 179, 183, 948 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1997) (determining
that police may not search a purse that is involuntarily left in the
passenger compartment), with State v. Hunnel, 89 Wash. App. 638,
639-43, 949 P.2d 847, 850 (1998) (finding that a purse is a searchable
container under Belton when a police officer ordered the defendant to
leave the purse behind when she exited the vehicle). Note that the
valid arrest of a driver does not justify the warrantless search of a
passenger's purse where the purse is on the passenger's person and the
passenger is outside the vehicle unless police have some articulable
suspicion that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur.
State v. Seitz, 86 Wash. App. 865, 869, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (1997).
The locked trunk of an automobile that is inaccessible from the
interior of the car is not considered part of the passenger compartment;
a search warrant is, therefore, required to conduct a lawful search. See
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4, 101 S. Ct. at 2684 n.4, 69 L. Ed. 2d at
775 n.4 ("interior of the passenger compartment ... does not
encompass the trunk"); Davis, 79 Wash. App. at 361, 901 P.2d at
1097. Federal courts have interpreted "passenger compartment" to
encompass the hatch area of a hatchback automobile. See, e.g., United
States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994). The engine
compartment is not considered to be part of the passenger compart-
ment and cannot be searched without a warrant under the search
incident to arrest exception. State v. Mitzlaff, 80 Wash. App. 184,
188, 907 P.2d 328, 330 (1995). A warrantless search of an automobile
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is not permitted incident to an arrest if the defendant lawfully exits and
locks the vehicle prior to arrest. Perea, 85 Wash. App. at 344-45, 932
P.2d at 1260-61.
When police have probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains contraband or evidence, whether or not they have probable
cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants, they may have authority to
search the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to one of the other
exceptions to the warrant requirement. See generally infra §§ 5.21-5.23.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the police may search any container
located within an automobile, even if they lack probable cause to search
the vehicle as a whole, if they have probable cause to believe that the
container itself holds contraband. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
573, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1988, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619, 630 (1991). In order
to provide the necessary added protection guaranteed by article I,
section 7, however, the court will require "virtual certainty that the
container, in the circumstances viewed, holds contraband, as if
transparent." State v. Courcy, 48 Wash. App. 326, 332, 739 P.2d 98,
102 (1987) (during a lawful Terry stop an officer viewed a precisely
folded paper "bindle," commonly used to package cocaine, in the
suspect's identification folder; the officer was justified in seizing the
"bindle" and opening it). However, an automobile occupant does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in property viewed through a
vehicle window, and such objects may fall within the "open view" or
"plain view" warrant exceptions. State v. Ozuna, 80 Wash. App. 684,
689-90, 911 P.2d 395, 399 (1996); State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App.
388, 397, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986).
5.3 Pre-Arrest Search
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a
lawful arrest, even if it occurs before the arrest, the search may be
considered incidental to the arrest and, therefore, valid as long as
probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633,
645-46 (1980); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 138, 559 P. 2d 970,
975 (1977); State v. Harrel, 83 Wash. App. 393, 400, 923 P.2d 698,
702 (1996). Note, however, that if probable cause does not exist at the
time of the search, a search that provides probable cause is not
considered a valid search incident to arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
541, 543, 110 S. Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464, 467-68 (1990)
(the warrantless search of the defendant's paper bag could not be
justified as a search incident to arrest when the bag contained drug
paraphernalia and the search was followed by the arrest of the
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defendant for drug abuse). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.5(a)-(d) (3d ed. 1996).
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted
even when the arrest does not closely follow the search. A search may
be considered incident to the arrest of a suspect when the police have
probable cause, believe the suspect is in the process of destroying
highly evanescent evidence, and when the evidence can be preserved
by a limited search. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct.
2000, 2004, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 906 (1973). See generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.4(b); Smith, 88 Wash. 2d at 137-38, 559
P.2d at 975 (upholding an officer's seizure of evidence prior to arrest
because of exigent circumstance of its possible destruction). Pre-arrest
searches are Terry searches and should be subject to the same standard
applied and discussed supra §§ 4.5-4.9.
5.4 Post-Detention Searches: Searches Incident to Arrest and
Inventory Searches
5.4(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest
The search incident to arrest exception can apply both to a search
at the place of detention as well as to a search at the place of arrest.
See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(a) (3d ed. 1996).
However, a significant delay between the arrest and the search will
render the search unreasonable, since the search is no longer contempo-
raneous with the arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 683, 835
P.2d 1025, 1030 (1992) (delay of seventeen minutes between arrest and
search of a fanny pack was not unreasonable under the circumstances).
Whether a delay is sufficient to render a search unreasonable and no
longer valid under the search incident to arrest exception depends on
the facts of the individual case. Id. at 683 n.4, 835 P.2d at 1030 n.4.
See also United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1987).
Any post-arrest search is unlawful, however, if probable cause to
arrest dissipates by the time the suspect is taken into custody. A
difficult question arises when a suspect is detained only because the
police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See generally
3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(d).
Under the Fourth Amendment, when an arrestee is searched upon
booking, officers may later conduct a warrantless "second look" into
the arrestee's belongings. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805,
94 S. Ct. 1234, 1238, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771, 777 (1974) (a search of the
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defendant's personal belongings long after the defendant had been
searched and placed in a jail cell was a permissible search incident to
an arrest). See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(b), at 123
(Edwards requires that (1) the object seized must come into plain view
at the time of arrival at the place of detention, (2) later investigation
must establish that the object has evidentiary value, and (3) the object
must remain in police custody as part of the arrestee's inventoried
property); see also United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir.
1980).
Under Washington law, probable cause is required for a "second
look." When the actions of the person detained in the course of an
investigative stop give rise to a reasonable suspicion by an officer that
the person is attempting to destroy or rid himself or herself of
evidence, seizure of that evidence is permissible. State v. Dorsey, 40
Wash. App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d 1109, 1116-17 (1985) (officers
observed the detainee's attempt to rid himself of an envelope that
protruded from detainee's coat pocket). If probable cause to arrest
exists or the elements of "plain view" are satisfied, no warrant is
necessary to further examine that evidence. State v. Alcantara, 79
Wash. App. 362, 366, 901 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1995); State v. Pressley,
64 Wash. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749, 753 (1992). See also State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 194, 622 P.2d 1199, 1214 (1980) (Utter,
J., concurring) (probable cause was required for a detailed, post-
booking search through the arrestee's personal belongings stored in a
police property box).
A search conducted after police have decided to release a suspect
is improper when there is no probability that the suspect possesses
relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App. 439,
445, 624 P.2d 204, 207-08 (1981). See also generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(a)-(d).
5.4(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search
Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, police
officers may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of
the arrestee's possessions prior to storage of the items for safekeeping.
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608-09,
77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 69-71 (1983); State v. Smith, 76 Wash. App. 9, 16,
882 P.2d 190, 194 (1994). These "caretaking procedures" are
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment's standard
of "reasonableness." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-
70, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097-98, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005-06 (1976). The
police need not have probable cause to believe that the containers
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conceal evidence of a crime, nor must they fear concealed weapons.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 n.5, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482-83
n.5, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 547 n.5 (1977). However, an inventory search
which is "a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence" is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,
4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6 (1990). See also State v.
Mireles, 73 Wash. App. 605, 612, 871 P.2d 162, 165-66 (1994). The
police have some obligation to safeguard the container and its contents
when they seize it. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19, 97 S. Ct. at 2487, 53 L.
Ed. 2d at 553. The ability of police to do an inventory search without
a warrant makes it significant whether the defendant is arrested in a
private place or in a public place. Id. (when a person is arrested in a
public place, it is reasonable for police to take custody of the arrestee's
property rather than to leave the property in the public place while a
warrant is obtained). Lower courts have reached consistent results as
to whether police may conduct an item-by-item inventory of contents.
See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.5(b), at 183-84.
Consistent with the greater protection provided under article I,
section 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted "in
good faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from
loss during detention, property belonging to a detained person, (2)
protecting police from liability due to dishonest claims of theft, and (3)
protecting temporary storage bailees against false charges." Smith, 76
Wash. App. at 16, 882 P.2d at 194. See also State v. Houser, 95
Wash. 2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1980); State v. Gluck, 83
Wash. 2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1974). Search of a
defendant's purse upon arrival at jail has been upheld under article I,
section 7. Smith, 76 Wash. App. at 15-16, 882 P.2d at 194-95. But
see State v. Smith, 56 Wash. App. 145, 151, 783 P.2d 95, 98 (1989)
(holding that a booking search of an arrestee's purse was unlawful).
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, the
police may conduct an inventory search of a validly impounded
automobile, and containers discovered during the inventory search may
be opened without a warrant. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
374-75, 107 S. Ct. 738, 742-43, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 747-48 (1987); State
v. McFadden, 63 Wash. App. 441, 448, 820 P.2d 53, 56 (1991); see
also infra § 5.28. The scope of a lawful inventory search of an
automobile is not exceeded if the police access the trunk via an
automatic release button located in the passenger compartment. State
v. White, 83 Wash. App. 770, 779, 924 P.2d 55, 59 (1996).
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5.5 Searches Conducted in Good Faith and Without Purpose of
Finding Evidence: Community Caretaking and Medical Emergency
If officers undertake a search in good faith for a reason other than
investigating a crime-for example, to aid someone who has been
injured-any evidence they discover may be admissible under the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Rodriguez-Morales 929 F.2d 780,
784-85 (1st Cir. 1991); State v. Gocken, 71 Wash. App. 267, 274-77,
857 P.2d 1074, 1079-81 (1993); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.4(c), at
163 (3d ed. 1996). These searches are justified on the basis of police
"community caretaking" functions, such as rendering aid to individuals
in danger of physical harm and providing services on an emergency
basis. See Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wash. 2d 210, 216-17, 943 P.2d
1369, 1372 (1997) (no Fourth Amendment violation for a warrantless
entry when police responded to a 911 call asking for police assistance);
State v. Lynch, 84 Wash. App. 467, 476-79, 929 P.2d 460, 465 (1996).
Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed, they may conduct a warrantless search of a premises when
the premises contain persons in imminent danger of death or harm;
objects likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause harm; or information
that will disclose the location of a threatened victim or the existence of
such a threat. Cf. State v. Menz, 75 Wash. App. 351, 353-56, 880
P.2d 48, 49-50 (1994) (police entry was justified when in response to
a domestic violence call). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 5.5(d).
Under article I, section 7, for an officer's warrantless entry to
come within the medical emergency exception to the warrant require-
ment, (1) the officer must subjectively believe that someone is in need
of assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a reasonable person in the
same situation would also believe a need for assistance exists; and (3)
a reasonable basis must exist for associating the need for assistance
with the place searched. State v. Davis, 86 Wash. App. 414, 420, 937
P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997); Gocken, 71 Wash. App. at 274-77, 857 P.2d
at 1079-80. The officer's warrantless entry must be motivated by a
need to render assistance and not merely a pretext for obtaining
evidence that would otherwise be unavailable. Gocken, 71 Wash. App.
at 275, 857 P.2d at 1080. Consequently, the officer must be able to
articulate specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
which justify the warrantless entry. Davis, 86 Wash. App. at 420-22,
937 P.2d at 1114 (entry was proper when, after check-out time, the
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motel occupant did not respond to repeated telephone calls and knocks
at the door).
Police may make a warrantless entry into a residence in response
to a report of domestic violence under the emergency exception. Menz,
75 Wash. App. at 353, 880 P.2d at 49. "Police officers responding to
a domestic violence report have a duty to ensure the present and
continued safety and well-being of the occupants" of a residence. State
v. Raines, 55 Wash. App. 459, 465, 778 P.2d 538, 542 (1989).
When the medical emergency is a homicide, the officer may not
only enter to attempt aiding the victim, but may also make a quick
check to see if the perpetrator or other victims are present. See
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S. Ct. 409, 412, 83 L. Ed.
2d 246, 251 (1984) (no "murder scene" warrant exception; other
exceptions justify warrantless search); State v. Stevenson, 55 Wash.
App. 725, 729-30, 780 P.2d 873, 876 (1989). Thus, any evidence
observed in plain view during the course of legitimate police emergency
activities at the scene may be seized. Stevenson, 55 Wash. App. at
730, 780 P.2d at 876. Any such search must be brief; a general
exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Thompson,
469 U.S. at 22, 105 S. Ct. at 412, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 251. Cf. supra
§ 5.1(b).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless
search of a victim's personal effects so long as the search is motivated
by a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562,
568, 647 P.2d 489, 493 (1982) (the search of the defendant's tote bag
for identification was improper when the defendant regained conscious-
ness prior to the search); see also Chavis v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 1077,
1078 (5th Cir. 1973) (police were justified in making an inventory
search of the defendant's clothing and effects when removed in the
hospital during the defendant's treatment and when police were
required to keep the clothing and effects as evidence of possible
homicide); United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir.
1973) (when taking a person to the hospital, police may search his or
her briefcase for the purpose of establishing identity); cf. State v.
Dempsey, 88 Wash. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265, 268-69 (1997) (a
search associated with emergency civil commitment was justified under
the emergency exception; the scope of the search may extend to
whatever is reasonable to conduct the caretaking function). But see
Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d at 568, 647 P.2d at 493 (necessity must exist at
time of search).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect property
and may seize evidence within their plain view. State v. Bakke, 44
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Wash. App. 830, 839-41, 723 P.2d 534, 538-40 (1986) (police may
make a warrantless entry into a private residence in response to a
reported burglary and may then seize contraband within their plain
view); State v. Campbell, 15 Wash. App. 98, 100, 547 P.2d 295, 297
(1976) (police entry to investigate alleged burglary permissible).
Firefighters may enter a house to extinguish a fire and immediately
thereafter conduct a limited warrantless investigation to determine the
fire's cause. Michigan v. Taylor, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942,
1950, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 500 (1978). Once a fire has been extin-
guished, however, a warrant is required for arson investigators to
search the premises to discover a possible criminal cause of a fire.
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S. Ct. 641, 649, 78 L. Ed.
2d 477, 484 (1984); Taylor at 511, 98 S. Ct. at 1951, 56 L. Ed. 2d at
500.
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant
when officials of another government agency have validly entered the
residence and have discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wash.
2d 193, 201, 737 P.2d 254, 259 (1987) (a marijuana growing operation
discovered in plain view by firemen justified a warrantless entry and
seizure by police). Seizure of immediately recognizable contraband by
firefighters is valid if it is inadvertently discovered while they are
engaged in their firefighting activities. Id. at 197, 737 P.2d at 257.
Exigent circumstances are not required to justify such a seizure. Police
officers, then, step into the firefighters' shoes and may subsequently
enter a residence without a warrant and seize the contraband so long
as they do not exceed the scope of the prior intrusion. Id. at 201, 737
P.2d at 259. Cf. State v. Browning, 67 Wash. App. 93, 97, 834 P.2d
84, 86 (1992) (contraband sighted during an unlawful entry by the
building inspector could not be used as the basis for later police entry
under warrant).
5.6. The Plain View Doctrine: Distinction Between "Plain View"
and "Open View"
This section discusses the warrantless seizure of objects based on
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Courts have used
the term "plain view" to describe three types of searches: (1) when an
officer observes an item that is exposed to public view in a public place
or in a location that is not constitutionally protected; (2) when an
officer intrudes into a constitutionally protected area-either lawfully
or unlawfully-and there observes a clearly exposed object; and (3)
when an officer, standing in a nonprotected area, observes an object
that is located inside a constitutionally protected area. State v.
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O'Herron, 380 A.2d 728, 729-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2(a), at 396 (3d ed. 1996).
These three situations are distinguished by the nature of the
defendant's expectation of privacy in the object. In the first situation,
the discovery of an object in a public place or in a location that is not
constitutionally protected is not a true search, for the defendant has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in an object that is exposed to the
public view. State v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280,
282-83 (1996). Generally, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88
S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 (1967). See generally supra
§§ 1.1-1.3. Thus, the first situation is more accurately referred to as
"open view" and not "plain view." State v. Dykstra, 84 Wash. App.
186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929, 932 n.4 (1996).
For the same reason, the mere observation of an object located in
a protected area from a vantage point in a nonprotected area does not
constitute a search. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d at 392, 909 P.2d at 283; State
v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 901, 632 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1981); 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 397-98. Privacy rights are
implicated, however, when police enter the constitutionally protected
area to seize the object. "Seeing something in open view does not ...
dispose, ipsofacto, of the problem of crossing constitutionally protected
thresholds . . . . Light waves cross thresholds with a constitutional
impunity not permitted arms and legs. Wherever the eye may go, the
body of the policeman may not necessarily follow." Charles E.
Moylan, Jr., The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1096
(1975) (italics added). See also Dykstra, 84 Wash. App. at 192-93, 926
P.2d at 933.
Although the open view doctrine may justify observing an object
located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify seizing
the object; the search is in the entry, not in the inspection. See
Dykstra, 84 Wash. App. at 192-93, 926 P.2d at 933; State v. Mierz,
72 Wash. App. 783, 791, 866 P.2d 65, 71, opinion corrected, 875 P.2d
1228 (1994), aff'd, 127 Wash. 2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995) (view of
unpermitted coyote pups from legal vantage point outside of the
defendant's fence did not justify an officer's warrantless entry onto
property). An "open view" sighting of contraband from a nonconstitu-
tionally protected vantage point may, however, be used as a basis for
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securing a search warrant. State v. Ferro, 64 Wash. App. 181, 182,
824 P.2d 500, 501 (1992).
If no entry or additional search is required, seizure of an object
may be permissible if an officer is virtually certain that a container
holds contraband, "[b]ecause of the appearance of the container itself,
the contents [are] in effect in open view." State v. Coursey, 48 Wash.
App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98, 101 (1987) (a paper "bindle" containing
cocaine was observed by an officer during a lawful investigative stop).
Consequently, the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy that would prevent opening the container or field testing its
contents. Id. at 330, 739 P.2d at 101.
The plain view doctrine has been used to justify the seizure of
objects without a warrant. The following sections discuss the criteria
for falling within the exception to the warrant requirement in the
second and third situations: the discovery and seizure of an object
after entry into a constitutionally protected area, and the entry into a
protected area and the seizure of an object that was viewed from an
unprotected area.
5.7 Criteria for Falling Within the "Plain View" Exception
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry into
Constitutionally Protected Area
The most common plain view situation occurs when the officer
lawfully enters a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly
discovers incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 65
Wash. App. 409, 416, 828 P.2d 636, 640 (1992).
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure .... The
extension of the original jurisdiction is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038,
29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 583 (1971).
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For a warrantless seizure to fall within the plain view exception,
three requirements must be met as follows: (1) the police must have
a prior justification for the intrusion into the constitutionally protected
area; (2) the police must immediately realize that the object they
observe is evidence-that is, the incriminating character of the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (3) the discovery of the incriminat-
ing evidence must be inadvertent. State v. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332,
346, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (1991). Note that under the Fourth Amend-
ment, inadvertent discovery is no longer required to justify a seizure
under the plain view exception. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
130, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 118 (1990). See
discussion, infra this subsection, part (2) regarding Washington's
adoption of Horton.
(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion
The plain view doctrine applies only when the police are justified
in occupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or
activity. State v. Dykstra, 84 Wash. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929,
932 n.4 (1996). Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto
property is illegal, confiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal
seizure. Id. See also State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 616
P.2d 649, 652 (1980), rejected on other grounds in State v. Hill, 123
Wash. 2d 641, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). Similarly, when the initial stop
of a vehicle is unlawful-the police therefore having no right to be in
a position to observe the vehicle's interior-the observation of
contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search. State v.
Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 942-43, 530 P.2d 243, 245 (1975). See also
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818, 70 L. Ed.
2d 778, 787 (1982), on remand, 100 Wash. 2d 14, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests on
the lawfulness of the officer's presence, plain view cases will have
different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the
two constitutions differ as to that lawfulness. For example, when an
officer has accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's dormitory room
and follows the arrestee into the room, the inspection of objects within
the room may be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, yet unlawful
under article I, section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 7, 9, 102 S. Ct. at
817-18, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 785-87 (Fourth Amendment permits officer
to accompany arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wash.
2d at 822, 676 P.2d at 424 (article I, section 7 prohibits officer from
entering misdemeanor arrestee's home unless officer can demonstrate
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threat to officer's safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of
misdemeanor charged, or strong likelihood of escape).
(2) Inadvertent Discovery
Under the Fourth Amendment, the plain view exception
previously did not apply when an officer expected to find the
incriminating object; the officer had to discover the object inadvertent-
ly. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471, 91 S. Ct. at 2040-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d at
586. More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court held
that "even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate
'plain-view' seizures, it is not a necessary condition." Horton, 496 U.S.
at 130, 110 S. Ct. at 2304, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 118-19. Thus, under
Horton, an object may be seized under the plain view exception if an
officer has the subjective expectation that he or she will find evidence
in a location where he or she is conducting a lawful search. The
discovery does not have to be an unexpected surprise. See id., 496
U.S. at 138-40, 110 S. Ct. at 2309-10, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 124-25. Note,
however, that several states continue to require inadvertence under
their own constitutions. See State v. Meyer, 893 P.2d 159, 165 (Haw.
1995); People v. Manganaro, 561 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (1990).
Washington courts have adopted the Horton approach to the plain
view exception and no longer require the inadvertence prong of the
Coolidge test. See State v. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 114 n.1, 874
P.2d 160, 164 n.1 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view
test); State v. Goodin, 67 Wash. App. 623, 627-30, 838 P.2d 135, 138-
39 (1992) (discussing Horton and suggesting that the inadvertence
requirement was never explicitly required under article I, section 7).
Recent cases set forth the test for the plain view exception as articulat-
ed in Horton:
For evidence to be admissible under "plain view" doctrine, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the officer lawfully occupied the
vantage point from which the evidence was discovered, (2) the
officer immediately recognized the incriminating character of the
object seized, and (3) the officer had a lawful right of access to the
object itself.
State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez, 72 Wash. App. 852, 855-56, 866 P.2d 667,
669 (1994). Thus, in Washington, the focus of the third prong of the
test for admissibility under the "plain feel" exception is now on the
officer's lawful access to the object seized, rather than his or her
subjective state of mind at the time of the search. See id. But see State
v. Mierz, 72 Wash. App. 783, 786 n.2, 866 P.2d 65, 68 n.2 (1994)
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(listing the requirements of the plain view exception as prior justifica-
tion, immediate knowledge, and inadvertent discovery).
(3) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character
Immediately Apparent
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediate-
ly recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. Coolidge,
403 U.S. at 466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 583. For example,
the discovery of a shotgun in a bombing suspect's bedroom did not
come within the plain view doctrine, despite the validity of entry under
warrant, because it was not immediately apparent to the FBI officers
that the shotgun was evidence of a crime. State v. Cotten, 75 Wash.
App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971, 979 (1994). See also State v. Murray,
84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (a warrantless
entry into an apartment to search for stolen office equipment was
justified because the owner gave consent; however, seizure of a
television under the plain view doctrine not justified because evidence
of the television being stolen was not readily apparent--officers tilted
the television to obtain serial numbers); State v. Gocken, 71 Wash.
App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074, 1081-82 (1993) (a warrantless entry was
justified under the emergency exception; evidence of foul play was
immediately apparent). But see generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.11(c), at 691-98 (3d ed. 1996).
If an object has to be moved or tampered with in any way to
determine whether it is evidence of a crime, the "immediately
apparent" prong of the plain view test will fail. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347,
356 (1987) (the scope of plain view was exceeded when police lifted
stereo components to read serial numbers). In other words, police
must connect items to a crime based solely on what is exposed to their
view, and there is a distinction between "looking at a suspicious object
in plain view and moving it even a few inches." Id. at 325, 107 S. Ct.
at 1152, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 354; see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.11(b), at 687-91, (c), at 691-98 (suggesting that for
officers to inspect items, they must be aware of facts that justify a
reasonable suspicion that the items are incriminating; for officers to
seize the items, they must have probable cause).
The officer's knowledge that the object is evidence of a crime need
not be certain; it is sufficient that the officer has probable cause to
believe that the object or substance constitutes incriminating evidence.
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.
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Ed. 2d. 502, 514 (1983) (interpreting the term "immediately apparent"
to mean "requiring probable cause in the ordinary case"); State v.
Sistrunk, 57 Wash. App. 210, 214, 787 P.2d 937, 939 (1990). Thus,
in State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 400-01, 731 P.2d 1101,
1108-09 (1986), a clear vial of capsules and pills, in context of other
items of drug paraphernalia, was properly seized although consent was
given only for jewelry and other items. However, a closed brown
paper bag containing marijuana was improperly seized since its weight
immediately indicated that it could not contain items within the scope
of consent, and the marijuana was clearly not within plain view. Id.
at 400, 731 P.2d at 1109. See also Sistrunk, 57 Wash. App. at 214,
787 P.2d at 939 (no probable cause to seize empty beer cans in open
view when the condition of cans was consistent with driver's explana-
tion that they had been picked up for recycling); State v. Anderson, 41
Wash. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 481, 490 (1985), rev'd on other grounds,
107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987) (although warrant was limited
to a search for clothing, police properly seized weapons and weapon
components discovered within the allowable area of the search, which
were probable instrumentalities of the crime under investigation).
A useful synthesis of Washington cases and doctrine pertaining
to the issue of when an object's incriminating nature is immediately
apparent is found in State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 542, 581 P.2d
172, 176 (1978) (officers may inspect for serial numbers on radio
equipment when they have a well-founded suspicion that the equip-
ment is stolen based upon knowledge of other stolen property on the
premises, past criminal activities of the person having access to
premises, and a peculiarly large quantity of equipment). See also State
v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526, 528, 590 P.2d 367, 368 (1979) (when
federal officers executing a warrant for a machine gun came upon items
they thought might be controlled substances and called local officers
to identify items, seizure was unlawful because the incriminating nature
was not immediately apparent to the federal officers and local officers
had no prior justification for intrusion); State v. Keefe, 13 Wash. App.
829, 832-35, 537 P.2d 795, 797-99 (1975) (a typewriter sample could
not be seized under the "plain view" doctrine while police executed a
search warrant for a stolen gun).
For objects seized under the plain view exception to be incriminat-
ing, they must be fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime.
Evidence includes objects having a "sufficient nexus" with the crime
under investigation, and officers may also seize objects that will aid in
apprehension or conviction of a suspect. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.
2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239, 1254 (1997); State v. Terrovona, 105
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Wash. 2d. 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295, 303 (1986); State v. Turner, 18
Wash. App. 727, 729, 571 P.2d 955, 957 (1977).
An officer's knowledge and experience is relevant to determining
whether an object is legally seized under the plain view exception.
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 627, 644 (1976) (use of specially trained investigators supported
the seizure of business records with nexus to crime under investiga-
tion). Thus, an officer's experience and knowledge that plastic baggies
are common receptacles for marijuana will enable the officer to
immediately recognize the incriminating nature of a baggie, even when
its contents are not observed. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 13,
726 P.2d 445, 452 (1986).
5.7(b) Seizure of Object from Protected Area After Observing
Object from Nonprotected Area
The "open view" doctrine applies in those cases when the police
officer is in a public or nonprotected area at the time he or she
observes contraband within a constitutionally protected area. The
officer's mere visual observation, without physical intrusion, does not
constitute a "search" because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in objects observed where the open view doctrine is satisfied.
State v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280, 283 (1996); State
v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44, 47 (1981). See also
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 23, 691 P.2d 929, 942 (1984)
(when an officer peered into the defendant's car on a public street and
saw blood on the door handle and jewelry similar to that observed at
a homicide scene, his observation fell within the open view doctrine);
1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 397-98.
When an officer enters a constitutionally protected area to seize
an object observed from outside the area, the plain view doctrine will
not justify the absence of a warrant. State v. Mierz, 72 Wash. App.
783, 791 n.6, 866 P.2d 65, 71 n.6 (1994); State v. Ferro, 64 Wash.
App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d 500, 501 (1992) (lawful aerial observation of
marijuana plants did not justify a warrantless intrusion onto the
property and seizure of the plants).
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure
of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle . ..
that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony
of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging
to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of
probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court
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has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may
not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039,
29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 584 (1971) (emphasis in original). See also Taylor
v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 52 S. Ct. 466, 467, 76 L. Ed. 951,
953 (1932) (although police were standing where they had a right to be
when they looked through a small opening in a garage and saw
contraband, their warrantless entry to seize the contraband was
unconstitutional).
Thus, a police officer who lawfully observes contraband within a
constitutionally protected area may enter the area without a warrant
only if the officer can justify the entry by one of the other exceptions
to the warrant requirement. See State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App.
592, 596-97, 675 P.2d 631, 633 (1984) (defendant was observed
through a window snorting cocaine; exigent circumstances justified
warrantless entry); 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 400;
see also State v. O'Herron, 380 A.2d 728, 733-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977) (warrantless entry into defendant's vegetable garden to seize
lawfully observed marijuana plants was unconstitutional where no
warrant exception was shown).
5.7(c) Curtilage as a Protected Area
The curtilage of a residence is defined as that area "so intimately
tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the 'umbrella' of
Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
300-01, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139-40, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334-35 (1987).
Thus, heightened Fourth Amendment protection extends to a home's
curtilage. State v. Ridgway, 57 Wash. App. 915, 918, 790 P.2d 1263,
1265 (1990). Open view observations, visual and otherwise, made by
police from the curtilage have been upheld in Washington under both
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, and police conducting
legitimate business may enter areas of a home's curtilage that are
impliedly open. See State v. Gave, 77 Wash. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d
1088, 1090 (1995). Thus, in connection with an investigation, officers
may approach a residence from any common access route, including a
"driveway, walkway, or access route leading to the residence or to the
porch of the residence," without violating the resident's reasonable
expectation of privacy. State v. Hoke, 72 Wash. App. 869, 874, 866
P.2d 670, 673 (1994). In essence, officers may intrude to the same
extent as any reasonably respectful citizen, and they may do so with
their "eyes open." State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d
879, 882 (1987); State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44,
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47 (1981). See also State v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 394, 909 P.2d
280, 283 (1996) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in what is viewed
through uncurtained windows). For an in-depth discussion of cases
upholding intentional viewing by police officers at residences through
unobstructed windows, see id. at 394-97, 909 P.2d at 283-84.
The facts of each case determine whether a portion of the curtilage
is impliedly open to the public. State v. Hornback, 73 Wash. App.
738, 744, 871 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1994). Factors to be considered in
determining whether an officer exceeded the scope of "open view"
include whether the officer: (1) spied into the house; (2) acted secretly;
(3) approached the house in daylight; (4) used the normal, most direct
access route to the house; (5) attempted to talk to the resident; (6)
created an artificial vantage point; and (7) made the discovery
accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d 761,
769 (1991). The posting of "no trespassing" signs is not dispositive on
the issue of privacy, but is an additional factor which may be
considered. Gave, 77 Wash. App. at 337, 890 P.2d at 1090; Hornback,
73 Wash. App. at 744, 871 P.2d at 1078; State v. Johnson, 75 Wash.
App. 692, 702, 879 P.2d 984, 990 (1994).
Thus, the open view doctrine applies when officers approach a
suspect's residence during daylight, by a direct access, and with no
spying or secretive actions, but not when police activity exceeds
reasonable bounds. Compare Myers, 117 Wash. 2d at 345, 815 P.2d
at 769 (officer approached the home during daylight via the most direct
access route), with Dykstra, 84 Wash. App. at 193, 926 P.2d at 933
(open view inapplicable where police officers climbed onto the back
porch at 3:00 a.m. despite the homeowner's protests, yanked the door
out of the homeowner's hands, and entered the dwelling). See also
Hornback, 73 Wash. App. at 743, 871 P.2d at 1078 (scope of open
view exceeded where officers substantially and unreasonably departed
from the area of curtilage impliedly open to the public by entering into
a side yard); State v. Graffius, 74 Wash. App. 23, 28, 871 P.2d 1115,
1118 (1994) (marijuana bud observed in a partially opened garbage can
in the curtilage area did not exceed the scope of open view).
5.7(d) Open Field as a Protected Area
Open fields are not entitled to protection from unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214,
224 (1984). In contrast, Washington courts have rejected the notion
that an open field can never be subject to an unreasonable search and
seizure. Rather, under article I, section 7, a case-by-case determination
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is made to determine whether a particular search and seizure unconsti-
tutionally intrudes into a person's private affairs. State v. Johnson, 75
Wash. App. 692, 707, 879 P.2d 984, 992 (1994). See State v. Hansen,
42 Wash. App. 755, 714 P.2d 309 (1986), aff'd on other grounds, 107
Wash. 2d 331, 728 P.2d 593 (1986) (warrantless search of a garden
upheld under article I, section 7 and open fields doctrine where the
field was not posted and contents were clearly visible to any passerby);
State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 513-14, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984)
(aerial surveillance of marijuana from 1500 feet without visual
enhancement devises did not violate article I, section 7). See also
Johnson, 75 Wash. App. at 707-08, 879 P.2d at 993 (conduct of DEA
agents violated article I, section 7 when they acted in concert with state
officials and ignored property owner's fence, gate, and no trespassing
signs and trespassed on property); State v. Crandall, 39 Wash. App.
849, 854, 697 P.2d 250, 253 (1985) (isolated trespass of a deputy into
an open, unposted field frequented by hunters did not violate article I,
section 7).
5.8. Plain View: Aiding the Senses with Enhancement Devices
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, the
police may use flashlights to aid their observations, provided that (1)
the observation is from a location where the officer has a right to be,
and (2) the observation could have taken place without flashlights in
daylight. State v. Rose, 128 Wash. 2d 388, 401, 909 P.2d 280, 287
(1996) (no search when police used a flashlight from the lawful vantage
point of the front porch; marijuana observed in plain view through an
unobstructed window). The use of flashlights is permitted on the
theory that what is observed with the aid of a flashlight is "no more
invasive than observations with natural eyesight during daylight would
have been." Id. See also State v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 417, 624
P.2d 725, 729 (1981) (tools suspected of being used in a robbery were
properly seized when an officer observed the tools after shining a
flashlight on the front seat of a car with the door left open). See
generally United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972);
Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.2(b), at 407-17 (3d ed. 1996).
The rule governing magnification is similar to the one governing
the use of flashlights. Under both the Fourth Amendment and article
I, section 7, the police may use binoculars and telescopes to observe
that which is in the open and subject to some scrutiny by the naked
eye from the same location, or to observe that which they lawfully
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could have observed from a closer location. State v. Jones, 33 Wash.
App. 275, 277, 653 P.2d 1369, 1370 (1982). See also State v. Manly,
85 Wash. 2d 120, 125, 530 P.2d 306, 309 (1975); State v. Ludvik, 40
Wash. App. 257, 264 n.1, 698 P.2d 1064, 1068 n.1 (1985). See
generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(c), at 417-28. The
binocular/telescope rule is based on the theory that the sense-enhanc-
ing capability of the devices merely provides information that could
have been otherwise obtained. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 183
n.1, 867 P.2d 593, 598 n.1 (1994). Consequently, the rule does not
permit enhanced observations that enable an officer to observe objects
or activities that could not have been observed by the naked eye; in
these circumstances, the defendant may have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the objects or activities. See, e.g., United States v. Kim,
415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976) (plain view exception does
not apply to FBI agents' use of 800 millimeter telescope to observe
activities in the defendant's apartment one-fourth mile away when no
observation was possible from a closer location); State v. Kender, 588
P.2d 447, 450-51 (Haw. 1978) (plain view exception is inapplicable
when an officer climbed up the fence on neighboring defendant's
backyard that otherwise would have been concealed by a fence and
heavy foliage). But see Commonwealth v. Hernley, 263 A.2d 904, 906
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1970) (applying the plain view exception to binocular
observation, from atop a four-foot ladder, of activity that could not
have been seen with the naked eye).
A particularly intrusive method of viewing which reveals evidence
that is not exposed to the general public may be considered a search.
See State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 182-84, 867 P.2d 593, 597-98
(1994). For example, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
warrantless infrared surveillance of a home violates both article I,
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment since the heat distribution
patterns detected were undetectable by the naked eye or other senses.
Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 183, 867 P.2d at 598. Cf. United States v.
Penny-Feeny, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on other
grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding infrared surveillance
of navigable airspace above defendant's residence).
Aerial surveillance is generally not considered to be an enhance-
ment that gives rise to a search violating the Fourth Amendment or
article I, section 7, so long as the search occurs from public, navigable
airspace and is conducted in a physically unintrusive fashion.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813, 90
L. Ed. 2d. 210, 217-18 (1986); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506,
513-14, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984) (holding aerial surveillance of open
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fields at 1500 feet, without the use of visual enhancement, not
unreasonably intrusive). See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451,
109 S. Ct. 693, 697, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835, 842-43 (1989) (suggesting an
aerial surveillance might violate the Fourth Amendment if it revealed
"intimate details" or caused "excessive noise or other disturbances");
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 106 S. Ct. 1819,
1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 238 (1986) (upholding high altitude aerial
photographic surveillance by EPA).
5.9 Extensions of the Plain View Doctrine
5.9(a) Plain Hearing
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a "plain hearing"
analog to the plain view doctrine. For example, defendants have been
held to have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding motel room
conversations that are overheard with unaided ears in the motel room
next door. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1069 (6th
Cir. 1990) (inadvertently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were
authorized under "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement);
State v. Texeira, 609 P.2d 131, 135 (Haw. 1980) (aural observations of
gambling activities overheard by officer who trespassed on adjacent
property to gain vantage point admissible); State v. Gil, 561 N.W.2d
760, 765-66 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (surveillance evidence of attempted
robbery and attempted homicide admissible under "plain hearing"
exception). Use of hearing enhancement devices may "raise very
different and far more serious questions" from visual enhancement
devices when determining the reasonable expectation of privacy of
defendants and, consequently, whether a warrant is required. Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39, 106 S. Ct. 1819,
1827, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 238 (1986).
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device
or the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other
electronic communications is governed by Washington's Violating
Right of Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.73 (1996). Even tape
recordings made by federal agents pursuant to the federal wiretap
statute are inadmissible in state courts when the recordings are made
in violation of the Washington statute. State v. Williams, 94 Wash.
2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980). Police testimony about such
recorded conversation is also inadmissible. Cf. infra § 7.3(c) (use of
illegally obtained evidence at probable cause hearings).
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5.9(b) Plain Smell
Courts have generally accepted the "plain smell" exception as a
branch of the plain view doctrine. Thus, odor has been used to justify
both warrantless entries and seizure of evidence so long as the officer
was lawfully in the location where the odor was detected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (odor of
marijuana can justify search of automobile or luggage); State v. Lueck,
678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (contents of packages could be
inferred where the packages "reeked of marijuana"); United States v.
Pagan, 395 F. Supp. 1052, 1061 (D.C.P.R. 1975) (plain view doctrine
has been expanded to cover evidence perceived by sense of smell),
aff'd, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976); Mazen v. Seidel, 940 P.2d 923, 929
(Ariz. 1997) (smell of burning marijuana is an exigent circumstance
justifying warrantless entry); People v. Mendez, 948 P.2d 105, 108
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (legislature never intended to bar a finding of
probable cause based on smell of burning marijuana). But see United
States v. Fernandez, 943 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (odor of
marijuana noticed on defendant during Terry stop and frisk did not
justify search inside clothing); People v. Taylor, 564 N.W.2d 24, 29-30
(Mich. 1997) (odors alone not sufficient probable cause to search
vehicle; totality of circumstances to be considered). See generally 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2(a), at 396-407 (3d ed. 1996).
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object
based on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when
the odor was in "open view." See State v. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332,
345, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (1991) (odor of marijuana was in "open view");
State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 291, 549 P.2d 35, 42 (1976); see
also State v. Hammone, 24 Wash. App. 596, 600, 603 P.2d 377, 379
(1979) (marijuana odor emanating from vehicle); State v. Compton, 13
Wash. App. 863, 864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62 (1975) (smell of
marijuana and discovery of greenish-brown vegetable substance was a
legal warrantless search). Odor can also support warrantless entry and
can serve as probable cause for a search warrant. See State v. Gave, 77
Wash. App. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995) (odor of marijuana
supported warrant probable cause requirement); State v. Gocken, 71
Wash. App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1993) (odor of decaying
flesh justified warrantless entry at homicide scene).
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5.9(c) Plain Feel
The "plain feel" or "plain touch" doctrine has been recognized as
a corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception
to the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contra-
band which is detected through the officer's sense of touch during a
legitimate patdown search so long as the search does not exceed the
scope delineated by Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-
76, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-38, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 345-46 (1993). The
object will be admissible only if its "contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent." Id. However, any "squeezing, sliding or
otherwise manipulating" the object extends the search beyond the
scope of Terry, thus rendering the search constitutionally invalid. Id.
at 376-77, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-38, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
For examples of cases in other jurisdictions applying the Minneso-
ta v. Dickerson plain touch rule, see United States v. Rivers, 121 F.3d
1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 582
(1997) (seizure of crack cocaine from pocket of defendant permissible
under "plain feel" doctrine); State v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (crack cocaine was admissible when found in the defendant's
underwear during consensual search); United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d
6, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (search was impermissible where the officer
concluded that no weapon was present and yet continued to explore the
bag in the defendant's jacket); State v. Denis, 691 So. 2d 1295, 1300
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no justification under "plain feel" for the
seizure of a bag of cocaine when the officer testified that he did not
believe the bulge in the defendant's waistband was a weapon).
Washington has adopted the Minnesota v. Dickerson Fourth
Amendment analysis in the context of the plain feel doctrine, and the
doctrine has been analyzed only under the Fourth Amendment. See
State v. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 116-17, 874 P.2d 160, 165-66
(1994); State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez, 72 Wash. App. 852, 857, 866 P.2d
667, 670 (1994) (cocaine seized during a valid frisk was suppressed
where the officer had no probable cause to support the belief that the
"slippery material" in the defendant's pocket was contraband). At the
time this article was submitted for publication, no Washington cases
have analyzed the plain feel doctrine under article I, section 7. See
Laura T. Bradley, The Plain Feel Doctrine in Washington: An
Opportunity to Provide Greater Protections of Privacy to Citizens of This
State, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 131, 133 (1995).
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5.10 Consent Searches: Introduction
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is
granted. State v. Cantrell, 124 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 875 P.2d 1208,
1210 (1994); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812,
818, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 787 (1982). A valid consent search requires
that: (1) the consent be "voluntary"; (2) the consent be granted by a
party having the authority to consent; and (3) the search be limited to
the scope of the consent granted. State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229,
234, 830 P.2d 658, 661 (1992). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 8.1 (3d ed. 1996). Furthermore, "where the State seeks to justify a
search on the basis of consent it has the burden of showing that the
consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of
the right to refuse consent." State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 116,
960 P.2d 927, 933 (1998) (quoting State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68
(N.J. 1975)) (emphasis in original).
5.11. Voluntariness of Consent: Burden of Proof
The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was
given voluntarily. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d
927, 933 (1998) (citing State v. Smith, 115 Wash. 2d 775, 789, 801
P.2d 975, 983 (1990)). The level of proof required is "clear and
convincing evidence." Smith, 115 Wash. 2d at 789, 801 P.2d at 983.
For a discussion of the distinctions between voluntariness of
consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see generally 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.1(a), at 598-606 (3d ed. 1996).
5.12 Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness
The validity or voluntariness of a consent to search is analyzed in
a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 854, 875 (1973). But cf. State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466,
471, 755 P.2d 797, 800 (1988) (consent to search is distinguished from
testimonial admissions since the prior is consistent with innocence).
In Washington, the issue "is clearly an interest of local concern . ..
due to '[t]he heightened protection afforded state citizens against
unlawful intrusion into private dwellings [that] places an onerous
burden upon the government to show a compelling need to act outside
our warrant requirement."' State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 114,
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960 P.2d 927, 932 (1998) (quoting State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d
814, 822, 676 P.2d 419, 824-25 (1984)) (emphasis in original).
Under article I, section 7, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the following rule to be applied when consent to search a
home is at issue.
[T]hat when police officers conduct a knock and talk for the purpose
of obtaining consent to search a home, and thereby avoid the
necessity of obtaining a warrant, they must, prior to entering the
home, inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or
she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search and that they can
revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can limit the
scope of the consent to certain areas of the home. The failure to
provide these warnings, prior to entering the home, vitiates any
consent given thereafter.
Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d at 118-19, 960 P.2d at 934.
5.12(a) Police Claim of Authority to Search
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual's
consent is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involun-
tary. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct.
1788, 1792, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wash.
App. 93, 98, 834 P.2d 84, 87 (1992) (acquiescence to a claim of
authority is not equivalent to freely and voluntarily consenting to a
search). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.2(a), at 637-43 (3d
ed. 1996).
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search
does not, however, automatically invalidate a consent. See State v.
Smith, 115 Wash. 2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975, 984 (1990) (no coercion
where the defendant was told officers would seek a search warrant if
consent to search the trunk of car was not given); State v. Murray, 84
Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (initial intrusion
justified where defendant gave consent to enter apartment); State v.
Bellows, 72 Wash. 2d 264, 268, 432 P.2d 654, 656 (1967) (officer's
search of motel room justified when defendant's consent was given);
Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n v. Thurston County, 85 Wash.
App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208, 215 (1997), review denied, 132 Wash. 2d
1010 (1997) (threats to obtain search warrant may invalidate consent
when grounds for obtaining a warrant do not exist; coercion is a
question of fact determined from totality of circumstances). See
generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(c).
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Note that police misrepresentation regarding the existence of a
search warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. at 1790,
20 L. Ed. 2d at 802; McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. at 112 n.8, 851 P.2d
at 1239 n.8.
5.12(b) Coercive Surroundings
If the police make a show of force at the time the consent is
sought, or if the surroundings are coercive in another respect, the
consent will generally not be considered voluntary. See McNear v.
Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 537, 398 P.2d 732, 737 (1965); State v.
Dresker, 39 Wash. App. 136, 139, 692 P.2d 846, 848 (1984); State v.
Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977) (when
the defendant was placed under physical restraint and not informed of
the right to refuse consent to search, and when the police had searched
her home illegally without consent two days previously, the defendant
did not voluntarily consent to the search of her home even if she
verbalized consent); see supra § 1.4(a); cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 219, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1765, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 258 (1984) (INS
agents moving systematically through a factory asking workers about
their citizenship while other INS agents were stationed at the factory
exits did not constitute a seizure). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 8.2(b). Coercive effects can, however, "be mitigated
by requiring officers who conduct [knock and talk searches] to warn
home dwellers of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search."
Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d at 116, 960 P.2d at 933.
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he or she consents
to a search, however, does not by itself establish coercion or involun-
tariness of consent. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.
Ct. 820, 828, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609 (1976); McNear, 65 Wash. 2d at
538, 398 P.2d at 737-38. Consent was held to be voluntary and
uncoerced when the defendant, arrested on the porch of his home in
midwinter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented to officers
accompanying him into his home; the arresting officers had given the
defendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as he was,
but indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to accompany
him. State v. Nelson, 47 Wash. App. 157, 163-64, 734 P.2d 516, 520
(1987). Defendant's fear that his behavior might appear "crazy" if he
accepted arrest without his jacket and keys was not considered equal
to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d at 520. Custodial restraint is,
however, a significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See Werth, 18
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Wash. App. at 535-36, 571 P.2d at 944; State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash.
App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978).
5.12(c) Awareness of the Constitutional Right
to Withhold Consent
Although an individual's knowledge of the right to refuse a search
is taken into account in determining whether consent to a search is
voluntary, the State may prove that consent was voluntary without
establishing such knowledge. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 863 (1973); McCrorey, 70
Wash. App. at 112, 851 P.2d at 1239. See also Shoemaker, 85 Wash.
2d at 212, 533 P.2d at 125; Werth, 18 Wash. App. at 535-36, 571
P.2d at 944; cf. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. at 880-81, 582 P.2d at 907
(consent was voluntary despite the defendant's assertion that he was
not told and did not know of the right to refuse consent). See generally
3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(i). Where police seek to
justify a warrantless search of a private home, however, knowledge of
the right to refuse consent is an essential element. Ferrier, 136 Wash.
2d at 116, 960 P.2d at 933. "[T]he only sure way to give such a
protection substance is to require a warning of its existence." Id. In
Ferrier, the Washington Supreme Court enunciated an explicit rule for
law enforcement officers conducting a "knock and talk" for the purpose
of obtaining consent to search a home without a warrant.
[Police officers] must, prior to entering the home, inform the person
from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to
consent to the search and that they can revoke, at any time, the
consent that they give, and can limit the scope of the consent to
certain areas of the home. The failure to provide these warnings,
prior to entering the home, vitiates any consent given thereafter.
Id. at 118-19, 960 P.2d at 934.
Washington and the majority of other jurisdictions hold that the
failure to give Miranda warnings to a defendant in custody does not
automatically invalidate a consent to search. Nelson, 47 Wash. App.
at 162, 734 P.2d at 519. See also McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. at 111,
851 P.2d at 1239 (whether Miranda warnings were given is one factor
to consider in the totality of the circumstances).
5.12(d) Prior Illegal Police Action
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant's
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., Werth, 18 Wash. App. at 535, 571
P.2d at 943-44 ("In view of the additional circumstance that two days
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before, Werth's home had been searched illegally without her consent,
it is apparent that overall, the situation was rife with coercion."). See
generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(d). Thus, a prior
illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent consent and thereby
render the consent invalid. See generally McCrorey, 70 Wash. App. at
111, 851 P.2d at 1239 (prior illegal police activity is one factor when
considering the totality of the circumstances); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.2(a), at 666-73.
The State has the burden of proving that a consent search was not
obtained by the exploitation of a prior illegal search. A court
determines whether the subsequent consent was tainted by the earlierillegality by considering, among other factors, the period of time
between the illegal search and the subsequent consent, the presence of
intervening circumstances, the purpose and flagrancy of the prior
official misconduct, and whether the person who consented to the
search received Miranda warnings. No single factor is dispositive. See
State v. Jensen, 44 Wash. App. 485, 489, 723 P.2d 443, 445 (1986)
(although only two hours intervened between the illegal search and the
consent, the consent was valid because in the intervening period the
defendant was advised of his right to refuse consent, had verbally
consented twice, was allowed to call his sister, and there was no
evidence that police did anything to frighten or intimidate defendant);
see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 2667,
73 L. Ed. 2d 314, 319 (1982); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wash. App. 626,
629, 811 P.2d 241, 243 (1991).
5.12(e) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State
The sophistication and emotional state of the defendant are always
considered in assessing the voluntariness of the consent. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 248, 93 S. Ct. at 2058, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 875 ("The
traditional definition of voluntariness we accept today has always taken
into account evidence of minimal schooling, [and] low intelligence.
."); Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 212, 533 P.2d at 125 (determination
of voluntariness should include consideration of "the degree of
education and intelligence of the consenting person"). See also United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1879, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497, 507 (1980). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.2(e).
Thus, while the mental condition of a defendant is a significant
factor in determining voluntariness, the presence of mental illness itself
is insufficient to render a consent to search invalid. See State v.
Sondergaard, 86 Wash. App. 656, 662, 938 P.2d 351, 354 (1997); cf.
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Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S. Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 473, 482 (1986) (voices directing the psychotic defendant to
confess to murder were not the result of police coercion).
5.12(f) Prior Cooperation or Refusal to Cooperate
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was
voluntary. A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a
subsequent consent was not voluntary. See generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(e).
A suspect's behavior may indicate consent even when verbal
consent is withheld. See State v. Raines, 55 Wash. App. 459, 462, 778
P.2d 538, 541 (1989) (failure to expressly object after police requested
permission to enter "to look around" amounted to implied waiver of
right to exclude them); State v. Sabbot, 16 Wash. App. 929, 938, 561
P.2d 212, 218-19 (1977) (although the undercover investigator followed
the defendant into the defendant's home after the defendant had told
him to wait outside, the investigator's presence in house was with the
defendant's tacit acquiescence).
5.12(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect
the voluntariness of a consent to search. Police may use a ruse to gain
entry to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a
justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the
residence. State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658,
660 (1992) (the defendant had no constitutionally protected expectation
of privacy in the residence where undercover officers had purchased
cocaine); State v. Hashman, 46 Wash. App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651,
655 (1986) (a police officer disguised as a building contractor gained
entry into a residence after another officer, who had lawfully been
within the residence, reported evidence of a marijuana growing
operation). See also State v. Williamson, 42 Wash. App. 208, 212-13,
710 P.2d 205, 207-08 (1985) (the fact that officers concealed their
identity and intent to effect an arrest did not abrogate the validity of
consent); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 285-88, 549 P.2d 35,
39-41 (1976). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2
(m)-(n).
5.13 Scope of Consent
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the
authority given by the consenting party. State v. Davis, 86 Wash.
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
App. 414, 423, 937 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997), review denied, 133 Wash.
2d 1028 (1997). The scope of consent may be reduced in duration,
area, or intensity by the express or implied limitation of the consenting
party. Id. Any search exceeding the scope of consent is invalid, since
exceeding the scope of consent is considered comparable to exceeding
the scope of a search warrant. Id. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129
Wash. 2d 61, 72, 917 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1996) (consent to search
vehicle when used as transportation for work release program did not
extend to time when defendant was no longer involved in program);
State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974)
(when defendant consented to search by officers who said they were
looking only for office and video equipment, search could not include
inspection of television serial numbers not in plain view). See generally
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1(c) (3d ed. 1996).
Although an object may be outside the limits of a valid consent,
items may be seized so long as the requirements of the plain view
doctrine are met. See State v. Cotten, 75 Wash. App. 669, 683, 879
P.2d 971, 979 (1994) (shotgun discovered during consensual search did
not come within the plain view doctrine when it was not immediately
apparent to FBI officers that the gun was evidence of a crime); State
v. Rodriguez, 65 Wash. App. 409, 416-17, 828 P.2d 636, 640 (1992)
(boots, towel and shirt validly seized during consensual search of
apartment); supra § 5.7. The officer's knowledge that an object is
contraband need not be certain; it is sufficient that the officer has
probable cause to believe that an object or substance constitutes
incriminating evidence. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 399-
401, 731 P.2d 1101, 1108 (1986) (although consent was given to search
for jewelry and other items stolen in recent burglaries, a clear vial of
capsules and pills, surrounded by other items of drug paraphernalia,
was properly seized; however, a closed, brown paper bag containing
marijuana was improperly seized because its weight immediately
indicated that it could not contain items within the scope of consent).
Whether a consent to search applies to a later search depends on
the time elapsed between the searches and whether the second search
has the same objectives and is conducted by the same officers as the
first search. State v. Koepke, 47 Wash. App. 897, 906, 738 P.2d 295,
300 (1987) (warrant was based on observations made following valid
third-party consent to search a room; later search was validated by the
original consent even though the warrant was defective because the
second search was conducted by the same officer within twenty-four
hours and with the same objective as the first search).
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A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a
particular type of material permits a search of personal property within
the area in which the material could be concealed. For example, in
State v. Jensen, 44 Wash. App. 485, 723 P.2d 443 (1986), the
defendant consented to a "complete" search of his vehicle for materials
of any evidentiary value. Officers conducting the search found cocaine
in the pocket of a jacket found in the back seat of the defendant's car.
The court held that the officers did not exceed the scope of consent
since the defendant had consented to the search for evidence of the size
and nature that could reasonably be in the jacket pocket, and he never
expressly or implicitly withheld consent to search his personal
belongings in the car. Id. at 492, 723 P.2d at 447. See also State v.
Mueller, 63 Wash. App. 720, 723-24, 821 P.2d 1267, 1268-69 (1992)
(search of vehicle, including trunk and gym bag, did not exceed scope
of unlimited consent given by defendant). A consensual search is not
invalidated if it results in the discovery of evidence that the consenting
party did not expect to be discovered. State v. Johnson, 40 Wash.
App. 371, 382-83, 699 P.2d 221, 229 (1985) (evidence of suspect's
involvement in murder admissible after suspect signed a voluntary
consent form permitting officers to search vehicle; record did not
support suspect's claim that consent was limited to search for
marijuana).
5.14 Consent by a Third Party
Under appropriate circumstances, warrantless searches may be
based upon the consent of third parties, and evidence discovered
during such searches may be used against a nonconsenting defendant.
State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 543, 688 P.2d 859, 862 (1994).
The validity of third-party consent is affected by both the
relationship between the defendant and the third party and by other,
more general considerations. The general considerations include: (1)
the antagonism between the defendant and the third party (3 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.3(b), at 720 (3d ed. 1996)); (2) the specific instruc-
tions that the defendant may have given to the third party (3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(c), at 723); and (3) the objection by the
defendant when he or she was present at the time the third party
authorized the search (3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(d), at
726).
Under the Fourth Amendment, third-party consent is analyzed
under the "common authority" standard articulated in United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242,
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248-50 (1974). This standard has been adopted as the proper guide for
analyzing questions of third party consent under article I, section 7.
Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d at 543, 688 P.2d at 863. Under this standard,
(1) the consenting party must be able to permit the search in his or her
own right, and (2) it must be reasonable to find that the defendant had
assumed the risk that a person with joint control might permit a
search. Id. at 544, 688 P.2d at 863. See also State v. Walker, 86
Wash. App. 857, 860, 941 P.2d 1, 3 (1997); Cranwell v. Mesec, 77
Wash. App. 90, 103-04, 890 P.2d 491, 499-500 (1995).
For a discussion of the significance of a police officer's reasonable
mistake that the third party had authority over the place searched, see
United States v. Yarborough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1988); Schikora
v. State, 652 P.2d 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); see generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(g).
The following sections discuss the relationships between a
defendant and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent.
5.14(a) Defendant's Spouse
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with
the "common authority" approach of Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d at 543, 688
P.2d at 863. Thus, the defendant's spouse, having equal use of an
object or equal right to occupation of the premises, may consent to a
search of the object or premises. See, e.g., State v. Gillespie, 18 Wash.
App. 313, 317, 569 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1977) (wife gave valid consent to
search of husband's army field jacket). However, for a valid consensu-
al search of the home, consent must be obtained from both spouses if
both are present and able to consent. State v. Walker, 86 Wash. App.
857, 860-61, 941 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). If only one spouse is present,
consent will be valid against the absent spouse. Id.
When police request entry pursuant to "knock and announce" in
conducting a search pursuant to a warrant, the admission of police by
either spouse is valid. State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410, 417, 550
P.2d 63, 69 (1976) (wife's invitation to police officer to enter defen-
dant's house in response to officer's request was consensual entry
requiring no notice of authority or purpose be given defendant, as
ordinarily required under knock and announce statute or applicable
constitutional provisions). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.4(a). But see State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 261,
738 P.2d 329, 332 (1987) (exigent circumstances needed to justify
noncompliance with knock and announce rule). See supra § 3.7.
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5.14(b) Defendant's Parents
A parent has authority over all rooms of a house and, consequent-
ly, can consent to a search of a dependent child's room whether or not
the child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wash. App. 767, 772, 764
P.2d 250, 253 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wash. App. 669,
685, 879 P.2d 971, 981 (1994); State v. Thompson, 17 Wash. App. 639,
644, 564 P.2d 820, 823 (1977) (when defendant's mother, knowing that
defendant was to be placed under arrest, consented without coercion to
search of home in which she and defendant were living, consent was
valid). However, when the child pays rent, and the status of the
parent is similar to that of a landlord rather than a custodial parent, the
parent has no authority to consent to a search of a child's room.
Summers, 52 Wash. App. at 771-73, 764 P.2d at 253-54.
A parent's common authority extends to objects. A parent can
consent to seizure of an object from a child's room that police
otherwise could not lawfully remove. Cotten, 75 Wash. App. at 685,
879 P.2d at 980-81 (where plain view exception did not apply,
defendant's mother could give valid consent to seizure of shotgun
found in defendant's room).
5.14(c) Defendant's Child
The defendant's child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent
to a search of the parent's home. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wash.
App. 447, 451-52, 591 P.2d 796, 799 (1979) (thirteen-year-old's
invitation to enter apartment in which child resided was legally
sufficient consent, absent any evidence that opening of door and
invitation were unusual, unexpected, or unauthorized acts, or that child
was too young or immature to consent). For a general discussion of
the scope and limitations of a child's consent to a search of the parent's
house, see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.4(c).
5.14(d) Co-tenant or Joint Occupant
A co-tenant or other joint occupant of the defendant's dwelling
with "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected" may give valid consent to
a search of the premises or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 (1974). The
theory behind allowing such a search is that the parties have equal
control over the premises, and each assumes the risk that a cohabitant
may permit a search of shared areas in the individual's absence. Id. at
170, 94 S. Ct. at 992-93, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 249; State v. Mathe, 102
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Wash. 2d 537, 543, 688 P.2d 859, 863 (1984) (quoting Matlock, 415
U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 n.7, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 250 n.7); State
v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 414, 717 P.2d 722, 732 (1986) (common
authority rule applicable to validate consent to search a "hobo" camp
located outside the city of Wenatchee); State v. Walker, 86 Wash.
App. 857, 860, 941 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). See generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(c).
Under the common authority rule, "when the police have obtained
consent to search from an individual possessing equal control over the
premises, the consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also
possesses equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent." Walker, 86
Wash. App. at 860-61, 941 P.2d at 3 (emphasis added). Washington
courts have held that if both cohabitants are present and able to object,
the police must obtain consent from both in order for a search to be
valid. Id. See also State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d
1035, 1040 (1989) (search invalid where premises of business defendant
shared with his girlfriend were searched; girlfriend consented, but
police failed to ask for defendant's consent when they realized he was
present).
In some jurisdictions, the defendant's contemporaneous objections
do not invalidate the consent of a cohabitant. See, e.g., People v.
Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1314-15 (Colo. 1995); People v. Cosine, 397
N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (N.Y. 1979). The dual consent rule for cohabitants
has not been extended to the common authority a driver and passenger
share in an automobile. State v. Cantrell, 124 Wash. 2d 183, 190, 875
P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (1994) (passenger's consent to search automobile
was sufficient to support warrantless search even though the defendant-
driver did not consent to the search).
5.14(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager
The lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent to
a search of an area that is not within the lessee's exclusive possession.
See, e.g., State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 123, 542 P.2d 782, 789
(1975) (search of rented half of garage upheld when police, with
permission of rental manager, searched unrented half, pried off
partition separating halves, and observed bottle of choloroform inside
the partition); State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348,
351 (1975) (grounds outside apartment building were common areas
not under exclusive control of defendant, and thus police could
lawfully search grounds with consent of building manager).
A landlord, however, lacks authority to consent to a search when
a tenant has the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises.
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State v. Birdsong, 66 Wash. App. 534, 537-39, 832 P.2d 533, 535-36
(1992). This rule applies as well to limited rental arrangements such
as those found in motels, boarding homes, and room rentals. Mathe,
102 Wash. 2d at 544, 688 P.2d at 863. See also Timothy E. Travers,
Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search
of Rental Property Authorized by Lessor of Such Property-State Cases,
2 A.L.R.4th 1173, 1208 (1980).
Upon expiration of the tenancy, a tenant abandons his or her
interest in the property and, likewise, an expectation of privacy. State
v. Christian, 95 Wash. 2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806, 809 (1981). See
generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(a).
Tenants may consent to searches of common areas under the
common authority" rule, even over the objection of the landlord.
Cranwell v. Mesec, 77 Wash. App. 90, 103-04, 890 P.2d 491, 499-500
(1995). For additional discussion of consent by a lessee, see generally
3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(b).
5.14(f) Bailee
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor's belongings when
the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of control over the
chattel. See State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 139-40, 559 P.2d 970,
976 (1977) (when hospital had joint control over patient-defendant's
clothing, hospital ward clerk could consent to police seizure of the
clothing). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6(a).
For a discussion of consent by a bailor, see generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6(b).
5.14(g) Employee and Employer
Under some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a
search of employer's premises, and an employer may consent to a
search of the place of employment even when the belongings of an
employee would be affected. Thus, under the common authority rule
analysis, see supra, § 5.14, an employer may validly consent to a search
of that portion of the employer's premises used by an employee for
personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wash. App. 620, 632-33, 736
P.2d 1079, 1082 (1987) (defendant leased a "crash pad" on premises
owned by his employer; employer controlled guard dogs on the
premises, stored personal and business items there, had keys to the
area, and allowed use of area by other employees). For a discussion of
the rules governing consent within the employer-employee relationship,
see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6(c)-(d).
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5.14(h) Hotel Employee
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search
of a guest's room because a motel guest generally has the same
expectation of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a
private residence. State v. Davis, 86 Wash. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d
1110, 1113 (1997). See also Stonerv. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84
S. Ct. 889, 891, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861 (1964); State v. York, 11 Wash.
App. 137, 141, 521 P.2d 950, 952 (1974). Note that the hotel guest's
expectation of privacy generally expires at check-out time. See Davis,
86 Wash. App. at 419, 937 P.2d at 1113 (motel guest loses expectation
of privacy at the expiration of tenancy unless late payment has been
accepted by the motel and/or the motel has tolerated previous overtime
stays).
5.14(i) Host and Guest
A host has the authority to consent to a search of a guest's
bedroom and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v.
Koepke, 47 Wash. App. 897, 903-04, 738 P.2d 295, 298-99 (1987)
(tenant of apartment gave valid consent to search of room in which
defendant was residing as a guest; defendant paid no rent); State v.
Rodriguez, 65 Wash. App. 409, 414-15, 828 P.2d 636, 639-40 (1992)
(mother could give valid consent for police search of apartment where
son was a temporary guest; consent extended to bathroom occupied by
defendant). For additional discussion, see generally 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(e). See common authority rule, supra,
§ 5.14.
5.15 Statutory Implied Consent
A statute may establish that particular conduct constitutes implied
consent to a search. For example, a person driving a motor vehicle in
Washington gives implied consent to a blood test if he or she is
arrested for vehicular homicide. State v. Brokman, 84 Wash. App.
848, 850-51, 930 P.2d 354, 355-56 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.308(1) (1996).
5.16 Exigent Circumstances: Introduction
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
applies when police have established probable cause but do not obtain
a warrant because the need for an immediate search or seizure makes
it impractical to obtain a warrant. State v. Audley, 77 Wash. App.
897, 905, 894 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1995); State v. Muir, 67 Wash. App.
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149, 152, 835 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1992). The reasoning underlying the
exception is that the delay involved in obtaining a warrant could result
in the loss of evidence, in the escape of the suspect, or in harm to the
public or the police. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 127 Wash. 2d 836, 852-
53, 904 P.2d 290, 297-98 (1995) (Alexander, J., dissenting) (exigent
circumstances justified search of motel room when police were afraid
that drugs inside room would be destroyed if room's occupants were
alerted to police presence by noises in hallway); State v. Pressley, 64
Wash. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749, 753 (1992) (police may seize
evidence without a warrant if probable cause exists and actions of
person detained give rise to reasonable suspicion that evidence is in
danger of being lost or destroyed). See also State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.
2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (1986); State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.
2d 632, 644-45, 716 P.2d 295, 303-04 (1986); Audley, 77 Wash. App.
at 907, 894 P.2d at 1364; State v. Flowers, 57 Wash. App. 636, 643-
44, 789 P.2d 333, 338 (1990). See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(b),
at 402-03 (3d ed. 1996). Exigent circumstances, however, are not
created merely whenever a serious offense has been committed.
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 411, 83 L. Ed.
2d 246, 250-51 (1984); State v. Stevenson, 55 Wash. App. 725, 732,
780 P.2d 873, 877 (1989). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 301 (1978); State v.
Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1983).
The exigent circumstances exception has been narrowly construed
when the search requires intrusion into the human body, Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908,
919 (1966), or entry into private premises, Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 587-89, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380-81, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651-52
(1980) (absent exigent circumstances, police may not make a warrant-
less arrest following a nonconsensual entry into home); State v. Solberg,
122 Wash. 2d 688, 696-97, 861 P.2d 460, 465 (1993). At the same
time, under the Fourth Amendment the exception broadly encompasses
searches of vehicles; thus, police may make a warrantless search of a
vehicle even though the vehicle and its owner are in police custody.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed.
2d 419, 428-29 (1970).
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution is not as broad
in the context of automobile searches. The scope of the permissible
search incident to arrest justified under the exigent circumstances
exception is limited to the passenger compartment and any unlocked
compartments or containers. Under this exception, the search is only
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permissible if conducted during the arrest process and immediately
subsequent to the suspect's arrest and placement in the patrol car. See
State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986); 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.2(b), at 68 (3d ed. 1996).
The requirement that exigent circumstances precede a warrantless
entry by police to make an arrest does not apply when the crime is
committed in the officer's presence after being admitted into the
residence. Thus, in State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. App. 279, 286, 716
P.2d 940, 944 (1986), an officer who had obtained entry into a
student's college dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs,
but with the intent of affecting an arrest, could make a warrantless
arrest under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (1996), which provides
for an arrest without a warrant where the police officer has reasonable
cause to believe a felony has been or is being committed. Dalton, 43
Wash. App. at 286-87, 716 P.2d at 944.
5.17 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Entry
into the Home
5.17(a) Hot Pursuit
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance
justifying a warrantless search of an arrestee's house. See Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409,
413-14 (1970). However, police may make a warrantless entry into a
home when (1) they attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place; (2)
the suspect retreats into the home; and (3) the police reasonably fear
that delay will result in the suspect's escape, in injury to the officers or
to the public, or in the destruction of evidence. United States v.
Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8-9 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruc-
tion of evidence); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (escape; destruction of evidence). See also United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 44, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 306
(1976) (White, J., concurring); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782,
787 (1967); State v. Griffith, 61 Wash. App. 35, 44, 808 P.2d 1171,
1176 (1991); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 722, 582 P.2d 558,
562 (1978). While the police are on the premises, the scope of the
intrusion is limited to its purpose; if the purpose is to prevent escape
or harm, for example, the search is limited to finding the suspect or
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weapons that could be used against the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at
299, 87 S. Ct. at 1646, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787-88.
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, a firm
line has been drawn at the entrance of the house, and "that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." State v. Holeman,
103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985) (quoting Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L. Ed. 2d
639, 653 (1980)). Washington courts have deemed that the location of
the arrestee, not the location of the arresting officer, is critical for
purposes of determining whether an arrest takes place in a home.
Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d at 429, 693 P.2d at 91. Thus, absent exigent
circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer may not arrest a suspect
without a warrant-and, subsequently, conduct a warrantless search
incident to arrest-if the suspect is standing in the doorway to his or
her home, even when the officer is outside the home. Id. However,
the unenclosed front porch of a home is a public place for purposes of
arrest once probable cause has been established. State v. Solberg, 122
Wash. 2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460, 466 (1993). Therefore, a suspect
who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the unenclosed porch may
be arrested there, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at
700, 861 P.2d at 466. See also State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474,
481, 682 P.2d 925, 931 (1984).
In determining whether the warrantless entry into a home was
justified by the hot pursuit exigent circumstance, courts examine not
only the purpose of the entry, but also whether:
(1) the offense was serious or one of violence, Dorman, 435 F.2d
at 392; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752-53, 104 S. Ct. 2091,
2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 745 (1984) (warrantless arrest in defendant's
bedroom for noncriminal traffic offense not justified to preserve
evidence of individual's blood alcohol level because no imprisonment
was possible, even assuming that underlying facts would have
supported finding of that exigent circumstance). But see Welsh, 466
U.S. at 763-64, 104 S. Ct. at 2104-05, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 752 (White, J.,
dissenting) (because suspect could cast substantial doubt on validity of
blood or breath test by consuming alcohol after arriving home, and in
light of promptness with which officers reached suspect's home, the
need to prevent imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of
serious violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided exigent circum-
stances justifying warrantless in-home arrest) (emphasis added);
(2) the suspect was armed, Dorman, 425 F.2d at 392;
(3) there was a clear and strong showing of probable cause to
believe the suspect committed the crime, id. at 392-3;
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(4) there were reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect was
on the premises, id.;
(5) the police identified themselves and provided an opportunity
for surrender prior to their entry, id.;
(6) the arrest decision was made in the course of an ongoing
investigation or in the field, and the exigency of entry into the house
was not foreseen at the time of the decision, see United States v.
Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1976) (entry into the
defendant's home without warrant was not justified because entry was
foreseeable consequence of planned investigation and prior police
activities); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464, 91
S. Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 581-82 (1971); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,
694 (1969);
(7) pursuit was substantially continuous and afforded police no
reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant, People v. Escudero, 592
P.2d 312, 318 (Cal. 1979); see also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 752-53, 104 S.
Ct. at 2099, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 745 (warrantless search in home not
justified by hot pursuit when police did not engage in immediate or
continuous pursuit of defendant from scene of crime); State v. Counts,
99 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1983) (no hot pursuit when
police stood outside defendant's home for one hour after defendant
retreated therein).
The more intrusive the search, the greater the level of proof
required for each element of the hot pursuit exception.
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include: State v. Griffith,
61 Wash. App. 35, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (escape; destruction of
evidence); State v. Hendricks, 25 Wash. App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980)
(escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)
(injury); State v. Stringer, 4 Wash. App. 485, 481 P.2d 910 (1971).
5.17(b) Imminent Arrest
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police may make a
warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that the
suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to
destroy evidence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349,
1356 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies
when the police reasonably believe that the suspect is armed or the
crime for which he or she is to be arrested is one of violence. Hayden,
387 U.S. at 298-300, 87 S. Ct. at 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787;
Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1355-56.
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In addition, police may make a warrantless entry when they
believe an accomplice has been alerted to the arrest of another
accomplice and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid, 38 Wash.
App. 203, 209-10, 687 P.2d 861, 866 (1984). Police may not,
however, make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is
slight, the offense is minor, and the police do not believe the suspect
is armed. State v. Dresker, 39 Wash. App. 136, 139-40, 692 P.2d 846,
849 (1984).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant;
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed
before a warrant can be obtained. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d
262, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1973); cf State v. Carter, 127 Wash. 2d 836, 840,
904 P.2d 290, 292 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless
entry of motel room where there was a risk of drugs being destroyed
if persons in motel room were alerted to police presence by noises and
scuffle in hallway); State v. Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d
312, 314 (1981) (presence of easily disposable contraband does not
itself constitute exigent circumstances justifying noncompliance with
"knock and announce" statute); State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App.
592, 596-97, 675 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1984) (exigent circumstances when
police observed occupants in process of inhaling what police reasonably
believed to be cocaine).
5.18 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Search and
Seizure of the Person
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by
the exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury
to themselves or others, flight, or the destruction of evidence. See,
e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 238, 246-47 (1979) (pat-down search unconstitutional absent
reasonable belief); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S.
Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20 (1966). See generally
State v. Audley, 77 Wash. App. 897, 894 P.2d 1359 (1995). The issue
generally does not arise with respect to an arrestee because the
warrantless search of an arrestee may be justified as incident to arrest.
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1, at 2 (3d ed. 1996). Exigent
circumstances are used to justify two other kinds of warrantless
searches of persons: searches that penetrate the body, such as blood
tests and other invasive medical procedures, and searches of persons
located on the premises being searched.
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5.18(a) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body
For a medical procedure to be performed without a warrant and
justified by exigent circumstances, the test selected to obtain evidence
must be reasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68, 86 S. Ct. at 1834,
16 L. Ed. 2d at 917-18. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 3.3(b), at 104. In addition, the State must show more than probable
cause because of the severity of the search, and the method used to
obtain the evidence must be reasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-
72, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20; State v. Young, 15
Wash. App. 581, 584-85, 550 P.2d 689, 691-92 (1976) (police may use
reasonable force to constrict throat to prevent swallowing).
Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect is an exigent
circumstance justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample
to determine the suspect's blood alcohol level. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20. Blood tests
without a warrant have been upheld as reasonable searches under both
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 as long as the test is
performed in a reasonable manner by a trained paramedic. State v.
Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991), abrogated
on other grounds, State v. Berlin, 133 Wash. 2d 541, 947 P.2d 700
(1997). In Washington, blood tests for alcohol intoxication are also
justified by statutory implied consent under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.308(3) (1996). Curran, 116 Wash. 2d at 185, 804 P.2d at 564
(no violation of article I, section 7 when a blood sample is taken
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(3)). But see State v.
Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 870-71, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073 (1973)
(lawful arrest of motorist is a prerequisite for operation of implied
consent statute; express consent is required for blood test of motorist
who is not under arrest).
Similarly, the exigent circumstance of dissipation of blood alcohol
has also been used to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into a residence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sample. State v.
Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 211-13, 697 P.2d 1025, 1032-33 (1985)
(officer used a passkey to enter apartment and arrest suspect following
felony hit and run).
The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed will not automati-
cally justify an intrusive medical procedure even when a warrant is
obtained; the evidence must be essential to a conviction. See Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-66, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1619-20, 84 L. Ed. 2d
662, 672-73 (1985) (no need to retrieve bullet from defendant's body
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under circumstances where other substantial evidence was available to
convict him).
5.18(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located on
Premises Being Searched
When a search warrant for premises is being executed, police may
conduct a warrantless search of a person located on the premises if they
have "reasonable cause" to believe that the person is concealing
evidence sought and immediate seizure is necessary to prevent its
destruction. State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408,
410 (1978) (warrant authorizing search of home and its owner did not
permit officers to search person found in home at time of search when
magistrate had made no prior determination of probable cause to search
that person and person did not act suspiciously). For a more complete
discussion of when occupants may be searched during the execution of
a search warrant for premises, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4, at 394.
5.19 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Entry into the Home or Search
of the Person: Absence of Less Intrusive Alternatives
Courts have held warrantless entries of homes illegal when police
could have kept the residence under surveillance until a warrant was
obtained. State v. Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 536-37, 571 P.2d 941,
944-45 (1977). See also United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204
(9th Cir. 1976); cf. State v. McKenzie, 12 Wash. App. 88, 528 P.2d
269 (1974) (when police officers watched defendant's house while other
officers applied for search warrant, and when defendant drove car out
of garage, was approached by police, and then sounded his horn, the
officers were permitted to immediately enter house in order to detain
occupants, provided the officers refrained from searching the house
until the search warrant was issued); State v. Peele, 10 Wash. App. 58,
516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant necessary when the suspect was
not fleeing, but might be expected to hide out on the premises until
morning); People v. Vogel, 374 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (when
threat of destruction of evidence in locker was minimal or nonexistent
and could be thwarted by stationing officer at locker while warrant was
obtained, warrantless search was not justified); State v. Allen, 508 P.2d
472 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (when no one who could dispose of contra-
band remains on premises, police should secure premises by stationing
guard while search warrant is obtained). See generally 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 6.5 (3d ed. 1996) (cordoning-off should be required
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
when it constitutes lesser intrusion than a warrantless search and does
not jeopardize life).
Similarly, the police may be required to keep occupants under
surveillance, instead of searching them, until a warrant is procured.
See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974) (police failure
to apply for warrant was unlawful when police could have stationed
officer with informant to prevent him from calling and warning
defendant of imminent search); State v. Lewis, 19 Wash. App. 35, 40,
573 P.2d 1347, 1350 (1978). Police may use methods not involving
any searching activity to secure premises in which they are legally
present while awaiting the issuance of a search warrant. State v.
Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 645-46, 716 P.2d 295, 302 (1986) (prior
warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his residence was justified
by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the police contributed
to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything in "plain view"
used as evidence).
A suspect attempting to swallow evidence may create an exigent
circumstance justifying efforts to prevent the swallowing, even when
the evidence could be expected to pass through the digestive system
and be recovered. State v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 665-67, 676
P.2d 504, 506 (1984).
5.20 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Search and
Seizure of Containers
Generally, a container may be seized without a warrant when there
is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime; the container's
mobility is the exigent circumstance permitting the warrantless seizure.
See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L.
Ed. 2d 538 (1977); State v. Jackson, 82 Wash. App. 594, 918 P.2d 945
(1996), review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1006 (1997) (positive reaction by
dog trained to discover drugs established probable cause justifying
seizure of package). A warrantless search of its contents, however, is
permissible only if delay would diminish the evidentiary value of the
contents, prevent the apprehension of suspects, or endanger the public.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14-15, 97 S. Ct. at 2484, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549;
State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 716, 677 P.2d 185, 190 (1984)
(emergency of public safety protection justified search of briefcase in
order to locate a missing gun). See also State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d
127, 137-38, 559 P.2d 970, 975 (1977); State v. Wolfe, 5 Wash. App.
153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971). Once the container is in the officer's
exclusive control, there is no danger of removal; thus exigent circum-
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stances no longer justify a warrantless search of the contents. See, e.g.,
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed.
2d 282 (1970); State v. Johnston, 31 Wash. App. 889, 645 P.2d 63
(1982) (seizure of purse valid, but subsequent search without a warrant
was illegal); State v. Moore, 29 Wash. App. 354, 628 P.2d 522 (1981)
(warrantless seizure of luggage proper, but warrantless search unlaw-
ful); cf. State v. Kealey, 80 Wash. App. 162, 170-71, 907 P.2d 319,
324 (1995), review denied, 129 Wash. 2d 1021 (1996) ("Purses,
briefcases, and luggage constitute traditional repositories of personal
belongings protected under the Fourth Amendment.").
When a container is found in an automobile, the rule requiring a
warrant for the search of a container's contents does not apply if police
have probable cause to search the vehicle, and police may open
containers discovered during a search so long as the container is large
enough to conceal the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). See also United
States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985).
See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.5 (3d ed. 1996).
A warrantless inspection or testing of a container's contents is not
always considered a "search." When the only fact that can be gleaned
from an inspection or test is whether the contents are contraband, the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated. United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100 (1984)
(chemical test that merely discloses whether a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy).
Accord State v. Bishop, 43 Wash. App. 17, 20, 714 P.2d 1199, 1200
(1986) (subjecting suspicious substance to chemical analysis to
determine identity does not invade privacy interests). Thus, a canine
sniff does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45,
77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121 (1983) (trained narcotics dog sniffing exterior
of luggage does not constitute a search). For a discussion of canine
sniffs under article I, section 7, see State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724,
723 P.2d 28 (1986) (canine sniff of air outside suspect's bank safe
deposit box; court suggests article I, section 7 requires a case-by-case
examination of the circumstances in order to determine whether a
canine sniff is a search). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 1.6. See State v. Courcy, 48 Wash. App. 326, 739 P.2d 98
(1987) for an application of the single purpose container rule in
Washington. See also 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 5.2(b), at
68; 5.5, at 169.
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5.21 Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Motor Vehicles
Automobiles and other motor vehicles are treated as a special
category in search and seizure law for two reasons. First, the
reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a
home or on a person and, second, the mobility of a vehicle may make
obtaining a warrant prior to a search or seizure impractical. See
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069-70,
85 L. Ed. 2d. 406, 414 (1985) (privacy expectation in vehicles is less
than in homes because of pervasive government regulation of driving
and roads); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 449, 453-54, 909 P.2d
293, 303, 306 (1996); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49,
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1980, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 427 (1970). Under both the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, the fact that it is possible
to sleep in a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights that
attach to fixed dwellings. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S. Ct. at 2070,
85 L. Ed. 2d at 414 (motor home is treated like a vehicle when it is
mobile); Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d at 449, 909 P.2d at 303 (lessened
privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig); State
v. Cantrell, 124 Wash. 2d 183, 190, 875 P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (1994)
(There exists "less expectation of privacy in automobile than in either
a home or an office. . . ."). The reasonable expectation of privacy in
motor vehicles is discussed in 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3(e), at
66 (3d ed. 1996).
This section focuses on the warrantless search or seizure of a
vehicle and its contents when police have probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of a crime. Vehicles may also be the subject
of a warrantless search when the circumstances of the search are
consistent with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as
the search incident to arrest or Terry stop and frisk exceptions. See 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(b), at 68; see also 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 4.7-4.9, at 583-652.
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents is treated different-
ly under the Fourth Amendment than under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. Compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460-61, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774-76 (1981) (police
may, as a contemporaneous incident of lawful custodial arrest of
occupants in automobile, search passenger compartment and contents
of any container in passenger compartment), with State v. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d 144, 148-52, 720 P.2d 436, 438-40 (1986) (in warrantless
search of automobile, actual exigent circumstances must be balanced
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against whatever privacy interests individual has in articles in vehicle).
The next section sets forth federal law governing search and seizure of
automobiles and their contents, and then discusses state law. Finally,
the general principles governing automobile impoundment and
inventory searches are discussed.
5.22 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles Under the Fourth Amendment
5.22(a) Probable Cause to Search a Vehicle: The Carroll Rule
Under the Fourth Amendment, police may conduct a warrantless
search of an automobile when there is probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S. Ct. 280,
285, 69 L. Ed. 543, 551 (1925); State v. Huff, 64 Wash. App. 641,
648-49, 826 P.2d 698, 702 (1992). A warrantless search is permissible
under the Carroll rule because an automobile's mobility creates an
exigency: the contraband or evidence could be transported out of the
jurisdiction while officers are applying for a warrant. Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285, 69 L. Ed. at 551.
The special treatment of automobiles has been extended to permit
the warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk when the police reasonably
believe that the trunk contains weapons and the vehicle is vulnerable
to vandalism. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S. Ct. 2523,
2531, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 718 (1973) (suspect's vehicle had been
disabled in an accident and subsequently towed to a private garage).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless search of a trunk when they
reasonably believe a suspect may be hiding in it. State v. Silvernail,
25 Wash. App. 185, 191, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980).
5.22(b) Application of the Carroll Rule When
Actual Exigency Removed
The Carroll rule permits a warrantless search even after a vehicle
has been taken into police custody and is in no danger of removal or
of disturbance of its contents. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382,
104 S. Ct. 1852, 1853, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381, 384 (1984); Chambers, 399
U.S. at 51-52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428-29 (actual exigent
circumstances not necessary to justify warrantless probable cause
search). The rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless
search does not disappear after impoundment. United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478, 484, 105 S. Ct. 881, 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890, 897 (1985).
The vehicle, however, has to have been initially mobile or readily
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mobile for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 460-62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2034-36, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 579-81
(1971) (warrant was required when defendant had already been
arrested, his car was located in his driveway, no other individual was
available to move the car, and police already had established probable
cause to search the car). See also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
390-91, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-69, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412-13 (1985).
The constitutional limits on the number of warrantless searches
and the length of time that may elapse before police are required to
obtain a warrant has not been clarified. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 484-88,
105 S. Ct. at 886-87, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 897-99 (upholding the warrant-
less search of containers in a vehicle under the Carroll rule when the
containers were stored in a government warehouse for three days prior
to the search).
5.22(c) Permissible Scope of Search or Seizure Under Carroll: The
Vehicle Itself and Containers Within the Vehicle
When police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains
contraband, they may conduct a warrantless search "of the same scope
as could be authorized by a magistrate." Johns, 469 U.S. at 483, 105
S. Ct. at 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 896 (citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 594
(1982)).
Thus, when the exact location of the contraband within the vehicle
is not known, police may conduct a warrantless search not only of the
vehicle itself, but also of any of its contents, including containers.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 594.
Formerly, police were required to obtain a warrant in order to search
a container found in a motor vehicle if the probable cause to search
was directed only at the container, and not the car itself. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2594, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235,
246 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S. Ct. 2476,
2484-85, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 549-50 (1977). Currently, however, when
police have probable cause to believe that the contraband is hidden
within a particular container, and the container is placed inside a
vehicle, probable cause automatically extends to the entire vehicle.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114
L. Ed. 2d 619, 634 (1991). In other words, if the police have probable
cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime is present anywhere
inside a vehicle, they may search the entire automobile and any
containers within it. Id. The scope of the permissible search is limited
to the size and shape of the items sought, and police may only search
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where it is reasonable to believe the sought items may be hidden. Id.
Note that Acevedo and Ross apply only in the context of the automobile
exception, and a legitimate expectation of privacy in closed containers
is retained outside of the context of motor vehicles.
5.23 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles Under Article I, Section 7
The Washington Constitution provides greater protection against
the warrantless search of an automobile than the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 69-70 n.1, 917 P.2d 563, 567
n.1 (1996). The Washington Constitution does not permit a blanket
exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles. Under article
I, section 7, warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest must occur
immediately following the arrest of the occupant of a vehicle. State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986); State v.
Perea, 85 Wash. App. 339, 343-44, 932 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1997). See
also State v. Cass, 62 Wash. App. 793, 795-96, 816 P.2d 57, 58-59
(1991) (search of passenger compartment valid if immediately
subsequent to arresting, handcuffing, and placing suspect in police car);
State v. Fore, 56 Wash. App. 339, 347, 783 P.2d 626, 631 (1989) (for
search to be valid, arrest must be sufficiently proximate, both
temporally and physically, to lawful arrest).
Moreover, under the heightened privacy protection of article I,
section 7, the warrantless search incident to arrest of locked containers
located in the passenger compartment is prohibited. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441. This is in contrast to the federal
standard, which permits the warrantless search incident to arrest of
both locked and unlocked containers. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.2(b), at 68 (3d ed. 1996). "The rationale for this departure from
the federal standard is that use of a lock demonstrates the individual's
expectation of privacy and the presence of a lock minimizes the danger
of an arrestee gaining access to the contents of the container." State
v. Johnson, 77 Wash. App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106, 109 (1995), aff'd,
128 Wash. 2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (discussing Stroud).
Therefore, in Washington police must obtain a search warrant prior to
searching any locked glove compartment or other locked container.
5.24 Warrantless Vehicle Searches Based on Generalized Suspicion:
Spot Checks of Motorists
In the absence of a valid spot check program, police officers may
stop a motor vehicle to check for valid registration or possible
automobile violations only when they have a reasonable suspicion of
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unlawful activity. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673 (1979) (random stopping of drivers
to check registration violated the Fourth Amendment); State v.
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 441, 706 P.2d 225, 228 (1985) (safety
spot check invalid under the Fourth Amendment). For police to
institute general spot check procedures, the procedures must constitute
"a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion."
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at 437-38, 706 P.2d at 226-27. In addition,
the spot check procedures must be such that "the exercise of discretion
by law enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained." Id. at 438,
706 P.2d at 227. See also Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 459,
755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (Seattle's sobriety checkpoint program
improperly "gave police officers unbridled discretion to conduct
intrusive searches"). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.4(c)
(3d ed. 1996). The validity of a road block program under the Fourth
Amendment depends on the balancing of the effectiveness of the road
block program against the degree of intrusion on the cumulative
interests invaded, rather than merely with one individual's interest in
freedom from intrusion. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 459-60, 755 P.2d
at 778 (checkpoint program involved no statutory constraints and
involved extensive invasion of privacy such as the smelling of suspect's
breath, visual check of automobile for open containers, and physical
tests designed to elicit evidence of dexterity). Cf. Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412
(1990) (sobriety checkpoint where all vehicles were briefly detained did
not violate the Fourth Amendment).
In Mesiani, the Washington Supreme Court held a sobriety
checkpoint program unconstitutional under both article I, section 7 and
the Fourth Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458, 460, 755 P.2d
at 777-78. Relying on article I, section 7's explicit recognition of the
privacy rights of the state's citizens and requirements that all searches
be conducted under "authority of law," the court dismissed the city's
argument that the stops fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 457-58, 755 P.2d at 777. In one of the cases relied
upon by the city, State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d
1279 (1980), the court permitted a warrantless search when there was
information that a serious felony had been recently committed. Id. at
190, 605 P.2d at 1283. The Mesiani court distinguished Silvernail,
stating that notice that a felony had recently been committed "is far
different from an inference from statistics that there are inebriated
drivers in the area." Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d at
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777 n.1. But see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987). The
California Supreme Court used the "administrative search" doctrine to
decide that sobriety checkpoints pass constitutional muster so long as
they are properly designed and operated. Ingersoll, 743 P.2d at 1303-
04. Such checkpoints are intended primarily to deter intoxicated
motorists from taking to the road, not to discover evidence of crimes,
and, therefore, may be characterized as administrative searches that
require no individualized suspicion of illegal conduct. Id. at 1306-08.
5.25 Warrantless Searches of Vehicles Suspected of Being
Subject of Criminal Activity
A police officer may make a limited entry and investigation into
a vehicle that he or she has probable cause to believe has been the
subject of a burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wash.
App. 467, 477-78, 929 P.2d 460, 465 (1996). An officer may search
those areas he or she reasonably believes to have been affected, and
those areas reasonably believed to contain some evidence of ownership.
Lynch, 84 Wash. App. at 477-78, 929 P.2d at 465. See also State v.
Orcutt, 22 Wash. App. 730, 734-35, 591 P.2d 872, 875 (1979) (valid
warrantless entry into vehicle to look in places where registration
papers might be kept if driver has fled vehicle and officer reasonably
believed vehicle was stolen); cf. Arizona v. Taras, 504 P.2d 548, 552
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (warrantless search for registration papers may
be made when occupant is detained and refuses to identify owner of
vehicle).
5.26 Forfeiture or Levy
Courts differ as to whether a vehicle that was used to transport
contraband may be seized without a warrant. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.3(b), at 514-19 (3d ed. 1996). See also General Motors Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 97 S. Ct. 619, 629-30, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 530, 545 (1977) (IRS may impound car parked on public street
for levy or forfeiture purposes without obtaining warrant when no
legitimate privacy is invaded; when car is on private property, a
warrant may be required).
In Washington, courts have recognized that "searches and seizures
of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday occur-
rence." State v. McFadden, 63 Wash. App. 441, 446, 820 P.2d 53, 55
(1991). In Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wash. App. 747, 719 P.2d 594
(1986), the court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, the police
are not required to obtain a search warrant before exercising the
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authority granted by WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(a)(4) (1985)
(forfeiture statute, Uniform Controlled Substances Act) to seize a
vehicle used to transport a controlled substance. Lowery, 43 Wash.
App. at 750, 719 P.2d at 596. See also Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wash.
2d 342, 804 P.2d 24 (1991); State v. Gwinner, 59 Wash. App. 119, 796
P.2d 728 (1990) (upholding seizure under Federal Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4), (6) (1970)). Under both the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 7, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle
seized pursuant to the forfeiture statute on the theory that the search
is a valid inventory search. McFadden, 63 Wash. App. at 449, 820
P.2d at 57 (1991). See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.5(c), at
590.
5.27 Impoundment
"Impoundment is considered a seizure because it involves the
taking of a vehicle into the exclusive custody of the government."
State v. Coss, 87 Wash. App. 891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1997),
review denied, - Wash. 2d _, 958 P.2d 318 (1998). The facts of each
case determine the reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id.
A vehicle may be impounded without a warrant in several circumstanc-
es:
(1) as evidence of a crime, if the officer has probable cause to believe
that it was stolen or used in the commission of a felony; (2) as part
of the police "community caretaking function," if the removal of the
vehicle is necessary ... ; and (3) as part of the police function of
enforcing traffic regulations, if the driver has committed one of the
traffic offenses for which the legislature has specifically authorized
impoundment.
Id. (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199,
1211 (1980)). See also State v. Lynch, 84 Wash. App. 467, 476, 929
P.2d 460, 465 (1996); State v. Hill, 68 Wash. App. 300, 842 P.2d 996
(1993); State v. McFadden, 63 Wash. App. 441, 820 P.2d 53 (1991).
A vehicle lawfully parked at one's home or even on a public street
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested.
United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1972).
Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is
imminent and the vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. State v. Bales,
15 Wash. App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 688, 690 (1976). Note also that
when police conduct warrantless impoundments and subsequent
inventory searches (see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7 .5(e), at 590 (3d ed.
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1996)) the searches may not be a pretext for a search that the police
otherwise could not have made. State v. White, 83 Wash. App. 770,
774-75, 924 P.2d 55, 57 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Wash. 2d
761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
5.27(a) Evidence of Crime
"A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an
officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the
commission of a felony." State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 647,
716 P.2d 295, 303 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the police properly impounded a vehicle that they had
probable cause to believe was used in the commission of a felony,
where the defendant had lured the victim to the murder site by
telephoning him and asking him to bring gasoline to the defendant's
empty vehicle. Id. at 647-48, 716 P.2d at 303. Cf. State v. Huff, 64
Wash. App. 641, 653, 826 P.2d 698, 705 (1992) (an officer who has
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
a crime may seize and hold the car for the reasonable time needed to
obtain a search warrant; the car may be towed to an impound yard
during seizure).
5.27(b) Community Caretaking Function
The "community caretaking function" permits impoundment
when the vehicle has been abandoned, impedes traffic, poses a threat
to public safety and convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism
or theft of its contents. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-
69, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005 (1976); Cady v.
Dombrowki, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d
706, 715 (1973); State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d
560, 566 (1986). In Sweet, for example, impoundment was held to be
proper under the community caretaking function when the arrestee was
unconscious, items of value were visible inside the vehicle, and the
vehicle was in a high crime area. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. at 236-37,
721 P.2d at 566.
Under the community caretaking function, the police need have
no reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal activity.
See State v. Chisholm, 39 Wash. App. 864, 866-67, 696 P.2d 41, 42-43
(1985). However, for a valid impoundment as part of the community
caretaking function, police must first make an inquiry as to the
availability of the owner or the owner's spouse or friends to move the
vehicle. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065,
1070-71 (1984). See also State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 153, 622
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P.2d 1218, 1224-25 (1980); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 189,
622 P.2d 1199, 1211 (1980). Police must also consider the alternative
of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 743, 689
P.2d at 1071.
5.27(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations
Officers are permitted to impound a vehicle as part of enforcing
traffic regulations only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary
to prevent a continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the
legislature has specifically authorized impoundment. Hill, 68 Wash.
App. at 305, 842 P.2d at 999. Impoundment is unreasonable and
improper if a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists, such as
when the owner of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is
available to transport it. Id. at 306, 842 P.2d at 999. Police officers
are to use discretion when deciding to impound a vehicle and, while an
officer need not exhaust all possibilities, the officer must at least
consider alternatives to impoundment. Coss, 87 Wash. App. at 899-
900, 943 P.2d at 1130 (impoundment improper where officer failed to
consider alternatives to impoundment; a validly licensed passenger
could have driven vehicle from scene of traffic stop). See also State v.
Reynoso, 41 Wash. App. 113, 119-20, 702 P.2d 1222, 1225-26 (1985)
(impoundment under WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.435 (1987) for
commission of certain offenses is not mandatory).
5.27(d) Warrantless Detention
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by
deflating its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a
suspect. State v. Burgess, 43 Wash. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948, 952
(1986). In Burgess, the court held that because the detention was
unaccompanied by an exploratory search, the detention was reasonably
restricted in time and place and was necessary to prevent the suspect's
flight from the scene. Id.
5.28 Inventory Searches of Impounded Vehicles
Following the lawful impounding of a vehicle, the inventory
exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to conduct a
warrantless search of the car. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 745 (1987) (inventory
searches are a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State
v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 765-67, 958 P.2d 982, 984-85 (1998)
(limiting scope of inventory search to those areas necessary to fulfill its
purpose). Routine inventory searches are reasonable under the Fourth
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Amendment when police follow standard practices and the search is
not a pretext for obtaining evidence the police otherwise would not be
able to obtain. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-76, 96
S. Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1008 (1976); State v. White, 83
Wash. App. 770, 774-75, 924 P.2d 55, 57 (1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
Washington courts have long held that a noninvestigatory inventory
search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for
the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during
detention property belonging to a detained person; [and] (2)
protecting police and temporary storage bailees from liability due to
dishonest claims of theft.
State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1980);
White, 83 Wash. App. at 777-75, 924 P.2d at 58. Cf. State v. Mireles,
73 Wash. App. 605, 612, 871 P.2d 162, 166 (1994) (routine inventory
search by Department of Social and Health Services did not violate
owner's Fourth Amendment rights; truck was seized to enforce lien for
owner's unpaid child support; search followed written standardized
inventory procedures).
The scope of an inventory search is limited "to those areas
necessary to fulfill its purpose," that is, "limited to protecting against
substantial risks to property. . . ." Houser, 95 Wash. 2d at 155, 622
P.2d at 1226. For example, in Washington, police may not open and
examine a locked trunk "absent a manifest necessity for conducting
such a search." Id. at 156, 622 P.2d at 1226 (no great danger of theft
to property left in trunk). Moreover, police may not open luggage
located in an impounded vehicle absent consent or exigent circum-
stances. Id. at 158, 622 P.2d at 1227-28. Police conducting an
inventory search of a validly impounded vehicle may not search a
locked trunk despite the fact that the trunk could be opened by a
switch located inside the passenger compartment. White, 135 Wash.
2d at 265-67, 958 P.2d at 984-86.
In State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984),
the court suggested that the owner's consent must be obtained before
police may conduct an inventory search of an impounded vehicle
pursuant to the community caretaking function. Id. at 743, 689 P.2d
at 1071. However, an inventory search of a vehicle impounded
pursuant to the community caretaking function without the owner's
consent was held to be valid in State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226,
721 P.2d 560 (1986). In Sweet, the owner was unconscious and unable
to either give or withhold his consent; there was also no evidence
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suggesting that the search was conducted in bad faith or that it was a
mere pretext for an investigatory search. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d at 566.
5.29 Warrantless Vehicle Searches: Medical Emergencies
Police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or to seek
information about a person in distress. United States v. Haley, 581
F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.5,
at 169 (3d ed. 1996).
5.30 Warrantless Searches in Special Environments
Warrantless searches have been permitted in special environments
when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion
small. Thus, warrantless magnetometer (metal detector) searches are
permitted at airports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (Sth Cir. 1973). Similarly,
brief stops are permitted at courthouses to prevent bombings. Downing
v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972).
At the same time, the Washington Supreme Court has rejected as
unconstitutional the warrantless pat-down of patrons at rock concerts.
Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 673-74, 658 P.2d 653, 656
(1983). The searches are distinguishable from the airport and court-
house searches because the dangers posed by the violence at rock
concerts are substantially less than those posed by bombings and
hijackings and because pat-down searches constitute a higher degree of
intrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse searches. Id.
For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special environ-
ments, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 6.1 (schools), 6.2
(prisons and jails), 6.3 (borders) (3d ed. 1996).
5.31 Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Objects in the
Public and Private Mails
First-class mail and packages transported by private carriers may
be seized when law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe
that the mail or packages contain contraband. United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 1031-32, 25 L. Ed. 2d
282, 282 (1970). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121-
22, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1660-61, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 99 (1984). The
contents of such mail or packages may not be examined without a
warrant, however, unless the reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents no longer exists or the examination consists of a test that will
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only disclose the presence of the contraband. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
121-22, 104 S. Ct. at 1660-61, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 99; State v. Wolohan,
23 Wash. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421, 425 (1979).
A canine sniff may be used to establish probable cause that a
package lawfully held by police contains contraband. State v. Jackson,
82 Wash. App. 594, 606, 918 P.2d 945, 952 (1996), review denied, 131
Wash. 2d 1006 (1997). See also State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724,
729, 723 P.2d 28, 31 (1986) (declining to adopt the blanket federal rule
that canine sniffs are never searches; suggesting article I, section 7
requires a case-by-case examination of the circumstances in order to
determine whether a canine sniff is a search).
CHAPTER 6: SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
6.0 Special Environments and Purposes: Searches and Seizures at
Schools, Prisons, and Borders; Administrative Searches and Seizures
This chapter discusses the differences in reasonable expectations
of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements at three special
environments: public schools, detention and correction facilities, and
the international border. The section also discusses special consider-
ations in administrative searches.
For a brief discussion of warrantless searches in airports,
courthouses, and public concerts, see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 10.6,
10.7 (3d ed. 1996).
6.1 Schools
Schools are considered a special environment in search and seizure
law and the usual burdens of proof and warrant requirements are
relaxed.
The reasonable suspicion standard and the balancing approach in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968),
have been used to justify the warrantless search of a student's purse by
a school official. New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325, 329-30, 105 S.
Ct. 733, 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 722 (1985). The special problem of
school discipline and the special environment of the school permit a
standard of proof less than probable cause. This is true even when the
intrusion is more substantial than a frisk and the object of the intrusion
is the discovery of evidence in violation of a school rule and not the
prevention of physical harm. Id. at 341-42, 105 S. Ct. at 742-43, 83
L. Ed. 2d at 734-35.
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The United States Supreme Court more recently has held that the
Fourth Amendment does not require school officials to have an
individualized suspicion before drug testing student athletes. Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396,
132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582 (1995).
Washington has recognized the school as a special environment
and, consequently, permits a search of a student's person based on less
than probable cause. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558
P.2d 781, 784 (1977). Using the Terry reasonable suspicion standard
and the balancing test articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 535, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 939 (1967), the
McKinnon court set forth several factors for determining the reason-
ableness of a search: "the child's age, history, and school record, the
prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the
search was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay,
and the probative value and reliability of the information used as a
justification for the search." McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, 558 P.2d
at 784 (citations omitted). However, because McKinnon was decided
under federal constitutional law, the continuing extent of its protection
is uncertain. It has clearly been overruled in the context of random,
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes, a practice which has been
upheld as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Vernonia
School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at
582.
Although the reduced standard of proof of reasonable suspicion
will justify the search of a student or his or her belongings, the school
still must have particularized suspicion with respect to each individual
searched. Kuehn v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594,
599, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985) (individualized suspicion required for
search of band members' luggage). But see Vernonia School Dist. 47J,
515 U.S. at 664, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582 (individual-
ized suspicion not required for drug testing of student athletes);
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8, 105 S. Ct. at 743 n.8, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735
n.8 (individualized suspicion may not be required). See generally 4
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11(b) (3d ed. 1996).
6.2 Prisons, Custodial Detention, and post-Conviction
Alternatives to Prison
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual's search and
seizure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of
proof required for intrusions, and the warrant requirements. This
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section will provide a sampling of some of the ways incarceration or
even conviction alone alters search and seizure protections.
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S. Ct. 3194,
3200-01, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 400-01 (1984). However, a convict
released- pending appeal does enjoy a limited expectation of privacy.
State v. Lucas, 56 Wash. App. 236, 241, 783 P.2d 121, 125 (1989).
Pretrial detainees, on the other hand, appear to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, for the government must show legitimate
reasons for instituting searches of their cells. See Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 590-91, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234-35, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438,
449-50 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-57, 99 S. Ct. 1861,
1882-84, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 479-80 (1979).
A convicted sex offender has only a minimal expectation of
privacy in personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for
blood testing without the defendant's consent. In re A, B, C, D, E,
121 Wash. 2d 80, 88-89, 847 P.2d 455, 458 (1993) (upholding
constitutionality of WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340 for both adult and
juvenile offenders); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340 (1996). Under
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (1996), the State may obtain blood
samples and perform DNA tests without the defendant's consent
following conviction. State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d
1076, 1089 (1993) (constitutionality upheld under Fourth Amend-
ment).
6.2(b) Levels of Proof
Neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is required for
searches of prisoners, pretrial detainees, or prison cells. See Bell, 441
U.S. at 555-60, 99 S. Ct. at 1882-85, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 479-82 (pretrial
detainees); State v. Baker, 28 Wash. App. 423, 424-25, 623 P.2d 1172,
1173 (1981) (prisoners).
A parolee does not have the same search and seizure protections
as an ordinary citizen, and, thus, police may search a parolee's vehicle
based only on a "well-founded" suspicion of criminal activity. State
v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116, 118 (1980).
Convicts released pending appeal are also subject to a warrantless
search if the police have a "well-founded" suspicion of a violation of
release conditions. Lucas, 56 Wash. App. at 241, 783 P.2d at 125.
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6.2(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial
detainees. See Block, 468 U.S. at 591, 104 S. Ct. at 3234-35, 82 L.
Ed. 2d at 449-50; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 521, 104 S. Ct. at 3200-01, 82
L. Ed. 2d at 402-03.
Warrants also are not required for searches of parolees, probation-
ers, work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for
their homes and effects. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-
77, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169-70, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 718-19 (1987) (neither
probable cause nor warrant required for search of probationer's home);
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929, 941-42
(1984); see also Lucas, 56 Wash. App. at 241, 783 P.2d at 125;
Coahran, 27 Wash. App. at 666, 620 P.2d at 118; State v. Simms, 10
Wash. App. 75, 85, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973).
6.2(d) Strip and Body Cavity Searches Following Custodial Arrest
for Minor Offenses
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed in part by
statute and administrative regulation. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 10.79.060-.110 (1996); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 289-02-020; 289-
16-100; 289-16-200 (1997). A defendant's state protections from a
strip search under article I, section 7 are coextensive with the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wash.
App. 897, 904, 894 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1995) (holding that WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.79.130(1)(a) is constitutional under article I, section 7 and
the Fourth Amendment, and that such searches are permissible where
they are supported by reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is conceal-
ing contraband that poses a threat to jail security). Probable cause and
a warrant are required for strip and body cavity searches conducted
prior to a detainee's first court appearance unless one of the following
occurs: (1) the detainee is charged with a violent offense; (2) the
detainee is charged with an offense involving escape, burglary, use of
a deadly weapon, or contraband; or (3) police possess a reasonable
suspicion that the detainee is concealing on his or her person contra-
band, weapons, or fruits or instrumentalities of crime. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 289-16-100; 289-16-200 (1997). Cf. State v. Brown, 33
Wash. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (strip search of
prisoner permitted after prisoner had contact with visitor); State v.
Hartzog, 96 Wash. 2d 383, 396-97, 635 P.2d 694, 701-02 (1981)
(holding visual and body cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal
institution for court appearance are permissible, and where the record
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fails to disclose that an inmate-defendant has undergone a body cavity
probe search immediately before leaving the penitentiary, a second
search at courthouse may also be imposed without a hearing to
determine its necessity).
6.3 Borders
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international
border fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but such
intrusions generally do not have to meet the strict levels of proof and
warrant requirements of ordinary searches and seizures. This section
will describe briefly some of the situations in which traditional proof
and warrant requirements have been relaxed.
6.3(a) Permanent Checkpoints: Illegal Aliens
Law enforcement officers may conduct routine brief questioning
of travelers at permanent checkpoints to identify illegal aliens provided
the intrusion does not exceed the scope of a Terry stop. United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1116, 1133 (1976). No warrant is required for such stops. See
id.
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens
Officers conducting roving patrols near borders must have a
reasonable suspicion, based on "specific articulable facts," that a
vehicle contains illegal aliens in order to stop the vehicle. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L. Ed.
2d 607, 618 (1975).
For a roving patrol to search a vehicle, reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle contains illegal aliens is insufficient; the officers must have
probable cause. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-
70, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2537-38, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 600-01 (1973).
6.3(c) Smuggling
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive
when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312, 87
L. Ed. 2d 381, 393 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of
alimentary canal smuggler may be detained for sixteen hours pending
bowel movement); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03, 103 S.
Ct. 1319, 1326-27, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 239-40 (1983) (officers who had
only reasonable suspicion that airport traveler was smuggling narcotics
could not detain traveler in a special room and seize his tickets and
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luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10, 103 S. Ct.
2637, 2645-46, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 122 (1983) (ninety-minute detention
of luggage at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement
officers had only reasonable suspicion of smuggling). But see United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 605, 616-17 (1985) (twenty-minute detention of suspect based
only on reasonable suspicion is permissible; Terry stop unconstitutional
in duration only when police do not act with due diligence, not at
expiration of any time period). However, a Washington case has held
that absent some independent legal justification, customs officers may
not conduct warrantless searches based on less than probable cause at
locations other than an actual border. See State v. Quick, 59 Wash.
App. 228, 232, 796 P.2d 764, 766 (1990).
6.4 Administrative Searches
Searches conducted for administrative purposes, whether or not
criminal prosecution is anticipated, are governed by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-93,
104 S. Ct. 641, 646-47, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483-84 (1984) (Fourth
Amendment applies to inspection of home that was partially damaged
by fire, even when purpose of inspection is to determine fire's origin
and no criminal conduct is suspected).
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory
program or has a purpose other than criminal prosecution does not
affect an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises
being searched. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29,
87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730-31, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 935 (1967) (search of home
for housing code violations); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46, 87
S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 947-48 (1967) (search of
commercial premises for fire code violations). Although a few
pervasively regulated industries are not permitted reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, the general rule is that the Fourth Amendment
protections apply to civil as well as criminal searches and to commer-
cial as well as residential premises. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820-21, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 311-12
(1978) (except for particular industries, such as those involving liquor
and firearms where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable administrative
searches of commercial premises); see also Clifford, 464 U.S. at 291,
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104 S. Ct. at 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 483; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 506, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 496 (1978).
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements
Warrants generally are required for administrative searches of
both private and commercial premises. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-
33, 545-46, 87 S. Ct. at 1732-33, 740-41, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 937-38, 947-
98. When the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement apply,
however, a warrant is unnecessary. See Clifford, 464 U.S. at 297-98,
104 S. Ct. at 646-47, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 483-84 (warrant not required for
entry onto premises when consent given or exigent circumstances
present: "[E]vidence of criminal activity . . . discovered during the
course of a valid administrative search . . . may be seized under the
'plain view' doctrine.") (citation omitted).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when
searches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictable
legislative schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598, 101 S.
Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 268-69 (1981). Such situations
are characterized by a substantial federal interest in inspection, as in
the case of hazardous industries, and by the necessity of a warrantless
inspection to enforce the legislative purpose. See id. at 598-99, 101 S.
Ct. at 2538-39, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 269 (Congressional scheme authorizing
warrantless inspections of mines found constitutional). In addition, the
scheme must prove to be an adequate substitute for a warrant by
imposing certainty and regularity in the inspections and by accommo-
dating special privacy concerns. Id. at 600-01, 101 S. Ct. at 2539, 69
L. Ed. 2d at 270.
Warrants are not always required for license, registration, and
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74 (1979)
(warrant required for random spot check of vehicles), with Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488,
110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 423 (1990) (holding that a highway sobriety
checkpoint program, under which all vehicles passing through the
checkpoint were stopped and examined for signs of intoxication, did
not violate the Fourth Amendment), and State v. Marchand, 104
Wash. 2d 434, 441, 706 P.2d 225, 228 (1985) (holding unconstitutional
a statute empowering state patrol officers to require the driver of any
motor vehicle being operated on any Washington highway to stop and
display his or her driver's license and/or to submit the vehicle to an
inspection to ascertain whether it complied with the minimum
equipment requirements).
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or
residential premises, law enforcement officers must either offer specific
proof of a violation, or show that "reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular [establishment]." Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320-21,
98 S. Ct. at 1824, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 316 (brackets in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct. at 1736, 18 L.
Ed. 2d at 941).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle
v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159, 162 (1981). Conclu-
sory statements are inadequate. Id.
When an administrative warrant is sought to determine the recent
cause of a fire, "fire officials need show only that a fire of undeter-
mined origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the
proposed search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the
fire victims' privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time." Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294, 104 S. Ct.
at 647, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
The constitutionality of vehicle spot checks depends in part upon
two factors: whether the purpose is satisfied by the procedure-that
is, whether spot checks are "a sufficiently productive mechanism to
justify the intrusion," and whether the checks do not involve the
"unconstrained exercise of discretion" by officers conducting the stops.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673-74; see
also Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at 439, 706 P.2d at 227. Where the
officers do not have unconstrained discretion, there is no constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S. Ct. at 2486, 110
L. Ed. 2d at 420-21 (holding that a highway sobriety checkpoint
program, under which all vehicles passing through the checkpoint were
stopped and examined for signs of intoxication, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
Since the Sitz case, the validity of Washington case law on the
issue of vehicle checkpoints prior to that decision has been imperiled.
Compare Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 47, 834 P.2d 73, 76
(1992) (upholding constitutionality of statute authorizing stops of
vehicles with license plates marked to indicate that the driver had
previously been cited for driving without a license; no particularized
suspicion required), with Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 460,
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755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (sobriety checkpoint program established
during holiday season that involved the warrantless stopping of all
oncoming motorists at checkpoints violated state and federal constitu-
tional guarantees against seizure without authority of law), and
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at 441, 706 P.2d at 228. Mesiani, in
particular, appears to be contradicted by the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Sitz.
As with the "area" warrants that authorize housing and fire code
inspections, see Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38, 87 S. Ct. at 1734-35, 18
L. Ed. 2d at 940-41; See, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S. Ct. at 1740, 18 L. Ed.
2d at 947, individualized suspicion is not necessarily required for spot
checks. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52, 110 S. Ct. at 2486, 110 L. Ed.
2d at 421; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed.
2d at 673-74. Furthermore, it is clear that under certain circumstances
and with certain procedures the Washington Constitution allows
vehicle spot checks. Compare Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at 441, 706
P.2d at 228 (procedures insufficient), with Yeager, 67 Wash. App. at
48, 834 P.2d at 77 (no unconstrained discretion).
CHAPTER 7: ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
7.0 Introduction
The exclusionary rule has traditionally provided that if a search
or seizure violates a person's Fourth Amendment rights, any evidence
found as a result of the search or seizure must be suppressed in the
criminal trial of that defendant. State v. Chaplin, 75 Wash. App. 460,
464-65, 879 P.2d 300, 303 (1994). When physical evidence must be
suppressed, testimony regarding that physical evidence must also be
suppressed if such testimony is the fruit of the unlawful search or
seizure. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.6, at 358 (3d ed. 1996); see, e.g.,
State v. Salinas, 121 Wash. 2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439, 442-43 (1993).
To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely
objection and have standing to object. See State v. Michaels, 60 Wash.
2d 638, 640-41, 374 P.2d 989, 990 (1962). The rule applies both to
federal and state violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1093
(1961).
Historically, the exclusionary rule has had several purposes: (1)
to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, id. at 656, 81 S. Ct. at
1692, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1090-91; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by
preventing courts from becoming accomplices to willful disobedience
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of the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. at 1694, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1092;
and (3) to sustain the public's belief that the government will not profit
from lawless behavior, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357,
94 S. Ct. 613, 624, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 576-77 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In 1984, the United States Supreme Court identified
deterrence of police misconduct as the principal justification for the
exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 3417, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 696 (1984). In fact, the Court declined
to employ the rule to demonstrate judicial integrity or to deter
magistrates from improper probable cause determinations. Id. at 917,
104 S. Ct. at 3417-18, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the
exclusion of evidence when compelled by the federal Constitution, state
law can compel the exclusion of evidence from state courts that federal
law would hold admissible in federal courts. See, e.g., State v.
Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980)
(recordings made in violation of Washington privacy statute, although
permitted under federal wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court
proceedings); see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.4(f) (State may
compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence from civil proceedings
even when federal Constitution does not require such exclusion).
The variations between the federal exclusionary rule and the state
rule are largely based on the difference in wording and intent between
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Crawley, 61 Wash. App. 29, 34, 808
P.2d 773, 776 (1991) (asserting State's emphasis on protecting
individual rights and assuring judicial integrity, not merely as remedial
measure for unconstitutional governmental action); State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 110-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071-72 (1982). Washington
has even recognized deterrence of legislative misconduct as a legitimate
purpose for excluding illegally obtained evidence. White, 97 Wash. 2d
at 112, 640 P.2d at 1072. Under the Fourth Amendment, the
application of the rule will depend largely on whether the exclusion of
evidence will deter future police misconduct; but, under article I,
section 7, the application of the rule focuses on protecting individual
rights and may even be automatic. Compare Crawley, 61 Wash. App.
at 35, 808 P.2d at 776, and White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640 P.2d
at 1071-72, with Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S. Ct. at 3418, 82 L. Ed.
2d at 695.
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7.1 Criticism of the Rule
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484
n.21, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047-48 n.21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1082 n.21
(1976); see generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2(a)-(f) (3d ed.
1996). The arguments for a broader rule and their counterarguments
include:
(1) Argument: The rule handcuffs the police, handicapping the
detection and prosecution of crime. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 1.2(a). Counterargument: The Fourth Amendment itself, not the
rule, has that effect. Id. When the amendment was adopted, that very
argument was rejected. See id. at 24. For citations to studies on the
effects of the exclusionary rule on felony prosecutions, see United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413 n.6,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 688 n.6 (1984).
(2) Argument: The rule aids only the guilty. 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2(a), at 24-29. Counterargument: Because
of the rule's deterrent effect, innocent persons are spared unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id.
(3) Argument: The rule does not deter. Id. § 1.2(b). Counter-
argument: After the rule's creation, there was a dramatic increase in
the number of warrant applications and the number of police academy
classes offering instruction on obtaining evidence in a manner that does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492, 96 S. Ct.
at 3051, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1086-87.
Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include providing
civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to knowing of
substantial violations, or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See
generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2(a)-(f). See also
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Feedback from the Fourth Amendment: Is the
Exclusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck?, 67 Ky. L.J.
1007 (1979) (suggesting remedy solely in tort, with damages paid either
through insurance or governmental reimbursement).
7.2 Limitations in the Application of the Rule
There are two general categories of exceptions to the exclusionary
rule: those based on the good faith of the police, and those based on
the nonsubstantive use of the illegally obtained evidence. Subsequent
sections will discuss additional limitations on the application of the rule
which pertain to: (1) the type of judicial proceeding, see 3 WAYNE R.
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LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT §§ 7.3, 7.4, at 508, 533 (3d ed. 1996); (2) the public or
private status of the party conducting the unlawful search and seizure,
see id. at §§ 7.5, 7.6; (3) the nexus between the unlawful search or
seizure and the evidence sought to be suppressed, see id. at §§ 7.7, 7.8;
and (4) the procedural requirements, see id. at §§ 7.9, 7.10.
7.2(a) Unlawful Searches and Seizures Conducted in Good Faith
The exclusionary rule does not apply in federal courts when
evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant
that is later found to be unsupported by probable cause. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419, 82 L. Ed.
2d 677, 696-97 (1984). "[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the
substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420, 82 L.
Ed. 2d at 698. Yet, Washington courts have repeatedly refused to
adopt the Leon good faith exception to search warrants violating the
state constitution. See State v. Crawley, 61 Wash. App. 29, 35, 808
P.2d 773, 776 (1991) (recognizing that Washington has not adopted a
"good faith" exception allowing admission of evidence obtained using
invalid search warrant); State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 212, 720
P.2d 838, 844 (1986) (declining to adopt "good faith" exception due to
the substantial basis required for probable cause); State v. Kelley, 52
Wash. App. 581, 587 n.2, 762 P.2d 20, 24 n.2 (1988).
Similarly, in federal courts evidence seized under the authority of
a technically invalid warrant may be admitted when the police
reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by
a valid warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88, 104
S. Ct. 3424, 3427-28, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 743 (1984). "Suppressing
evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical
corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made
will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was
designed to achieve." Id. at 990-91, 104 S. Ct. at 3429, 82 L. Ed. 2d
at 745.
Federal courts may also admit evidence obtained during a search
incident to an unlawful arrest when the arrest is made in good faith
reliance on an ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional.
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2633, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 343, 351 (1979). This good faith exception has its own
exception: the evidence is inadmissible when the ordinance at issue is
so similar to an ordinance or statute that previously was declared
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unconstitutional and as a consequence is "so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be
bound to see its flaws." Id. at 38, 99 S. Ct. at 2632, 61 L. Ed. 2d at
350.
Even if the unlawful arrest was based partly on a provision of a
statute that had not yet been construed to make it presumptively valid
at the time of the arrest, evidence obtained is inadmissible if the valid
section of the statute could not be enforced without incorporating the
grossly and "flagrantly unconstitutional" section. State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 104, 640 P.2d 1061, 1068 (1982).
However, the DeFillippo good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to claims brought under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640 P.2d
at 1070-72. Thus, when an arrest is made pursuant to an unlawful
statute, the good faith of police and the presumptive validity of the
statute at the time of arrest will not render the fruits of the arrest
admissible. Id. at 112, 640 P.2d at 1072 (recognizing that the
automatic application of the exclusionary rule "will add stability to the
rights of individual citizens, discourage the legislature from passing
provisions akin to [the unlawful statute], and will make law enforce-
ment more predictable").
7.2(b) Nonsubstantive Use of Illegally Seized Evidence
Illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a defendant's
direct testimony at trial even when the evidence is inadmissible in the
government's case-in-chief. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65,
74 S. Ct. 354, 356, 98 L. Ed. 503, 507 (1954). A defendant's
statements made in response to proper cross-examination are also
subject to impeachment by illegally obtained evidence that is inadmis-
sible as substantive evidence of guilt. United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 627-28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 566
(1980); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179-80, 622 P.2d 1199,
1206 (1980).
7.3 Applications of the Exclusionary Rule in Criminal
Proceedings Other Than Trials
7.3(a) Grand Jury Testimony
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence
derived from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 349-50, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620-21, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 572 (1974).
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The exclusionary rule is not applied to grand jury proceedings because
its application would have only a marginal deterrent effect. In
determining whether to employ the rule, the court weighs the deterrent
value of applying the rule against the costs of excluding the type of
evidence in question. Id. at 349, 94 S. Ct. at 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
7.3(b) Indictment
The rule does not apply to indictments based on illegally obtained
evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 S. Ct. 311,
318, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321, 329-30 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence,
even if it means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal
deterrent value. Id.; see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351, 94 S. Ct. at
621, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
7.3(c) Probable Cause Hearing
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed
the crime charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78
S. Ct. 1245, 1251, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 1511 (1958); State v. O'Neill, 103
Wash. 2d 853, 867-72, 700 P.2d 711, 719-21 (1985) (recordings by
federal agents made in a manner inconsistent with state law and, thus,
inadmissible at trial nevertheless may be used to furnish probable cause
for court-ordered search).
7.3(d) Bail Hearing
Several cases in other jurisdictions suggest that illegally seized
evidence may be suppressed at bail hearings. See Steigler v. Superior
Court, 252 A.2d 300, 305 (Del. 1969); State v. Tucker, 244 A.2d 353,
355 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968). This question has not been presented to
the Washington Supreme Court.
7.3(e) Sentencing
Before the establishment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
the exclusionary rule had only been applied in sentencing hearings
when the illegal search was conducted for the express purpose of
enhancing the sentence or improperly influencing the sentencing judge.
United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1981)
(remanding case for resentencing because judge abused his discretion
by excluding evidence given that the illegality of the search was based
on a technical error, not by an overextensive or inappropriate search);
United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1975)
(limiting exclusion of evidence when customs agent was not aware that
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defendant was a probationer or that evidence could be used for any
other purpose than the possession conviction); Verdugo v. United
States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 1968) (excluding evidence from
sentencing consideration when search conducted without a warrant was
"blatantly illegal," and the police need to be deterred). See also United
States v. Graves, 785 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Butler, 680 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d
1205 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 1970). See generally Michael K. Forde, The Exclusionary Rule at
Sentencing: New Life Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 379 (1996).
Since the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the majority
of jurisdictions have maintained that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in sentencing hearings. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Lynch,
934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321
(3d Cir. 1991); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir.
1991). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that the sentencing
Guidelines and Title 18, Section 3661 of the United States Code may
preclude the application of the Verdugo exception and may require that
all evidence be considered during sentencing. Kim, 25 F.3d at 1435-
36; see also Forde, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. at 388-92.
A small minority of jurisdictions have argued that the exclusionary
rule should apply at sentencing given the certainty of increased
punishment if illegally-seized evidence is considered under the
Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238-
40 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); United States v.
Gilmer, 811 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Colo. 1993); United States v. Rullo,
748 F. Supp. 36, 43-45 (D. Mass. 1990); see also Forde, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. at 392-401. Failure to invoke the exclusionary rule during the
expansive sentencing process would create a greater incentive for police
officers to illegally search for additional evidence in order to enhance
sentencing such that the "constitutional ban on unreasonable searches
and seizures will become a parchment barrier." Jewel, 947 F.2d at 240
(Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also Forde, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
at 408-09.
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which became
effective July 1, 1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary
decisions affecting sentencing. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010
(1996). Because the sentencing process is limited to the present
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conviction and the defendant's prior convictions, Washington does not
have the problems that exist under the federal guidelines.
7.3(f) Revocation of Conditional Release
There continues to be a split of authority on whether the
exclusionary rule extends to parole or probation revocation hearings.
Compare Vandemark, 522 F.2d at 1022 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusionary
rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings when officers
conducting search did not know and had no reason to believe suspect
was probationer), and Richardson v. State, 841 P.2d 603, 605-06 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1992) (rule does not apply to revocation hearings, but may
be applied in cases of particularly egregious misconduct), with United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir. 1978) (rule applies
to probation revocation).
Some courts have suggested that the exclusionary rule should
apply when the arresting officer knows that the victim is on conditional
release; otherwise, a zealous officer would have less incentive to obey
the Constitution knowing that illegally seizing the evidence could send
the parolee back to prison. See Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019. See
generally Workman, 585 F.2d 1205.
Washington courts are also divided on whether article I, section
7 of the Washington Constitution requires the application of the
exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings. State v. Murray,
110 Wash. 2d 706, 709, 757 P.2d 487, 488 (1988) (recognizing the
division and the uncertainty that exists around article I, section 7's
exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but not resolving the
uncertainty). Compare State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 194, 499
P.2d 49, 51 (1972), aff'd on other grounds, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d
1061 (1972) (evidence obtained in illegal search not applicable to
probation revocation proceedings), and State v. Proctor, 16 Wash. App.
865, 867, 559 P.2d 1363, 1364 (1977) (rule against illegal search only
applies in probation revocation proceedings if police, aware suspect is
on probation, act in bad faith in conducting search), with State v.
Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 232, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986)
(requiring application without exception to probation revocation
proceedings).
However, under article I, section 7 a parolee does have a
diminished right to privacy and a warrantless search of the parolee may
be made by a law enforcement officer with a well-founded suspicion
that a probation violation has occurred. Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at
235, 724 P.2d at 1096 (fact of parolee's flight, in light of officer's
knowledge, created a well-founded suspicion that a parole violation had
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occurred). See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.2(a), at 282 (3d ed.
1996).
7.3(g) Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding
The exclusionary rule does not require habeas corpus relief when
the State granted the defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate all
Fourth Amendment claims. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.
Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1067-68 (1976).
7.3(h) Perjury
Illegally seized evidence may be used to support a perjury
conviction. See United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976) (cautioning
against per se admissibility; suggesting that exclusion may sometimes
have deterrent effect).
7.4 Application of the Rule in Quasi-Criminal, Civil, and
Administrative Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has been applied in forfeiture proceedings,
requiring the suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove
the criminal violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L.
Ed. 2d 170 (1965); People v. Zimmerman, 358 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976). Yet, the further removed the proceeding is from a criminal
trial, the greater the disagreement in the applicability of the rule.
7.4(a) Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has generally been applied in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
30-31, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1967); In re
Marsh, 237 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1968); In re Robert T, 8 Cal. App.
3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37, 38 (1970). However, some courts have
recognized the inapplicability of the rule to juvenile dependency
proceedings based on the potential of harm to a child remaining in an
unhealthy environment. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App.
3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
7.4(b) Narcotics Addict Commitment Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has been applied in narcotics addict
commitment proceedings. See People v. Moore, 446 P.2d 800, 805
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(Cal. 1968), overruled on other grounds by People v. Thomas, 566 P.2d
228 (Cal. 1977); but see Conservatorship of Susan T, 884 P.2d 988,
996-97 (Cal. 1994) (rule not applicable to conservatorship proceedings
because of concern for individual's well-being and society's safety).
7.4(c) Civil Tax Proceedings
The exclusionary rule is not applied in civil tax proceedings when
state officials turn over illegally seized tax records to the IRS. United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-60, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3033-35, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1046, 1062-64 (1976). But see Pizzarello v. United States, 408
F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969) (tax assessment invalid if based substan-
tially on illegally obtained evidence). See generally 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.5(a)-(g) (3d ed. 1996).
Nor does the exclusionary rule apply when IRS agents violate
internal regulations as long as no constitutional or statutory rights are
infringed upon. United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430-31
(9th Cir. 1984) (involving seizure of documents by defendant's
coworker who was not acting as a government agent).
7.4(d) Administrative Proceedings
Most courts apply the exclusionary rule in administrative hearings
when the disposition is relatively significant and when application of
the rule is likely to deter unlawful searches and seizures. See
Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959)
(claimant's statement, taken while claimant under sedation and in
severe pain, admissible in worker's compensation hearing); see also New
Brunswick v. Speights, 384 A.2d 225, 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978) (policy
of deterring unlawful governmental conduct may be significant when
subsequent disciplinary hearing directed at police officer charged with
criminal violations was foreseeable at time of search or seizure);
Governing Bd. of Mountain View Sch. Dist. v. Metcalf, 111 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727-28 (1974) (recognizing rule may be applied in administrative
hearings, but holding that rule is not applicable in teacher dismissal
proceeding based on immoral conduct because primary purpose of
proceeding is to protect school children).
7.4(e) Legislative Hearings
Whether the exclusionary rule applies in a legislative hearing
depends on whether the evidence was seized with the intent to use it
at the hearing; if it was, then application of the rule will have some
significant deterrent value. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178,
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1194 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (when defendant is prosecuted for contempt of
Congress, court must exclude evidence derived from unlawful search
and seizure by congressional committee investigator); see also Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 205, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1188, 1 L. Ed. 2d
1273, 1294 (1957) ("Protected freedoms should not be placed in danger
in absence of clear determination by House or Senate that particular
inquiry is justified by specific legislative need.").
7.4(f) Private Litigation
The exclusionary rule is not applied in suits between private
parties. Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained illegally by state police when private parties seek to
introduce evidence in civil proceeding); Sackler v. Sackler, 203 N.E.2d
481, 482 (N.Y. 1964) (evidence of wife's adultery obtained by illegal
entry into wife's home by husband and private investigators admissible
in divorce action). Even evidence illegally seized by the government
may be introduced into a private proceeding, as exclusion would have
little deterrent value because the State is not a party to the proceeding
and would have nothing to gain from a Fourth Amendment violation.
Honeycutt, 510 F.2d at 348.
States, however, may rely on their own laws to bar the use ofillegally seized evidence in private litigation, and, thereby, promote the
following policies: (1) depriving transgressors of the fruits of their
wrongs; (2) deterring lawless behavior; and (3) discouraging violence.
See Kassner v. Frement Mut. Ins. Co., 209 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1973) (unlawful search of premises destroyed by fire represents
significant invasion of privacy; thus, evidence seized as result of search
not admissible in civil case); Hans W. Bade, Illegally Obtained Evidence
in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of a Classic
Mismatch, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1325, 1353 (1973). The issue has not
been reviewed under the Washington State Constitution.
7.5 Application of the Rule to Searches by Private Individuals:
General Principle
Because the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on the government
only, federal courts do not exclude the fruits of a private search.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576, 65 L. Ed.
1048, 1051 (1921) (papers obtained through theft by private individual
and delivered to federal prosecutors admissible against defendant); see
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658, 80
L. Ed. 2d 85, 96 (1984) (a private freight carrier notified government
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agents that damaged package contained white powdery substance;
information held admissible, for "when an individual reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will
reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs[,] the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that
information.").
Washington Constitution article I, section 7 does not apply to
searches by private citizens acting on their own initiative. State v.
Clark, 48 Wash. App. 850, 855, 743 P.2d 822, 826 (1987). The
protection from private searches afforded by article I, section 7 is, thus,
coextensive with the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Dold, 44 Wash. App. 519, 524-25, 722 P.2d 1353, 1357
(1986). The fact that the person conducting the search may be a
public employee does not lend an element of state action to the search
if the search is not related to the employee's official duties and is
undertaken solely in his capacity as private citizen. State v. Ludvik, 40
Wash. App. 257, 263, 698 P.2d 1064, 1068 (1985) (state game warden,
residing across the street from defendant, observed suspected drug
transactions and informed police). But see State v. Faford, 128 Wash.
2d 476, 910 P.2d 447 (1996).
When a private party acting independently of the government
conducts a search and delivers the material to the police, neither the
Fourth Amendment, nor article I, section 7 require the police to obtain
a search warrant before examining the material so long as the
government search does not exceed the scope of that previously
conducted by the private party. In re Teddington, 116 Wash. 2d 761,
766, 808 P.2d 156, 158 (1991) (no violation when sergeant inventoried
defendant's locker after soldier was arrested for murder and turned
over incriminating letter to police); State v. Walter, 66 Wash. App.
862, 866, 833 P.2d 440, 443 (1992) (no violation when photo lab turns
pictures over to police); State v. Bishop, 43 Wash. App. 17, 20, 714
P.2d 1199, 1200 (1986) (no violation when police re-opened packets
and tested substance which was found by private security guard in the
telephone mouthpiece of defendant's hospital room); Dold, 44 Wash.
App. at 522, 722 P.2d at 1355 (police investigation of defendant based
on receipt of a letter addressed to defendant, but delivered to a private
party who forwarded it to police). Cf. Kuehn v. Renton School Dist.
No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985) (when
private person acts under authority of state, Fourth Amendment
applies; thus, lawfulness of school search of students' luggage is not
dependent upon whether person conducting search is band director,
principal, or parent); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 826, 787
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P.2d 932, 935, (1990) (recognizing "school search exception" for
teachers and when reasonably justified based on circumstances).
7.6 Searches by Private Individuals: Particular Applications
A private search becomes a state search if the private party acts
as an agent for the government or the two are engaged in a joint
endeavor. See State v. Clark, 48 Wash. App. 850, 743 P.2d 822
(1987). A private search may also be considered a state search when
the party conducting the search acts on behalf of the public or with the
purpose of aiding the government. See, e.g., In re Robert T, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970) (entry by deceit considered
government action when landlord introduced plainclothes officer as
companion in order to gain access to apartment to search for stolen
goods). A criminal defendant has the burden of proving that a private
citizen search was conducted as an agent or instrumentality of the state.
Clark, 48 Wash. App. at 856, 743 P.2d at 826. No agency relation-
ship exists unless the State actively encourages or instigates the
citizen's actions. See id. at 856-57, 743 P.2d at 826-27. Factors to be
considered include the State's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
search and whether the citizen's intent was to assist law enforcement
efforts or to further his or her own ends. State v. Clark, 48 Wash.
App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d 822, 826 (1987) (friend of defendant who had
entered into an immunity agreement in return for testimony was not
acting as agent of State when he turned over incriminating evidence
belonging to defendant to police).
A minority of jurisdictions hold that any illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible, regardless of who performed the unlawful act.
See Sackler v. Sackler, 203 N.E.2d 481, 484-86 (N.Y. 1964) (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting; Bergan J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
admissibility of evidence illegally obtained by a private person, see
Paul G. Reiter, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of
Evidence Obtained by Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553,
575-84 (1971).
7.6(a) Agency Theory
Under agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or
requested by a government officer. Thus, evidence is admissible when
obtained as a consequence of postal authorities' opening of a package
to see if the proper postage rate was paid, but is inadmissible when the
postal authorities open the package upon the request of a police officer
seeking evidence. United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Dembo, 301 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1973); State v. Blackshear,
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511 P.2d 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (DEA agent's removal of plastic
bags from rubber tubing inside damaged package and agent's visual
inspection of contents enabled him to learn nothing more than had
been learned from private search conducted earlier by private courier
employees who called DEA after observing white powdery substance);
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1949). See New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S. Ct. 733, 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720,
731 (1985) (school officials act as representatives of the State, not as
surrogates for parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity
from Fourth Amendment strictures); see also United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984).
7.6(b) Joint Endeavor Theory
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a
citizen on a search it becomes a government search. State v. Scrotsky,
189 A.2d 23, 25-26 (N.J. 1963). "It is immaterial whether the official
originates the idea, or simply joins the search while it is in progress."
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374, 93 L.
Ed. 1819, 1823 (1949). Tacit governmental approval of a private entry
may also convert a private search into state action. State v. Becich, 509
P.2d 1232, 1234 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
A search is private, however, if it is undertaken in direct
contravention to police instructions. United States v. Maxwell, 484
F.2d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1973). And even if the police are sum-
moned before the search begins and are present as it occurs, the search
may still be considered private if a private purpose is served. United
States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin discovered
by airline agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner is
admissible even when officer was present during search); see also
United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (allegedly obscene
books discovered by shipping manager and delivered to FBI admissi-
ble); Berger v. State, 257 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (contraband
discovered in briefcase by hotel manager and security personnel
admissible because purpose of search was to determine owner of lost
or misplaced property admissible); cf. Corngold v. United States, 367
F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1966) (contraband discovered by airline agents
inadmissible when government agents actively joined in search).
7.6(c) Public Function Theory
Evidence obtained by store detectives, security officers, and
insurance investigators is generally admissible. See United States v.
Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 121 (D.C. 1980); Reiter, Annotation, 36
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A.L.R.3d at 567-71. Searches by off-duty police officers are consid-
ered private if the officers acted as private citizens and if the search or
seizure was unconnected with their duties as police officers. People v.
Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920-21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (1976)
(deputy sheriff acted as private citizen when he notified law enforce-
ment officials of defendant's marijuana plants).
But when a private party acts as a police officer, has a strong
interest in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and seizure
law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppression
and the rule will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 383 A.2d 838,
842 (Pa. 1978) (off-duty police officer considered acting as government
agent when he trespassed, seized suspicious-looking package from car,
and handed package over to police); Stapleton v. Super. Ct., 447 P.2d
967, 970 (Cal. 1968) (police participation in planning car search that
was conducted by credit card agent marked subsequent actions of agent
with imprimatur of state action).
For examples of private action constituting state action in contexts
other than search and seizure cases, see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265 (1946).
7.6(d) Ratified Intent and Judicial Action Theory
A majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence is
seized to aid the government and when the government had prior
knowledge that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action
is transferred to the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505
F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims
allowed into evidence because defendant failed to prove that federal
investigators knew nurse had illegally copied records for government
use).
7.7 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: General Rule
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search or seizure
may be suppressed depends on the extent to which the evidence
derives from exploitation of the illegality. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct.
182, 183, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920) (when police unlawfully seized
documents, made copies of the documents, and returned the originals,
the copies were inadmissible); State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 559
P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v. Williams,
102 Wash. 2d 733, 741 n.5, 689 P.2d 1065, 1070 n.5 (1984). The
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following sections discuss three tests that have been used to determine
whether a given piece of evidence constitutes "fruit of the poisonous
tree" that should be suppressed. See generally 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.4 (3d ed. 1996).
7.7(a) Attenuation Test
The attenuation test suggests that at some point the taint of
evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression. That point
arises when the detrimental consequences of the illegal police action
becomes so attenuated that the deterrent effect on the exclusionary rule
no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09, 95
S. Ct. 2254, 2264-65, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 430-31 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 213, 687 P.2d 861, 868
(1984). For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly
after the defendant emerged from his apartment building and got into
a car. When the defendant refused to identify from which apartment
unit he had exited, police seized the defendant's keys from the car,
entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of
the apartments. The police then entered the apartment, observed
evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized the evidence
pursuant to a warrant. Reid, 38 Wash. App. at 205-09, 687 P.2d at
864-66. The court reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the keys
was unlawful, the evidence taken from the apartment would be
admissible because the seizure of the evidence "was so attenuated that
the taint of the seizure of the keys had dissipated." Id. at 208-09, 687
P.2d at 865-66 ("[B]ystanders had identified the door through which
the defendant had often entered and exited. [Thus,] [t]he keys were
not utilized in the manner of a divining rod to locate [the defendant's]
apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the] residence and to
confirm from which door the defendant had exited.").
One commentator has suggested the following criteria for
establishing whether the fruit of the unlawful search or seizure is too
attenuated to be suppressible.
(1)
[T]he chain between the challenged evidence and the primary
illegality is long or the linkage can be shown only by "sophisticated
argument". . . . In such a case it is highly unlikely that the police
officers foresaw the challenged evidence as a probable product of
their illegality; thus [the discovery of the evidence would] not have
been a motivating force behind [the search].
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Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1148-49 (1967). Consequently, the threat
of exclusion would not operate as a deterrent.
(2) When the evidence "is used for some relatively insignificant
or highly unusual purpose. Under these circumstances, it is not likely,
that, at the time the primary illegality was contemplated, the police
foresaw or were motivated by the potential use of the evidence and the
threat of exclusion would, therefore, effect no deterrence." Id. at 1149.
(3) When the unlawful police conduct is minimally offensive.
Because "the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter undesirable
police conduct, where that conduct is particularly offensive the
deterrence ought to be greater and . the scope of exclusion broader."
Id. at 1150-51.
7.7(b) Independent Source Test
When evidence has been obtained lawfully, the fact that police
also came by the evidence unlawfully does not make it suppressible.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377, 387-88 (1984); State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash. 2d 425, 429-30,
423 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) (when missing child found during unlawful
search of apartment, child's testimony admissible because she was not
discovered solely as result of unlawful search; witness had informed
police he knew where child was).
The case for admitting the evidence is stronger when the
independent source is known prior to the police illegality. United
States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1966) (testimony of witness
found on premises of gambling casino during illegal search admissible
when witness' identity as casino patron was previously learned from
observation by federal agents); see also United States v. Giglio, 263 F.2d
410, 413 (2d Cir. 1959).
Finally, when the unlawful search or seizure results in the police
only "focusing" their investigation on a particular individual, subse-
quently obtained evidence is not suppressible even if police would not
have been able to focus the investigation but for the illegality. United
States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (even when
evidence can be traced to leads resulting from illegal search, evidence
is admissible if government in fact learned of evidence from indepen-
dent source).
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7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Test
Evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police action is
admissible when the police inevitably would have obtained the
evidence lawfully. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L. Ed.
2d at 387-88; see also Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d
Cir. 1943); State v. Warner, 125 Wash. 2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479,
484 (1995) (relying on federal precedent); State v. Richman, 85 Wash.
App. 568, 570, 933 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1997) (applying inevitable
discovery rule after providing detailed state constitutional analysis
under Gunwall factors); Reid, 38 Wash. App. at 209 n.6, 687 P.2d at
866 n.6.
The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered
through lawful means. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L.
Ed. 2d at 387; Warner, 125 Wash. 2d at 888, 889 P.2d at 484.
Washington has recognized that "[a]bsolute inevitability of discovery
is not required[,] but simply a reasonable probability" that the evidence
would have been discovered from an untainted source. Warner, 125
Wash. 2d at 888, 889 P.2d at 484 (recognizing lengthy statute of
limitations for child rape increased likelihood of eventual discovery).
The inevitable discovery test applies even when the State cannot
show that the police acted in good faith in accelerating the discovery
of the evidence. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, 104 S. Ct. at 2510, 81 L. Ed.
2d at 388 (under inevitable or ultimate discovery exception to
exclusionary rule, prosecution is not required to prove absence of bad
faith). But see Richman, 85 Wash. App. at 570, 933 P.2d at 1090
(recognizing need to demonstrate that police did not act unreasonably
or attempt to accelerate discovery in addition to its inevitability). See
generally Robert F. Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 307, 315 (1964).
7.8 Particular Applications of the Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree Doctrine
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Generally, a court may admit a defendant's confession into
evidence consistent with the Fifth Amendment when the defendant
confessed voluntarily. However, when a confession is the fruit of an
illegal search or seizure, the court must also ensure that the distinct
policies of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied. Brown v. Illinois, 422
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U.S. 590, 600-03, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425-27
(1975). For example, a confession made immediately upon an illegal
entry and arrest is excludable, but when a suspect is released after an
illegal arrest and later returns to the police station to make a confes-
sion, the confession is admissible because its taint has dissipated.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 419, 9
L. Ed. 2d 441, 454 (1963).
The factors dissipating the taint of a confession are the following:
(1) the giving of Miranda warnings, although the warnings taken
alone do not constitute a per se break in the causality between
the illegality and the confession;
(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
(4) the purpose and egregiousness of the official misconduct.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-05, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428;
accord State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 559 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689
P.2d 1065 (1984); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110, 100
S. Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645 (1980); State v. Johnston, 38
Wash. App. 793, 800-01, 690 P.2d 591, 595 (1984).
When a person is detained, but not formally arrested, and the
detention is unlawful because probable cause is lacking, his or her
confession, if causally connected to the detention, is not admissible,
even though the person was first given Miranda warnings. Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259, 60 L. Ed.
2d 824, 839-40 (1979).
7.8(b) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search
Dissipation of the taint and the Brown factors do not apply to a
confession following an unlawful search as opposed to one following an
unlawful arrest because a suspect is more likely to confess as a result
of a search. People v. Robbins, 369 N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977). Thus, a confession is suppressible if it would not have been
made but for the illegal search. See State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92,
102-04, 640 P.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1982). But cf. United States v. Green,
523 F.2d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's admission allowed into
evidence when admission followed government agents' confronting
defendant with both legally and illegally seized products of search);
United States v. Trevino, 62 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (defen-
dant's admissions allowed into evidence even though they were result
of an illegal search; defendant testified at pretrial hearing that he
"probably would have" made admissions even in absence of search).
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7.8(c) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention
When a search is incident to an illegal arrest, the fruits of the
search are suppressible unless intervening factors, such as a valid
arrest, occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v.
Walker, 535 F.2d 896, 898 (Sth Cir. 1976).
A search following an illegal arrest may be purged of the taint by
voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the consent may
be determined by reference to the Brown factors, as outlined above in
§ 7.81(a). 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4(d), at 277 (3d ed.
1996). See State v. Fortier, 553 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Ariz. 1976); see also
State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975);
cf. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1, at 596.
Some courts have held that when the execution of a search warrant
has been preceded by an illegal arrest of the person who lives at the
place searched, the evidence derived from the illegal arrest is automati-
cally excluded. See, e.g., People v. Shuey, 533 P.2d 211, 222 (Cal.
1975). But see State v. Fenin, 381 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1977) (evidence of possession and of possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance is admissible although preceded by
illegal search because evidence was obtained pursuant to valid warrant
and not as the result of illegal search).
7.8(d) Search as Fruit of Illegal Search
When the issuance of a search warrant is based upon untainted
evidence, the fact that an illegal search took place prior to securing the
warrant will not invalidate the execution of the warrant and evidence
seized during the execution will be admissible. Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 814, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3391, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 614-15
(1984) (second search of home is not tainted by prior illegal entry).
Generally, warrants are considered valid if they could have been
issued based upon the untainted information in the affidavit. See
United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1977)
(when lawfully obtained evidence is sufficient to justify issuance of
warrant, the fact that officer might not have sought warrant but for
receipt of illegally obtained evidence does not require suppression of
fruits of search made pursuant to warrant); United States v. DiMuro,
540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d
884, 889 (6th Cir. 1972).
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7.8(e) Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search
If an arrest is based solely on information derived from an illegal
search, the arrest is tainted and void. Marchand, 564 F.2d at 1002; see
Sheffv. Florida, 329 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 1976).
7.8(f) Identification of Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Courts differ as to whether to exclude suspect identifications made
as a result of an illegal arrest exemplified by the following.
(1) Line-up identification. Courts have reached conflicting
conclusions on the suppression of line-up identifications resulting from
illegal arrests. Compare Commonwealth v. Garvin, 293 A.2d 33, 37-38
(Pa. 1972) (permissible to introduce line-up evidence obtained as result
of illegal arrest), with Garner v. Delaware, 314 A.2d 908, 912 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1973) (line-up evidence derived from illegal arrest suppress-
ible).
Some courts have used the Brown factors in determining whether
such identifications are admissible. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 365, 92 S. Ct. 1620, 1626, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 161 (1972)
(defendant may consent to line-up and, hence, break taint); State v.
McMahon, 568 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Ariz. 1977) (post-arrest discovery of
information connecting defendant with another crime dissipates taint
of illegal line-up if new information comes to light before line-up
occurs and illegal arrest is not made with intent to obtain line-up
evidence). Courts have also examined the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct. See generally 5 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 11.4(a)-(j).
(2) At-trial identification. When both the police officer's
knowledge of the accused's identity and the victim's independent
recollection of the accused antedate the unlawful arrest, an in-court
identification of the accused by the victim is untainted by either the
arrest or the pretrial identification arising therefrom. United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537,
547-48 (1980); State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 546-47, 688 P.2d
859, 864 (1984). Other factors to be considered in determining
whether the at-trial identification is admissible include:
(a) the witness' prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal
act;
(b) the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-line-up
description and the defendant's actual description;
(c) any identification of another person as the perpetrator prior to
the line-up;
[Vol. 22:337
1998 Search and Seizure
(d) the identification of the defendant by picture prior to the line-
up;
(e) the failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and
(f) the length of time between the alleged act and the line-up
identification.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1940, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 1149, 1165 (1967). Compare Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d
723, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (no taint), with Garner, 314 A.2d at 912
(Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (in-court identification inadmissible when based
solely upon line-up identification that was result of illegal arrest), and
In re Woods, 314 N.E.2d 606, 611 (I11. App. Ct. 1974) (six-month
lapse between identification that was result of illegal arrest and in-court
identification insufficient to purge the primary taint).
When police have made flagrantly illegal arrests for the purpose
of securing identifications that otherwise could not have been obtained,
the identifications are inadmissible. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d
577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970).
(3) Photo identification. A photo identification produced by an
unlawful arrest is not admissible. Crews, 445 U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct.
at 1251, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 547-48. But see Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d
72, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photo identification not fruit of illegal
arrest when discovery of outstanding warrant was intervening
circumstance).
Courts have allowed photos taken during illegal arrests to be used
on subsequent occasions to connect suspects with additional, unrelated
crimes when the suspects were not originally arrested for the sole
purpose of acquiring the photo. See People v. Mclnnis, 494 P.2d 690,
693 (Cal. 1972) (use of photo identification permitted when illegal
arrest by law enforcement agency when (1) the arrest was made in good
faith, (2) the ultimate charge was wholly unrelated to the charge in the
illegal arrest, (3) a different agency pressed charges, and (4) there is no
evidence of exploitation of the original arrest); cf. People v. Pettis, 298
N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (testimony identifying defendant
as perpetrator of offense admissible, even though photo was taken after
illegal arrest for unrelated offense).
(4) Fingerprints. Fingerprints must be suppressed when the
unlawful arrest was for the purpose of obtaining and using the
fingerprints for prosecuting the suspect for the crime that he or she
was arrested for. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct.
1394, 1397-98, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681 (1969). See also Paulson v.
Florida, 257 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (because police
did not arrest defendant for sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints,
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
fingerprints obtained from arrest for public drunkenness not suppress-
ible at trial for grand larceny).
7.8(g) Identification of Property as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony concerning an object seized during an illegal search is
inadmissible when the identification of the object is established by use
of the illegally seized object. People v. Dowdy, 50 Cal. App. 3d 180,
187, 123 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1975).
7.8(h) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently for
purposes of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 277-79, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1061-62, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 278-79
(1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an exercise of free-will, and
the costs of excluding the evidence are great. Consequently, the ability
to suppress a derivative witness's testimony depends on several of the
following factors:
(1) whether the witness testified freely, see United States v.
Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony by illegal aliens
obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible because testimony was
prompted by government statements concerning future prosecution);
(2) whether the physical fruits of the illegal search were used in
questioning the witness, see Ohio v. Rogers, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (Ohio
Ct. of Common Pleas 1963) (testimony about gun suppressed because
witness would not have been questioned about gun but for unlawful
search);
(3) whether the search and testimony were close in time, see
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-78, 98 S. Ct. at 1061, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 277-
78;
(4) whether the witness' identity and location were known before
the search, see State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash. 2d 425, 429-30, 423 P.2d
530, 533 (1967) (when parents had sought help from police, police
questioned boy, and boy stated girl was in apartment; girl's testimony
admissible although girl was found in apartment during illegal search);
and
(5) whether the search was made with the intent to find witness-
es, see People v. Martin, 46 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ill. 1942) (testimony of
witnesses suppressed when witness' names obtained from papers found
during illegal search of defendant's premises); see generally Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268.
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7.8(i) Crime Committed in Response to Illegal Arrest or Search
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or
attack an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. United
States v. Perdiz, 256 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); State v.
Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. 125, 132, 665 P.2d 443, 447 (1983). Thus,
evidence of a suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop has
been considered sufficiently distinguishable from the intrusion to be
admissible at trial. State v. Owens, 39 Wash. App. 130, 135, 692 P.2d
850, 853 (1984).
The rationale for admitting the evidence is that acts of free will
purge the taint; thus, the application of the exclusionary rule would
only marginally further deterrence. In addition, exclusion would
permit persons unlawfully arrested to assault officers without risk of
criminal liability. Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. at 132-33, 665 P.2d at
447-48. Yet, the evidence would be inadmissible if it were the product
of questionable police action. See People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872
(N.Y. 1975) (without identifying themselves, three officers encircled
defendant; evidence of defendant pulling gun inadmissible).
7.9 Waiver or Forfeiture of Objection
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional
objection and, thus, render the objectionable evidence admissible. A
waiver can be made in several ways, including: (1) failure to make a
timely objection, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 598 (3d ed.
1996); (2) defendant's testimony at trial about the evidence, see id. at
§ 7.9(b); and, (3) entry of a guilty plea, see id. at § 7.9(c).
7.9(a) Failure to Make Timely Objection
Jurisdictions have their own rules for what constitutes a timely
objection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant's failure
to object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the error
if the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure
prior to the hearing. See WASH. CR.R. 4.5(d). The defendant's
failure to object at trial will constitute a waiver unless the illegality "is
of such a flagrant or prejudicial nature that any curative measure would
have been futile." State v. Van Auken, 77 Wash. 2d 136, 143, 460
P.2d 277, 282 (1969).
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7.9(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence
A defendant may not raise a Fourth Amendment claim on appeal
challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a timely
objection, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the
possession of that evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wash. App. 58, 67,
516 P.2d 788, 793 (1973); Jones v. Texas, 484 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972). A claim may be raised, however, if the defendant's
testimony was induced by the erroneous admission of the evidence.
See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224-25, 88 S. Ct. 2008,
2011, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, 1052-53 (1968); Peele, 10 Wash. App. at 67-
68, 516 P.2d at 794. The rationale for the general rule is that the
testimony may make the admission of the illegal evidence harmless
error. See Peele, 10 Wash. App. at 66, 516 P.2d at 793; see also LaRue
v. State, 224 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 7.10.
7.9(c) Guilty Plea
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty
plea may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth
Amendment grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to
suppress in advance of the plea. Sanders v. Craven, 488 F.2d 478, 479
(9th Cir. 1973); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct.
1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243 (1973). Because the conviction is
based on the plea, the defendant cannot directly challenge the evidence.
See Sanders, 488 F.2d at 479. But if the plea itself can be character-
ized as the fruit of illegally obtained evidence and, consequently,
should have been suppressed upon the defendant's timely motion, then
the plea was not entered voluntarily or knowingly. The defendant in
such a case is permitted to go to trial and, if convicted, to appeal the
admission of the evidence. See L.A. Bradshaw, Annotation, Plea of
Guilty as Waiver of Claim of Unlawful Search and Seizure, 20
A.L.R.3d 724, 732-35 (1968).
7.10 Harmless Error
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have
been convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d
329, 352-53, 610 P.2d 869, 883 (1980); State v. Flicks, 91 Wash. 2d
391, 396, 588 P.2d 1328, 1332 (1979).
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CONCLUSION
Since this Survey was first published by Justice Robert F. Utter
in 1985, search and seizure law in Washington State has undergone
both minor modifications and major revisions. The Washington
Supreme Court's action in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720
P.2d 808 (1986), set forth the minimum matters that must be
considered in making arguments under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. The court's refusal to consider arguments
that do not address the Gunwall factors, as discussed in State v.
Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), stresses the court's
continuing insistence on quality legal thought, briefing, and argument
by the lawyers appearing before the court.
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and consid-
ered are likely to remain much the same. An attempt has been made
to expand upon basic issues by referencing additional and more recent
Washington search and seizure cases. While this Survey is not
comprehensive and will require continuous updating, it will hopefully
continue to be a useful tool for practitioners and judges who must
assess the scope of protection that the Washington Constitution and
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SUBJECT INDEX'
References are to section numbers.
ABANDONED PERSONAL
EFFECTS





See also: Warrantless Searches;
Inspection of Fire Scenes
Automobile spot check, 1.4(b),
5.24
Generally, 6.4









Aid to observation, 5.8











Oath or affirmation, 3.3(a)
Oral testimony or oral warrants,
3.3(c)
AFFIRMATION











See also: Warrantless Arrest
Booking and crime charged,
4.5(b)




Terry stop distinguished, 4.6
Use of force, 4.5(a)
Warrantless for felony, 4.3(a)
* The Seattle University Law Review would like to thank Bob Menanteaux, our reference
librarian, for compiling this index.
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Expectation of privacy, 1.3(g)
BINOCULARS
Aid to observation, 5.8
BLOOD SAMPLE
Consent implied by driving
vehicle, 5.15
Expectation of privacy, 1.3(f)
Probable cause, 3.13(b)
Search incident to arrest, 5.2(a)
BODILY INTRUSIONS
Exigent circumstances, 5.18(a)
Prisoners or pre-trial detainees,
6.2(d)
Probable cause, 2.9(c), 3.13(b)




Roving patrols, vehicle search,
6.3(b)




See: Stop and Frisk
BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL PREMISES














Seizure of person triggered by,
1.4(d)
COMMERCIAL PREMISES
See: Business and Commercial
Premises
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COMMON AUTHORITY
STANDARD
See: Consent searches, third
party
COMMUNITY LIVING RULE
See: Expectation of Privacy
CONSENT
Determinative as to arrest,
1.4(a)
CONSENT SEARCHES




Landlord, lessor, or manager,
5.14(e)
Maturity, sophistication, mental
or emotional state, 5.12(e)
Police claim of authority,
5.12(a)
Police deception as to identity
or purpose, 5.12(g)
Prior cooperation or refusal to
cooperate, 5.12(f)
Prior illegal police action
tainting consent, 5.12(d)
Scope of consent, 5.13












Host or guest, 5.14(i)
Hotel employee, 5.14(h)
Spouse, 5.14(a)





See also: Expectation of Privacy;







Search incident to arrest, 5.1 (b),
5.2(b)
Within vehicle,
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DETENTION

















Consent to search by, 5.14(g)
ENHANCEMENT DEVICES
Aid to observation, 5.8
Eavesdropping, 5.9(a)
EXCLUSIONARY RULE










Good faith reliance, 7.2(a)





Limitations on the application
of the rule, 7.2
Narcotic addict commitment
proceedings, 7.4(b)








Joint endeavor theory, 7.6(b)
Public function theory, 7.6(c)
Ratified intent and judicial
action theory, 7.6(d)







Detention of persons incidental
to premises search, 3.8(b)
Nonconsensual entry, 3.7(a)









Searches of persons incidental to
premises search, 3.8(a)
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Seized property, receipt and
inventory, 3.11














Premises search, search of











Community living rule, 1.3(a)







Mobile motor home, 1.3(a)
Observable activity as
relinquishing, 1.3(a)
Open fields, wooded areas, etc.,
1.3(c)
Open view and plain view, 5.6
Personal characteristics, 1.3(f)











See: Stop and Frisk
FINGERNAIL SCRAPING
Expectation of privacy, 1.3(f)
FIRE SCENES
See: Inspection of Fire Scenes
FLASHLIGHT
Aid to observation, 5.8
FORFEITURE OF
OBJECTION
See: Waiver of Objection
FRISK
See: Stop and Frisk
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS
TREE
Attenuation test, 7.7(a)
Arrest as fruit of illegal search,
7.8(e)
Confession as fruit of illegal
arrest, 7.8(a)
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Confession as fruit of illegal
search, 7.8(b)
Crime committed in response to
illegal arrest or search, 7.8(i)
Generally, 7.7
Identification of property as
fruit of illegal search, 7.8(g)
Identification of suspect as fruit
of illegal arrest, 7.8(f)
Independent source test, 7.7(b)
Inevitable discovery test, 7.7(c)
Search as fruit of illegal arrest
or detention, 7.8(c)
Search as fruit of illegal search,
7.8(d)
Testimony of witness as fruit of
illegal search, 7.8(h)
FURTIVE GESTURES


















Consent to search by employee,
5.14(h)




















See: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
INDIVIDUALIZED
SUSPICION





Fruit of the poisonous tree,
7.7(c)
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Administrative searches, level of
proof requirement, 6.4(c)
Warrantless entry resulting








Post detention search, 5.4(b)
Searches of, without probable
cause, 2.9(a)
JOINT OCCUPANT
Consent to search, 5.14(d)
JUDGES
See: Neutral and Detached
Magistrate
JURISDICTION












See: Execution of Search
Warrants, notice of authority
requirement
KNOCK AND WAIT RULE
See: Execution of Search
Warrants, notice of authority
requirement
LANDLORD
Consent to search, 5.14(e)
MAILS















Seattle University Law Review
NONSUSPECT




See: Execution of Search
Warrants
OATH











See: Plain View, Smell, and
Hearing
OUTBUILDINGS














Expectation of privacy, 1.3(f)
PERSONAL PRIVACY
INTEREST
Expectation of arrestee, 5.2(a)
Generally, 1.6
PLAIN HEARING
See: Plain View, Smell, and
Hearing
PLAIN SMELL














Odor as probable cause, 2.4(b)
Plain view and open view
distinguished, 5.6
Probable cause resulting from,
2.4(b)
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Protected area,
Curtilage, 5.7(c)
Seizure of object, 5.7(b)
Seizure of unnamed items, 3.10
Smell, generally, 5.9(b)
POISONOUS TREE
See: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
POLICE
See also: Expertise of Officer
Business premises, investigative
entry, 1.3(d)
Plain view doctrine, 5.7(a)(1)
Police information, multiple
hearsay, 2.7(b)
Seizure of unnamed items, 3.10
PREMISES
See also: Business and
Commercial Premises;
Inspection of Fire Scenes;
Expectation of Privacy
Adjoining lands,




Buildings in curtilage, open to
public by implication, 1.3(b)
Circumstances of warrantless
arrest, 4.2








Expectation of privacy, 1.3(a)
Pre-Katz, 1.3(b)









Expectation of privacy, 1.3(h),
6.2(a)




See: Expectation of Privacy
PRIVATE PAPERS





Association, persons and places,
2.4(c)
Bodily intrusions, 2.9(c)




First hand observation, stolen
property, 2.4(a)


























Prior arrests and convictions,
2.3(b)
Quantum of evidence required
to establish, 2.2(b)
Response to questioning, 2.4(e)
Search and arrest compared, 2.1
Terry stop and frisk, 2.9(b)
Totality of the circumstances
standard, 2.5











See: Stop and Frisk
QUESTIONING




See: Stop and Frisk
REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
























Strip or body cavity search,
6.2(d)
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SEARCH WARRANTS
See also: Affidavit for Search







Description of place or target,
generally, 3.4
Generally, 3.0












Time of execution, 3.6
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
See: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
SEIZURE
See also: Arrest; Protected Areas
and Interests; Warrantless
Searches
Civil offense, of person, 1.4(d)
Person,



























Detention of persons within
suspect's proximity, 4.8(b)
Factual basis and individualized
suspicion, reasonable belief
standard, 4.7(a)
"Fellow officer" rule, 4.7(b)
Frisk, grounds for, 4.10
Frisk of persons in suspect's
proximity, 4.10(b)
Generally, 4.6






Nature of the offense, 4.7(c)
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Reasonable belief standard,
4.7(d)






Terry stop, Washington law,
4.7(d)
STORE
See: Business and Commercial
Premises; Premises
STREET ENCOUNTERS











Aid to observation, 5.8
TERRY STOP





Search incident to arrest, 5.1(a)
USELESS GESTURE
EXCEPTION
See: Execution of Search
Warrants, notice of authority
requirement
VEHICLES
See also: Execution of Search
Warrants, scope and intensity
of search








Personal privacy interest, 1.6
Scope of warrantless search,
5.22(c)
Search and seizure, 5.22
Exigency removed, 5.22(b)

































See: Plain View, Smell, and
Hearing
WAIVER OF OBJECTION




























Premises search, search of
person in context of, 5.18(b)
Prior to arrest, 5.3
Prisoners or pre-trial detainees,
6.2(c)
Schools, 6.1






Scope of search, 5.22(c)
Subject of criminal activity,
5.25
WARRANTS







Personal privacy interest, 1.6
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